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1.1 Journey of Muslim Americans
This is a study of prejudice toward Muslim Americans and its implications for
American public opinion. I attempt to show that dislike of Muslim Americans is part
of a larger syndrome of prejudice in American public opinion. I name this generalized
prejudice the “Band of Others.” The band refers to the overall image of minority
groups in American minds. It highly benefits from the theory of ethnocentrism
that identifies prejudice as a broad process of simultaneously targeting all groups
rather than specific minorities. People who feel warmer toward blacks, Latinos,
Asians, Jews, homosexuals, illegal immigrants, people on welfare, and feminists also
feel less prejudiced toward Muslims. Dislike of Muslims goes hand in hand with
racism, Anti-semitism, xenophobia and homophobia. So, what matters the most
in explaining prejudice toward Muslim Americans is the presence or absence of a
welcoming attitude toward all minorities, or the band of others.
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There are many important theoretical and empirical reasons to study attitudes
toward Muslim Americans. First, arguably the most dramatic terrorist attack on
United States’ soil was carried out by radical Islamists on September 11, 2001.
To many, it was such a turning point in history that nothing would be the same
afterwards. Immediately and unexpectedly, attention on Muslim Americans was
everywhere in the media. A Lexis-Nexis search revealed that there have been only
a handful stories in the New York Times and the Washington Post without the
word “Muslim” since September 11, 2001. Within the same time period, there have
been at least nine issues of Time, Newsweek, and the Economist (combined) that
studied Muslim Americans as the cover stories. This unmatched attention of the
media indicates the growing salience and presence of Muslims in American public
opinion. This study aims to empirically examine the structure of these highly visible
attitudes toward Muslim Americans both before and after the attacks.
Second, most of the United States’ foreign policy issues concern areas of the
world where Muslims constitute the majority of the population. For example, fol-
lowing the terrorist attacks, the United States declared a “War on Terrorism,” and
the declaration mainly targeted countries like Afghanistan and Iraq. The most re-
cent wars fought by the United States were against countries with predominantly
Muslim populations. Additionally, the frequent involvement of the United States in
the Middle East conflict between Palestine and Israel is another foreign policy area
through which Muslims became highly salient in American public opinion. This one
particular minority group has been a major component of the United States’ foreign
affairs, particularly since the September 11 terrorist attacks. As a result, it may be
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essential to understand attitudes toward Muslims whose place in American foreign
policy is truly pivotal.
Third, Muslim Americans represent higher levels of assimilation into main-
stream society both among minorities in America and other Muslim minorities in
Europe. As Newsweek magazine (July 30, 2007, 3) claims, “Islam in America” is a
“success story.” What helps this assimilation the most is Muslim Americans’ socio-
demographic characteristics. According to the 2007 Pew Muslim American Survey,
one in four Muslim Americans, like the general American public, has a college or
advanced degree. Twenty-six percent of them earn more than $75,000 annually, and
forty-two percent of Muslim Americans think that their personal financial situation
is either excellent or good. These percentages look very similar to the ones for the
general American public. Muslim Americans’ integration can be better understood
if we compare, for example, the income disparities in Europe. According to the
2006 Pew surveys in advanced demcoracies, sixty-one percent of British Muslims
make less than £20,000 whereas it is only forty percent among the British general
public. Similarly, while three in four Spanish Muslims make less than ¤14,500, only
one in two among the mainstream Spanish population make this little. The most
striking income disparities between Muslim minorities and mainstream populations
are in Germany and France. More than one in two German Muslims make less than
¤18,000 whereas it is less than one in three mainstream Germans that make this
little. Similarly, according to the 2006 Pew survey in France, almost half of French
Muslims live under the poverty line but it is only twenty-five percent of the main-
stream French population that falls below the poverty line. Unlike these income
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disparities in Europe, Muslim Americans and the American general public have al-
most identical income distributions. In other words, Muslims in America mirror the
general public in terms of annual income. So, Muslim Americans have some dis-
tinguishing socio-demographic characteristics when compared to many other recent
immigrant groups in America (such as Latinos). As the 2007 Pew Report suggest,
Muslim Americans are mostly middle class and mainstream. Therefore, studying
prejudice toward a more mainstream looking minority may unveil whether having
middle class features can help Muslims eventually assimilate into mainstream Amer-
ican society.
Another important reason to study Muslim Americans is their increasing pres-
ence in the American political system. America elected her first Muslim Congress-
man Keith Ellison from Minnesota in 2006. His election was not without controversy.
In fact, there were many conservative politicians and media hosts that found him
taking his oath of office on the Koran that was once owned by Thomas Jefferson
unacceptable. For example, Virginia Rep. Virgil Goode called this a threat to
American values. Shortly after, André Carson was the second Muslim representa-
tive elected to serve in the House. He won the Democratic nomination in a special
election to succeed his late grandmother, Congresswoman Julia Carson, in 2008.
Then in the 2008 election, he was re-elected to serve his first full term in Congress.
Unlike Ellison’s case, Carson’s faith was not a central focus during the campaign or
after his election. In addition to two national office Muslim politicians, according
to the American Muslim Alliance report, there were around 10 state level Muslim
American politicians serving or re-running in 2008. Three Muslim Americans are
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now serving as mayors in Prospect Park and Irvington (New Jersey), and Wayne
(Michigan). There are several more Muslim Americans serving at the city level.
According to the American Muslim Alliance, the number of Muslim American can-
didates running for state and city level positions is increasing every year. In other
words, Muslim Americans are trying to become a part of American political system,
and prejudice toward them may play a substantial role in this endeavor.
The 2008 presidential election also showed how important it is to study at-
titudes toward Muslims in America. The United States elected her first African
American president, Barack Obama. It was a great success for a country that has
been divided along racial lines. Even though the most salient minority aspect of
Barack Obama was his racial status, his religious affiliation and a lie or rumor about
him being a Muslim was a much more important debate during his campaign1. A
non-trivial portion of the American public believed (and is still believing) that he
was a Muslim. It was a smear campaign to portray Obama as un-American or a
foreigner. By associating him with Islam, conservative talk show hosts tried to indi-
cate that he was not American enough to become the president. Nothing could do
a better job than the frames of“Islam” and “Muslim” to de-Americanize a political
figure. Thus, studying the sources and structure of the negative image of this faith,
which was highly controversial in the most recent presidential election, is essential.
Finally, Muslim Americans are growing in numbers. Even though scholars and
1It may be argued that social norms prevented Americans who were racist from using his racial
minority status as a reason to claim he is unfit for office. Therefore, they used his religion as a
proxy. This will be addressed in chapter 5.)
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research centers cannot agree on a single number, many believe that Muslims consti-
tute between 0.6 and 1.1 percent of the U.S. adult population. Muslim immigrants
in the United States comprise a diverse community that includes people from 68 dif-
ferent countries, all races, many ethnicities, and varying generations. According to
the 2007 Pew Muslim American Survey, more than one third of Muslim Americans
were born in the United States, and the rest (around 67 percent) are non-U.S. born.
Twenty-four and eighteen percent of first-generation Muslim immigrants come from
Arabic regions and South Asia, respectively. Ten percent comes from Iran, and the
rest from Europe and Africa. Many immigrated to America for educational pur-
poses (26%), economic opportunities (24%), or family reasons (24%). Forty and
twenty-six percent of Muslim Americans identify themselves as whites and blacks,
respectively. One in five calls himself/herself Asian, and only four percent identify
as Hispanic. They are a young community with males (54%) slightly more pop-
ulous than females. And, despite such a diverse nature and a heavy presence of
first-generation immigrants, more than sixty-five percent of non-U.S. born Muslim
Americans were naturalized American citizens in 2007.
Muslim Americans are trying to become an integral part of mainstream Amer-
ican society but its minority image is not very favorable in the eyes of many Ameri-
cans. Such a clash may have many normative, and mostly unfavorable, implications
for the participatory theory of democracy. The United States has been a successful
example of being a welcoming country for many immigrants from different ethnic,
racial, and religious background. Muslim Americans’ experience will be the most
contemporary test of how welcoming American democracy really is. And, this dis-
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sertation will attempt to answer many empirical questions regarding this experience
from the perspective of mainstream American society.
The dissertation is comprised of five substantive chapters and a conclusion.
The following chapter elaborates the theory of band of others in its relation to eth-
nocentrism. After briefly defining ethnocentrism, I develop the idea of the band of
others as ethnocentrism among mainstream Americans. What I mean by “main-
stream” is also explained both from theoretical and historical points of view in this
chapter. This chapter, in other words, provides the theoretical core for the disser-
tation’s overall theme regarding generalized prejudice or attitudes toward the band
of others. The third chapter is the foundational chapter of the dissertation that
expands on the empirical test of the band of others and attitudes toward Muslim
Americans. The discussion starts with the multidimensional nature of the band,
and how it relates to prejudice toward Muslims both in 2004 and 2008. Briefly, the
findings support the idea that the main determinant of prejudice toward Muslims is
prejudice toward other outgroups like, blacks, Latinos, Jews, Asians, homosexuals,
illegal immigrants, welfare recipients, Hindus, and feminists. Mainstream Amer-
icans’ political orientations, or a sense of threat, play a minimal role in shaping
these attitudes. What matters primarily is what they think about all minorities
across the board. The same chapter also examines the persistence of an ethnocen-
tric structure of Muslim affect before and after the terrorist attacks. The empirical
models show that the terrorist attacks did not change the ethnocentric structure
that influences dislike of Muslims. The band of others has always been influential.
The chapter ends with a discussion about how familiarity or contact may influence
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dislike of Muslims. I show that contact may play a substantial role in decreasing
negative evaluations of Muslims in America.
The fourth and fifth chapters concern how the theory of band of others shapes
American public opinion and behavior in general. The former probes the likelihood
of voting for a hypothetical Muslim or Arab candidate by using a unique experi-
mental survey. It shows that mainstream Americans become more likely to vote for
a Muslim or an Arab candidate as they become less prejudiced toward the band
of others. The major conditioning factor in voting for a Muslim candidate is how
people feel about outgroups, rather than political orientations, authoritarianism,
or religious traditionalism. The fifth chapter has a thorough analysis of the 2008
presidential election. The main focus is the misperception during the campaign
that Obama is a Muslim, what shaped this rumor, and whether it was electorally
consequential or not. By using the 2008-2009 American National Election Studies
Panel Data, I show that attitudes toward the band of others play an important role
in believing this rumor, and how this rumor, in return, decreased the likelihood
of voting for Obama with fully-specified vote choice models. I also examined the
impact of this rumor on turnout and other forms of political participation.
The last empirical chapter distinguishes itself from the rest of the dissertation
on the grounds that it studies the level of ethnocentrism among Muslim Americans,
and how it potentially shapes their willingness to become integrated into mainstream
American society. I show that Muslim Americans’ opinions about the band of oth-
ers have a substantive influence on whether they want to adopt American values
and customs, call themselves primarily American rather than Muslim, and speak
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English predominantly. As they become less prejudiced toward gays and lesbians,
non-Muslims, and have diverse friendship networks, they become more assimilated
into mainstream American society. The conclusion chapter tries to outline the nor-
mative implications of the empirical findings of the dissertation along with some





2.1 Prejudice in America
The complex and long history of immigration to the United States has always
been at the heart of political science research. Most of the attention in these studies
has been on prejudice toward blacks. It should be duly noted that the history of
African Americans is very unique and crucial when compared to the other minorities’
experiences in this country. They experienced involuntary immigration and, as a
result, slavery. The most visible political, economic, and social discriminations were
against them but they were, mostly, able to overcome these unfortunate experiences
through the civil rights movement and successful achievements in sports, arts, and
politics. Most recently, an African American person has become the president of
the United States.
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These great achievements by blacks, however, do not mean that racial prejudice
is over in this country. Bigots are still bigots. They hold prejudiced attitudes toward
blacks. The question is whether their dislike is only toward one particular minority,
like blacks, or is a generalized attitude toward all minorities, regardless of race,
ethnicity, religion, and behavioral strangeness. Do people form their opinions or
affect specifically for each minority group, or, do they have a general sense of how
they feel about all minorities? More importantly, do people distinguish Muslims
from other minorities? Do they hold distinctive attitudes toward them? Or, are
they primarily perceived as a part of a generalized syndrome of minority attitudes?
I argue that minority attitudes in the United States primarily follow a gen-
eralized pattern in which individuals categorize people into “us vs. them” labels.
Or, as Sumner (2002) named it, prejudice in America is mostly caused by ethnocen-
trism. Prejudice toward Muslims is no exception to this. In this chapter, I will lay
out the theoretical foundations of ethnocentrism and its significance for American
public opinion. Then, I will incorporate a historical background of minorities in the
United States in order to define who mainstream and minority Americans are. This
part is very essential because ethnocentrism is defined by a distinction between in-
group and outgroup. Before I get into any empirical tests of my hypotheses, I need
to establish who counts as American. The following chapter, where I introduce
and empirically test the theory of “band of others”, will apply ethnocentrism and




At the beginning of the twentieth century, William Graham Sumner proposed
the term ethnocentrism to explain a mental process that tries to divide people
into ingroups and outgroups. It is a habit of assigning all unfavorable qualities
to outgroups, and associating all desirable qualities with ingroups. The outcome
of attachment to ethnocentrism is “a mutually exclusive division into “us” versus
“them”, we who belong and they who do not, ingroup versus outgroup” (Sniderman
et al. 2000, 144). It refers to the ingroup being the center of everything. It involves
exaggerating and intensifying everything related to the ingroup so that all others
become different, or outgroups (Sumner 2002). Outgroups, on the other hand, may
be any group that does not look, believe, talk, or behave like “us”. If a person
belongs to the ingroup then she is “friendly, cooperative, trustworthy, safe, and
more”; if not, then she is “unfriendly, uncooperative, unworthy of trust, dangerous,
and more” (Kinder and Kam 2009, 8). If there is any line between “us” and “them”,
then the content of that line does not matter. It may be a religious, ethnic, or
behavioral boundary as well as a racial divide.
It is a consistent and readily available frame of mind regardless of time and
space because “no age or society seems wholly free from unfavorable opinions on
outsiders” (Higham 1981, 3). Since it has deep socio-psychological roots, individu-
als, societies, countries or any other groups (like country clubs) can be ethnocentric.
However, it should be noted that ethnocentrism is not a dichotomous phenomenon.
It is, instead, a continuum that ranges from completely ethnocentric to completely
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non-ethnocentric (Kinder and Kam 2009). People will erect ethnocentric boundaries
on varying levels. Those who are less ethnocentric will be more welcoming of out-
siders, and those who are not will hold more negative opinions of outgroups. This is
why ethnocentrism is “not a sickness” but “a ‘natural’ way to look upon the social
world” (Kinder and Kam 2009, 8). As nations become ethnically, religiously, racially,
and behaviorally more diverse, categorization of people into ingroups and outgroups
becomes inevitable. Ethnocentrism plays a great role in this categorization.
Probably, the most important aspect of ethnocentrism is its across-the-board
approach to intergroup attitudes. In other words, ethnocentric evaluations target all
outgroups or minorities. This is why (Adorno et al. 1950, 102) defines ethnocentrism
as “prejudice, broadly conceived.” Empirical research finds support for this gener-
alized attitude toward minorities. For example, white Americans’ attitudes toward
blacks are closely related to their attitudes toward other minorities. (Sniderman
and Piazza 1993, 53) find that prejudice against blacks is “a blind and irrational
reaction. . . because it has nothing to do with blacks and may just as well manifest
itself against Jews, or Asians, or any of many outgroups.” Similarly, Kinder and
Kam (2009) find that ethnocentrism among white Americans is a strong predictor
of approval on policies targeting not only blacks but also Latinos and Asians. Those
who are against job training and affirmative action policies favoring blacks, are also
against the same policies designed for Latinos and Asians. They are also against
same sex marriage and increased level of immigration. Therefore, it would not be
wrong to expect that ethnocentric evaluations will also determine attitudes toward
Muslims. People who have thin boundaries between ingroups and outgroups will
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be more likely than those who have thicker boundaries to hold positive attitudes
toward Muslims in the United States.
2.2.1 Potential Causes of Ethnocentrism
Kinder and Kam (2009) analyze four theoretical perspectives to understand
the causes of ethnocentrism. The first one comes from realistic group conflict which
focuses on the rational basis of prejudice. Prejudice, in this framework, is a result of
rational calculations of groups that compete for scarce resources. Prejudice against
immigrants or strangers occurs as a result of actual conflict, mostly economic. Ev-
ery additional group threatens the existing economic prosperity of the other groups.
According to Hooghe (2008), realistic group conflict theory assumes that ethnocen-
trism is “triggered by a real or perceived conflict between various ethnic groups
competing” for limited supplies in society. The newly emerging or arriving groups
will be evaluated as competitors in the market so that originally dominant groups
will develop hostility against these new immigrants (Hooghe 1993).
The idea of “ ‘they’ have more ‘we’ have less” (Sniderman and Hagendoorn
2007, 77) is at the heart of realistic group conflict. Prejudice is a function of the
severity of competition. The higher the stakes, the more negative the attitudes are.
Even though a relaxed version of this highly economic version of realistic group
conflict theory expands the scope of benefit to social status (Bobo 1999), conflict is
usually defined in terms of material resources like wealth, housing, university posi-
tions, and jobs (Sidanius and Pratto 1993). If an ingroup begins to lose its dominant
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position in the eyes of minority groups, its attitudes toward the threatening outgroup
become more negative.
In American politics, the most significant instance of realistic group conflict
was observed in the American South during the middle of the twentieth century. In
a seminal study, Key (1949) argues that most of the racial conflict of those times
happened around fertile soil which is important for agriculture and economy in the
South. This region, or black belt, was highly populated by black people so that the
economic prosperity of whites was challenged. Group conflict between whites and
blacks in the black belt had economic and rational roots. Racial conflict between
whites and blacks appeared in an economic form in the South. A recent test of
this racial threat hypothesis is conducted by Giles and Buckner (1993) who find
its persistent influence on voting behavior in the South (but see Voss (1996) for a
serious methodological criticism of this article).1
The problem with realistic group conflict, as is also acknowledged by Kinder
and Kam (2009), is its little relevance for ethnocentrism. Take Key’s black belt
analysis. The conflict is economic, and the competition is over scarce resources.
But, there are only two groups, which have vested interest in this conflict, namely
1An alternative interpretation of the intergroup attitudes in the South in the 1950s focuses on
the importance of elites’ efforts to keep their superior positions in politics. Instead of an economic
conflict, it was white Southern elites who tried to prevent a coalition of white poor class and
and blacks. The black-belt elites wanted to protect their political and economic power because
the political mobilization of white working class and poor farming blacks threatened the political
hegemony of the current black belt elites. The race card was used to keep the white poor and
working class people from flocking to the Populists.
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whites and blacks. The former does not want to lose its economic prosperity (or
political hegemony as an alternative view), and the latter lives on fertile soils. So,
the nature of conflict is far from being ethnocentric, but group-specific. Why would
whites become angry and prejudiced against, let’s say Asians, due to an economic
challenge posed by blacks? Realistic group conflict does not suggest a generalized
prejudice toward all outgroups. Rather, it “takes up pairs of opposing groups”
(Kinder and Kam 2009, 11). If the number of these pairs increases, then realistic
group conflict may turn into ethnocentrism. However, in its initial form, economic
competition between two groups is not a sufficient condition for across-the-board
hostility.
Specifically for the case of Muslims, the question is whether they are economi-
cally threatening to white Americans. Figure 2.1 compares the socio-economic status
of Muslims with whites and the general population in America. I used income, ed-
ucation, homeownership, and self-employment as indicators of economic well-being.
Income and education are recoded so that they range from 0 to 1. Muslims have
slightly higher income and education levels when compared with both the general
population and whites. But, the difference is not substantively significant. They
are mostly middle class, maybe a little bit more affluent, people. The difference
in homeownership levels, on the other hand, is both statistically and significantly
different. Muslims rent more than mainstream society. Homeownership among Mus-
lims who are born in the U.S. (forty-five percent) is less than among those who are
foreign-born (fifty-seven percent). Another important indicator is self-employment
level. The figure shows that more than one quarter of Muslim Americans are self-
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employed. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of the general population and
white Americans are not self-employed.
Figure 2.1: Comparison of Socio-Economic Status of Muslims, Whites, and General
Population
What do these tell us about the potential relevance of the realistic group con-
flict in terms of attitudes toward Muslims? Are negative attitudes toward Muslims
economically rational? On the one hand, Muslims have mainstream socio-economic
features preventing them from being cheap labor in the market. They are not cre-
ating wage competition because they are a highly educated labor force. If it is
economically threatening, it is against the upper-middle and upper classes. On the
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other hand, higher self-employment rates may impose competitiveness among small
and medium scale business owners. Their presence may threaten already existing
businesses. However, given that seventy-five percent of Muslim Americans are not
self-employed, the threat may be minimal. So, it appears that realistic group con-
flict theory may not capture the underlying reasons behind the negative attitudes
toward Muslims.
The second theoretical framework for ethnocentrism in Kinder and Kam (2009)
concerns the idea of an authoritarian personality which was first coined by Adorno
et al. (1950), in a seminal book called The Authoritarian Personality, to explain
the dynamics of anti-democratic ideas in the post World War II era. They chose
to study anti-Semitism as an example of these anti-democratic tendencies. Their
major motive is investigating the psychological, or personality related, causes of anti-
Semitism. But, then, they expanded the scope of their study to other forms of prej-
udice, and they found a general predisposition behind all of these anti-democratic
ideas. People who are anti-Semitic are also likely to think that blacks should be
kept in their place, and authorities should control Japanese Americans and foreign
ideas. Like Sumner, Adorno et al. (1950) named this general predisposition as eth-
nocentrism. It is because of this consistency in attitudes toward outgroups that they
urge us to explain this ethnocentric ideology, rather than prejudice against a single
group (Adorno et al. 1950, 122). According to them, all of these ethnocentric neg-
ative attitudes toward minorities emerge out of authoritarian personality. Kinder
and Kam (2009, 14,18) summarize an authoritarian personality as “rigid adher-
ence to traditional values, moralistic condemnation of those who violate convention,
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readiness to capitulate to established authorities, preoccupation with strength and
power, disdain for imagination and generosity, cynicism toward human nature, and a
conviction that wild and dangerous things go on in the world.” These qualifications
define authoritarian personality that triggers ethnocentric attitudes or “a relatively
consistent frame of mind concerning ‘aliens’ generally.” Since authoritarians place
a high value on conformity, sameness, and convention, and display an aversion to
individuals and groups who are different from them, this translates readily into in-
tolerance and hostility toward and distrust of those groups who have not been part
of the conventional racial, ethnic, religious, and cultural mainstreams in American
society (Uslaner 2004, Stenner 2005).
A number of scholars recently have revived the significance of authoritarian
personality in the study of tolerance and public opinion. For example, Stenner
(2005), in her book The Authoritarian Dynamic, finds that authoritarian personality
is one of the strongest explanations of political intolerance. Obviously, political
intolerance and prejudice are not the same things but they are related (see also
Barker and Tinnick (2006) and Mockabee (2007)). Hetherington and Weiler (2009)
show that the polarization we are experiencing today in America is mostly due to
disagreements on normative matters, like what is good and bad, right and wrong.
At the core of these debates, according to them, are authoritarian tendencies. The
polarization between authoritarian and democratic personalities cuts across race,
religion, ethnicity, and political predispositions in contemporary American society.
Even though authoritarianism reduces ethnocentrism entirely to personality (Kinder
and Kam 2009), its influence on prejudice toward minorities and contemporary
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public opinion is important. This is why I will incorporate individuals’ authoritarian
tendencies in empirical models to assess the structure of Muslim attitudes.
The third theoretical framework comes from social identity theory, and it at-
tempts to explain the contextual causes of ethnocentrism. It was first developed by
Tajfel (1981) to test whether intergroup conflict is based on an economic reason,
as proposed by realistic group conflict. For example, in a series of experiments,
the participants are shown several slides with dots on them, and are asked to guess
the number of dots on these slides. Then, they are told that they are divided into
two groups based on their answers. Two groups are created based on completely
trivial and non-economic grounds without any history of hostility or threat. This
is why these experiments are called “minimal group experiments”. After the split,
each participant is asked to allocate points to other participants in the experiment.
Tajfel (1981) found that a great majority of the participants reward their own group
relative to other groups. His main conclusion is that ingroup favoritism does not al-
ways require an economic conflict, unlike realistic group conflict suggests. And, this
“tendency to put distance between their [own] group and the other group between
“us” and “them” is impressive” and replicable across several other studies (Kinder
and Kam 2009, 20). We see the preliminary forms of ethnocentrism in these minimal
group experiments. Social categorizations cause ingroup favoritism and outgroup
hostility easily without any rational grounds of conflict. They are natural outcomes
(Brewer 1979, Hammond and Axelrod 2006).
The question is whether this ingroup favoritism is associated with outgroup
hostility or derogation. For example, the Nazis’ celebration of “the Aryan race”,
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and intense derogation of the Jewish population through anti-semitism need not
be highly correlated (Sears et al. 1997). They may occur independently of each
other in modern democracies. Outgroup dislike may also be contextual rather than
an automatic outcome of ingroup affect. For example, Brewer (1999) argues that
“when intergroup attitudes are not conflict-based, attitudes toward the ingroup and
prejudice toward the outgroup are essentially independent” (436).
In a more recent study, Brewer (2007), again, finds that these two processes
are not closely related to each other. However, as long as the scenario includes
some sort of categorizing, conceivably unimportant and minimal conditions will be
enough to “induce a bias in favor of one’s own group at the expense of the other”
(Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, 75). The self-categorization process may assign
anything positive to the ingroup, and anything negative to outgroups. Individuals
may tend to see the positive characteristics of their own groups, and the negative
ones of outgroups without any necessary differentiation among them.
This minimal group approach defines the social aspects of ethnocentrism (Kinder
and Kam 2009). In a way, social identity theory views prejudice against one mi-
nority group as part of a tendency to denigrate outgroups more generally due to
any reason, not just economic (Stouffer 1955, Adorno et al. 1950). As Tajfel (1982)
argues, “one of the principal features. . . of intergroup behavior and attitudes [is]
the tendency shown by the members of an ingroup to consider members of out-
groups in a relatively uniform manner, as ‘undifferentiated items in a unified social
category’”(22). Individuals tend to generalize feelings of contempt and denigration
not to specific outgroups, but across-the-board. Thus, prejudice is likely to be “a
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dislike not of a particular minority but of minorities in general” (Sniderman and
Hagendoorn 2007, 56), and ethnocentrism is prejudice broadly conceived.
If ethnocentrism has a social dimension, as social identity theory suggests,
and this social dimension creates a generalized prejudice toward outgroups, then
we would expect that attitudes toward Muslims will be part of this ethnocentric
syndrome in the United States. That is, people will perceive Muslims as just an-
other member of the band of others which includes already existing minorities. The
best predictor of Muslim feelings will be feelings about blacks, Asian Americans,
Latinos, Jews, illegal immigrants, welfare recipients, gays and lesbians, and other
outgroups. Or, as I name this theoretical expectation, prejudice about Muslims will
be associated with attitudes toward the “band of others.” 2
The final aspect of ethnocentrism, according to Kinder and Kam (2009), is
its potential genetic source. Ethnocentrism may have a hereditary component that
makes it part of human nature. Evolution “would have favored motivational dispo-
sitions furthering group life” so that eventually, genetic “mutations furthering the
capacity for ingroup loyalty and outgroup hostility might have spread through the
population” (Kinder and Kam 2009, 25). Therefore, ethnocentric attachments may
have a genetic component that is transmitted from one generation to another. One
important implication of a potential biological component of ethnocentrism, that
Kinder and Kam (2009) do not elaborate in detail, concerns its persistence over
time and space. Ethnocentric evaluations already reflect highly stable psychological
2The multi-dimensional nature of band of others, and Muslims’ unique position within this
framework, are discussed in the following chapter theoretically and empirically.
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and social orientations as we see from authoritarian personality and social identity
theories. Adding genetic codes into the list of causes will make ethnocentric atti-
tudes even more stable because evolution is a very slow process. This may be why
stereotypes are very hard to change, the definition of who counts as mainstream
and minority is stable, and individuals’ prejudices toward minorities do not change
abruptly due to dramatic events. We would not expect, for example, the September
11 terrorist attacks to change the overall ethnocentric structure of Muslim attitudes.
Since Muslims have always been considered an outgroup, stereotypes about them
will not be affected by the terrorist attacks. Psychological, social, and maybe even
genetic roots of ethnocentrism may keep prejudice toward Muslims relatively stable.3
Briefly put, ethnocentrism is a mental behavior to categorize individuals into
ingroup and outgroups. It is readily available, quick, and easy. The reason for out-
group hostility can be anything, not just economic or competition. People may favor
members of the ingroup over those belonging to an outgroup based on a minimal
reason, like a disagreement on the number of dots. So, if I want to measure attitudes
toward Muslims, first, I have to determine whose attitudes I need to study. Whites
only? Christians? Then, what about Catholics or Christian Fundamentalists? Are
mainstream Americans only white Protestants? Or, can we say seculars are part
of this mainstream? In other words, who counts as the prototypical or mainstream
American? In the next section of this chapter, I will try to answer these questions
with the help of both a historical background of immigration in the United States
3In the next chapter, I empirically show that familiarity and contact may help people have more
favorable opinions of Muslims.
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and a very recent empirical study by Theiss-Morse (2009) on mainstream Americans.
2.3 Who is mainstream?
A test of ethnocentrism’s influence on prejudice toward Muslim Americans or
any other public opinion research requires defining ingroup in the United States with
somewhat clear boundaries. Ethnocentrism is a mental habit of associating all good
qualities with ingroup, and all bad qualities, like negative stereotypes or dislike, with
outgroups. Ingroup membership is arguably the core component of ethnocentrism.
Even though ingroup membership does not necessarily cause outgroup hostility, we
need to determine who is a mainstream American. My main interest is to see how
these mainstream Americans perceive Muslim Americans, and what kind of a role
ethnocentric attachments play in this attitude formation.
The most important question, then, is who is the mainstream in general and
in the United States? How do we define it in general, and how does this generalized
theoretical definition of the mainstream apply to the American case? Alba and Nee
(2005, 12) define the mainstream as “that part of the society within which ethnic
and racial origins have at most minor impacts on life chances or opportunities”
(emphasis in original). They argue that simply being the most crowded group in a
society may define the mainstream. Historical presence also plays a role to define
the mainstream. The longer a group lives in country, the more likely it will be part
of the mainstream. There also economic conditions but Alba and Nee (2005) think
that they may not play a significant role. The mainstream, according to them, is
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beyond economic distinctions. For the mainstream, having a comfortable life is a
function of hard work, and members of it think that it is not impeded by their racial,
ethnic, or religious identifiers.
This perceptual definition offers an insightful framework for defining the main-
stream in United States which has always had a very fluid and dynamic population
structure. Lots of immigration waves occurred throughout its short history, which
invited many immigrants from different races, ethnicities, and religions. Some of
them were initially subject to condemnation, prejudice, and even slavery but then
made their way out of these unfortunate circumstances. But, even afterwards, sev-
eral minorities think of themselves more of marginalized Americans while some oth-
ers think they reflect prototypical or mainstream Americans. History plays a role
but perception about who is mainstream has a final say, as the general definition of
the mainstream suggests. This is why, first, I will talk about historical component
of minorities becoming mainstream, and then examine the perceptual backgrounds
of it.
2.3.1 Immigrants Becoming Mainstream: Historical Overview
America has always been a country with flows of immigrants from a variety of
races, ethnicities, and religions. People of different origins come together, integrate,
and become Americans. It may not be wrong to conclude, like (Handlin 1951, 3),
that “the immigrants were American history.” And, it is a relatively successful im-
migration history. Unlike European cases, “the country did not suffer from deep
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class cleavages which immigration might aggravate” because the social structure of
America “combined an underlying cohesion with a remarkable degree of individ-
ual mobility” (Higham 1956, 214). Immigrants came to America with great hopes,
suffered initially, and then integrated into its social structure. This sequence may
sound as if all immigrants were able to integrate into American society easily. In
contrast, it was a long and somewhat painful process for many groups of people
like Jews, Irish and Italian Catholics, Asians, and Latinos. The result of this fluid
structure of American immigration history is that the definition of being a “main-
stream American” may change (Kazal 1995). Therefore, an overview of minorities
in general, Catholic and Jewish immigrants in particular, and their integration into
mainstream society will help us define who mainstream is today, and speculate about
Muslims’ likelihood of being perceived as mainstream in the future.4
4Before getting into the details of the immigration history of certain minorities, I would like to
mention that my focus here will be on non-English people who came to America voluntarily. This
means that I will exclude two important of minorities from my analysis, namely African Americans
and Native Americans. The legacy of slavery and the Civil Rights Movements make the case of
African Americans particularly important in the progressive history of the United States. Several
studies showed that racism is still prevalent today through either a symbolic (Sears, Hensler and
Speer 1979) or an explicit form (Sniderman and Piazza 1993). They are the most readily and
easily identifiable minority group in America. But, the unique historical background of blacks
may not be an appropriate source to speculate about Muslim immigrants’ integration. There are
three reasons for that. First, Muslims’ immigration is mostly voluntary, as we saw in the previous
chapter. They come here for education, business, or family reunion. Second, unlike the case of
blacks, Muslims’ socio-economic background is similar to that of mainstream Americans. Most of
them are either self-employed or high-skilled workers. Last, unlike blacks’ long history of presence
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Historians analyze immigration flows into the United States under five chrono-
logical eras. The first one concerns the colonial era, during which the majority of
immigrants was European Protestants. They were mostly Puritans and Pilgrims
who made the most significant contributions to the development of the United States
through emphasizing “the importance of the Protestant faith, diligent application
to work, and individual accomplishment” (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999, 5). There
were few Jewish and Catholic immigrants at these times, and they became subject
to negative stereotyping immediately. Neither Catholics nor Jews always enjoyed
the right to vote, for example, in colonial America, and “Jews in particular were
proscribed from becoming physicians and attorneys in some places” (Dinnerstein
and Reimers 1999, 14). Protestant skepticism toward Catholics and Jews during
the colonial era determined the standards for future minorities in the United States.
The colonists welcomed the cheap supply of labor provided by the immigrants but
“expected them to absorb existing customs while shedding their own [like their at-
tachment to cultures and faiths prevalent in the Old World] as quickly as possible”
(Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999, 15). So, the standards were a two step process:
first, minorities were expected to assimilate into the existing mores and traditions
of the New World. But, this was not enough. They were expected to try hard to
in the United States, the history of Muslims is fairly recent. Muslim immigration looks more
similar to Jewish, Irish, Italian, and Asian immigration than to African American immigration.
This is why the historical overview will focus on the success story of these immigrants, not of
blacks in the United States. The case of blacks will be important when we examine the perceptual
grounds of mainstream Americans in the next part of this chapter.
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abandon any cultural and behavioral customs belonging to the Old World. Minori-
ties who were able to meet both of these Colonial era standards at the same time
were eventually welcomed into mainstream society.
The second wave of immigrants was between 1789 and the 1890s. Most of
them were initially Asians and Latin Americans but they were few in numbers.
Then, toward the end of the nineteenth century, the country attracted many Irish
immigrants who “were often treated as inferior races . . . , and charged with pollut-
ing and degrading the purity of Anglo-Saxon stock” (Halter 2006, 169). Prejudice
toward Irish immigrants started as a result of Protestant skepticism toward Catholi-
cism. Having faith connections to an outside source, namely the Vatican, reminded
most Protestants of their unfortunate history in the Old World due to religious con-
flicts between them and the Vatican. However, economics is considered to play just
as significant a role as religious skepticism in this era just before the Civil War. Irish
immigrants were mostly poverty-stricken refugees who came to the United States
with hopes of better jobs. Having too many poor people increased the sense of fear
among Americans because unskilled labor “would depress wages and the American
standard of living” (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999, 41). These economic and re-
ligious fears eventually transformed into a political organization. Know Nothings
(or eventually, the American Party) became the center of anti-Catholic sentiments,
and gained popularity in 1854 and 1855 with a dozen governorships, more than 100
Congressional races, and around 1000 legislative seats (Anbinder 2006, 179).
Anti-Catholic prejudice was the main axis of minority politics in the nineteenth
century, and it continued in the third wave of immigration between 1890 and the
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1920s, besides anti-black prejudice. Italians outnumbered all other European immi-
grants of the twentieth century, and they were one of the most disliked minorities
(Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999). They were associated with negative stereotypes
and treated as racially inferior (Guglielmo 2003). Like Irish immigrants, they came
from poor areas and rural backgrounds so that they were mostly unskilled workers.
As opposed to the expectations from immigrants to integrate into the New World,
for Italian immigrants “success meant bringing something home, not achieving sta-
tus in the United States” so that after working for some time, they would go back
to Italy (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999, 165). They did not have the chance to
experience social mobility.
Jews were the second largest immigrant group of the third wave between 1890
and the 1920s. When they arrived, they became subject to the same negative
stereotypes and prejudice that Catholics experienced. Unlike the clash between
Protestantism and Catholicism, the religious tension was somewhat less important
in the case of negative attitudes toward Jews. There was agreement on some key
issues, and “Jews found it easier than did some others to accept the American stress
upon individual achievement and mobility” (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999, 165).
They committed to ideas of hard work and individual success. During this time,
Jews became famous for their philanthropic activities which are considered to be
necessary activities in the Jewish community to seek honor and respect (Dinnerstein
and Reimers 1999). They appreciated higher education, and as an outcome, they
“made up 85 percent of the student body at New York’s free but renowned City
College, one fifth of those attending New York University, and one sixth of the
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students at Columbia” (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999, 67). Their success in high
skilled jobs, such as the legal profession, was recognized by everyone.
However, these growing positive attitudes toward Jews diminished due to anti-
Catholic sentiments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Religious
skepticism toward Catholics caused hostility toward immigration as a whole (Higham
1981). This generalized anti-foregin sentiment of the post World War I era has been
labeled “nativism.” Nativisim, according to Higham (1981), is a generalized ideolog-
ical structure which emphasizes absolute differences between white Americans from
people of other colors. It is a special form of ethnocentrism directed specifically
at foreigners, aliens, or immigrants. It is an ethnocentric zeal to destroy groups
that challenge the existing American way of life (Higham 1981). There may be sev-
eral reasons for the rise of nativism but scholars mostly agree on the economic one
(Higham 1981). Increased flows of immigrants threatened employment opportuni-
ties for workers, which caused them to strike frequently. These strikes also made
employers oppose immigration because they started losing a lot of working days
(Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999). People’s prejudice against immigrants surged so
quickly that “ethnocentrism and xenophobia ran wild”; the Ku Klux Klan gained 4
million members around the nation by 1920, and anti-Semitism peaked by the 1930s
(Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999, 84). It was not very pleasant for all immigrants to
be in the United States during these years.
The rising trend of nativism subsided with the beginning of the Second World
War. Unlike the destruction in Europe, the end of the war brought enormous eco-
nomic prosperity to the United States. Americans found themselves in a bourgeon-
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ing economy with a lot of great opportunities both in the manufacturing and finance
industries. This economic prosperity also affected intergroup relations in America.
“[P]ostwar public opinion polls,” for example, “indicated that fewer Christians be-
lieved Jews to be greedy, dishonest, or unscrupulous; and overt anti-Semitismbecame
less frequent and less respectable” (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999, 9798). Even
though there was still bigotry against Jews, it became less apparent after the war.
Similarly, anti-Catholic prejudice also decreased during this period. It was not as
fast as the decline of anti-Semitism because there were still conflicts about “aid to
parochial schools, a proposed American ambassador to the Vatican, the relations of
church and state, publicly sponsored birth control clinics, and abortion” (Dinner-
stein and Reimers 1999, 98). Even if there were heated debates on the topics, the
level of anti-Catholic hostility was visibly lower than during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth century.
The historical overview of immigration flows shows that there are two essential
factors shaping the integration of groups that previously suffered from prejudice into
mainstream society. The first one concerns the economic circumstances, both at the
group and country levels. If the immigrant group came to the United States with
a middle class background like not all but most of the Jewish immigrants, then
their acceptance into the mainstream society was relatively easier. They posed less
challenge to the existing employment structure of the country. In contrast, poor
immigrant groups, like Irish and Italian immigrants, had much more difficult times
in integrating into mainstream society. In the end, both Jews and Catholics were
accepted as Americans (Theiss-Morse 2009) but the process was relatively harder
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for the latter than for the former. If the socio-economic background of immigrants
plays a great role, then we can expect that Muslim Americans may have a similar
experience to Jews in the United States. As I talked about in the previous chapter,
their income and education levels are slightly higher than the mainstream levels,
and they engage in either self-employment or high-skilled jobs. Muslims may benefit
from their middle class background during their integration. However, this positive
feature of Muslim Americans may be adversely affected by the recent economic
downturns. People’s attitudes toward immigration and immigrants can be shaped
by economic crises or booms (Higham 1981, Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999).
In addition to an economic explanation, time or familiarity plays a significant
role in the integration of minority groups into American society. Historians agree
that this process is very slow. The length of integration into American society is
“tightly linked to the timing of arrival in the United States” (Devos and Banaji
2005, 448). Immigrant groups had long-lasting unfortunate experiences but, over
time, these subsided. Increased familiarity played a prominent role in the upward
mobility of these immigrants. Like everything else, “success came gradually and
not spectacularly” for them (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999, 166). It took quite a
while to get to know these “strangers” and their behavioral and cultural differences
(Higham 1981). Irish Americans, for example, “moved up the social scale slowly”
(Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999, 151). Jews’ success was relatively shorter but it
still took almost half a century to earn their deserved respect in American society.
Familiarity’s impact mostly came from its power on relinquishing immigrants’ Old
World cultures and traditions (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999). The longer they
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live in the United States, the more likely they accept the American way of life.
And, this long process is mostly “with indeterminate starting and ending points”
(Melnick 2006, 266). One implication of familiarity is the growing presence of these
immigrants in local and national politics (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1996). There have been
many Catholics, Jews, Asians, and recently Latinos among presidential candidates,
administration members, senators, representatives, governors, mayors, and other
low profile elections.
It is too early to speculate about familiarity’s effect on prejudice toward Mus-
lim Americans. Even though there were many Muslim immigrants in the twentieth
century (Dinnerstein and Reimers 1999), they have not been a visible or salient
minority group until the September 11 terrorist attacks (Jamal and Naber 2008).
Muslim Americans are experiencing similar stereotyping and hostility that Catholics,
Jews, and even Asians experienced in the past. The historical story of immigrants
shows that their willingness to accept the American way of life and familiarity will
be one of the major determinants of their potential success of becoming at least a
not-disliked minority. Their higher socio-economic status will be of great impor-
tance in this long process. In the next chapter, I test whether knowing someone
who is Muslim has any significant influence on favorability toward Muslims. The
finding supports the historians’ perspective on integration: those who are familiar
with Muslims become less prejudiced toward them.
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2.3.2 Who is Mainstream in America Today? Perceptual
Explanation
The historical overview of immigration flows suggests that almost all immi-
grant groups, Jews, Catholics, Asians, and early Latinos, were able to integrate into
American society after a long and painful process. Does this mean that these groups
are perceived as part of mainstream America? In other words, attitudes toward them
may be less prejudiced and hostile but are they counted as American? The historical
account of immigration falls short of answering these important questions that may
help us define ingroup and outgroup (or minority) in the United States. We need to
examine identity politics at a perceptual level which draws a generalized definition
of the mainstream in any country, not just in the United States.
The national group is considered to be an imagined community (Anderson
1991). Normative citizenship through birth or naturalization may not capture the
whole idea of being American. Perceptually, individuals “ need to think they are
a member of their national group, evaluate their national group positively, and
feel attached to their national group” so that they become part of this imagined
community (Theiss-Morse 2009, 8). Based on this perceptual definition, there may
be some nominally American citizens who are thought of as not being American
enough. They are considered to be minorities or marginalized groups by mainstream
or prototypical Americans.
There are two major grounds of drawing distinctions between marginalized
and prototypical members of a nation. The first comes from constructions of the
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past (Theiss-Morse 2009). The historical background of intergroup relations we saw
in the previous part will determine most of the contemporary perceptions about who
counts as Americans. Although some groups immerse into the American nation, like
Catholics and Jews, people may still hold negative attitudes toward them. Main-
stream Americans, as the dominant group, will decide who is American and who is
not there yet by relying on past ethno-cultural relationships (Theiss-Morse 2009).
Thinking that Catholics and Jews are less mainstream than Protestants will reflect
such historical baggage of historical intergroup conflicts. We observe such claims
recently by Huntington (2004) in various normative studies. He argues that being
American refers to being Anglo-Protestant or at least having attachment to that cul-
ture. They do not have to be Protestant but they have to acknowledge and practice
its culture. This is a typical ethno-cultural explanation of who counts as Americans
based on perceptions coming from historical conflicts between Catholics/Jews and
Protestants. Recent scholarship shows that attachment to ethno-cultural values to
define American identity is still at a notable level (Schildkraut 2007, 601).
The second explanation of putting boundaries between mainstream and minor-
ity concerns attachment to principles that created America, namely “the American
Creed” (Theiss-Morse 2009). People may “come from anywhere and still become
Americans by believing in the American Creed” (Theiss-Morse 2009, 19). Those
who believe in hard-work, individual achievements, free enterprise, and liberalism
are considered to be Americans. Another aspect of the principles that created Amer-
ica concerns egalitarianism: the belief that all races are equal. (McClosky and Zaller
1984, 69) show that half the American public in the 1950s “endorsed the proposi-
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tion that when it comes to the things that count most, all races are certainly not
equal.” In 1963, it decreased to 31 percent, and in 1978, it was only 15 percent.
The 1978-79 Civil Liberties Survey, examined by the same authors, revealed that
most Americans reject the idea of inherent inferiority of certain races. The idea of
egalitarianism is now becoming more common that it has now been “extended to
include blacks, women, Catholics, Jews, immigrants, and other groups traditionally
subject to discrimination” (McClosky and Zaller 1984, 72). These minorities used
to be subject to harsh prejudices but the spread of egalitarian ideals make them
integrate into the mainstream society over time.
Theiss-Morse (2009) argues that the boundaries for mainstream Americans
can be established by relying on both grounds of perceptions, i.e. ethno-cultural
and principled. She calls it the social theory of national identity. Those who are
considered to be “true Americans” enjoy all of the exclusive membership benefits
like being helped by fellow Americans during hard times, getting fair share from
resources, and being listened to (Theiss-Morse 2009, 3). My main interest in this
theory is the “true American” part. By using a unique dataset coming from the 2002
Perceptions of the American People Survey, she examines who feels like a typical
American. The dependent variable she uses is an index score out of four variables
regarding the perceptual basis of being a typical American: “When I think of the
American people, I think of people who are a lot like me,” “I would feel good if I
were described as a typical American,” “On the important issues, I find I often agree
with American people,” and “In many respects, I am different from most Americans”
(Theiss-Morse 2009, 78). People responded on a five-point Likert scale ranging from
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strongly agree to strongly disagree. She analyzes relationships between this index
score and several ethno-cultural, demographic, and political variables. Her findings
suggest that individualism and patriotism play a significant role. Egalitarianism
does not make people feel typically more American. Ethno-culturally, Christians
do not feel typically more or less American than non-Christians do. The same
thing holds across different Christian denominations as well. Neither Protestants
nor Catholics feel more typically American than other members of denominations do
(Theiss-Morse 2009, 83). Unlike religious affiliations, race plays a significant role in
feeling typically American. All races (blacks, Latinos, and others) feel less American
than white Americans. Among these, only the difference between blacks and whites
is statistically significant but substantively the relationship has the same direction
across all races (Theiss-Morse 2009, 83). The case of blacks is also replicated in
the focus group studies of Theiss-Morse (2009). African Americans were the ones
in these focus groups who preferred to use “they” rather than “we” when it came
to talk about who Americans were. Given the distinctive historical background
of blacks in the United States, this finding is not surprising. A long history of
involuntary immigration, the legacy of slavery, and long-lasting conflicts during the
Civil Rights Movement always make the case of blacks truly unique and distinctive
among all other minorities in the United States.
The finding that whites feel themselves typically American more than any
other races is also replicated in other studies. For example, Devos and Banaji
(2005) show, using implicit association tests in a series of experiments, that being
Americans means to be white, or as they frame “American = White.” They find
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that prototypical Americans are often associated with white people. They argue
that “white Americans, as a group, have been immersed in American society for
an extensive period of time and constitute the numerical majority” so “ they are
more likely to be thought of . . . [as] American than members of other ethnic groups”
(Devos and Banaji 2005, 449). Again, the impact of time and familiarity comes into
effect in the perception of whites being “true Americans.”
The category of whites is too broad, though. It includes several immigrant
groups, such as Jews and Catholics, that used to be considered part of the minority
but are now considered to be parts of the mainstream (Theiss-Morse 2009, Kinder
and Kam 2009), as I showed earlier in this chapter. Does this mean that they are
no longer considered to be minorities? Fiske (1993) has the most frequently cited
definition of minority. According to her, the most important determinant of minority
status is the persistence of negative stereotypes about a group. Its impact will be
worse for those groups which have lower status and experienced discrimination in
the past (Phinney 1996). Anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic sentiments can be found
everywhere in the world, not just in the United States. However, they are not as
common as they used to be in the past. As I mentioned earlier, they are subsiding
as time passes.
Then, who is mainstream in America? Since I will be examining their attitudes
toward Muslims, and its implications in public opinion, I have to be clear about
how I define mainstream American society. Historical analysis shows that time
and familiarity play an essential role in the integration process. It takes a long
time to overcome prejudice and hostility. Jews and Catholics among non-Anglo
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immigrants achieved to be part of this nation. In contrast, the perceptual basis of
being American suggests that certain minorities can regard themselves as not being
typical American, like blacks. And, minority status persists as long as negative
stereotyping exists. Empirical research established that whites are considered to
be the mainstream society. Being Christian is not that important but, on racial
grounds, blacks do not feel themselves as typical Americans.
Since I argue that attitudes toward Muslims are part of a generalized syn-
drome of prejudice, namely ethnocentrism or band of others as an extension of
ethnocentrism, I need to have a sample of mainstream America without any mi-
nority groups. On racial grounds, these people will be whites. But, this is not
enough because there may be white Latinos, Catholics, Jews, and atheists/seculars.
I excluded Latinos and Jews from the mainstream sample because there are still,
unfortunately, negative stereotypes about these groups. Catholics, as expressed in
Theiss-Morse (2009), consider themselves as typical Americans so they are included
in the sample.5 Atheists/seculars are also part of the mainstream because perceptu-
ally religious affiliation matters a lot less in contemporary America. But, I excluded
respondents who belong to minority religions such as Islam, Buddhism, Hinduis-
metc. In sum, throughout the dissertation, I will define mainstream as non-Latino,
non-Asian, and non-Jewish whites who do not belong to any minority religion, unless
otherwise noted in the text.
In the next chapter, I will elaborate on the structure of Muslim attitudes
5I should note that they are excluded from the sample when I examine the structure of minority
attitudes, including anti-Catholic sentiments, as a whole at the beginning of the next chapter.
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both theoretically and empirically. The theory of band of others, as an extension
of ethnocentrism, will be introduced as a multi-dimensional structure of minority
attitudes in the United States. Several empirical tests will suggest that attitudes
toward band of others will be strongly related to people’s level of prejudice against
Muslims. This will be persistent both before and after the terrorist attacks. And, for
Muslims to be part of mainstream, time and familiarity will play a crucial role. The
next chapter with these findings will present the core component of my dissertation.
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Chapter 3
A Theory of Band of Others
3.1 Attitudes Toward Muslim Americans: An Ex-
tension of Ethnocentrism
When I was a graduate student, I spent most of my summers as a teaching
assistant at the Inter-Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) Summer
Program on Quantitative Methods in Ann Arbor. Ann Arbor is a small college town
but its population is very diverse in terms of race, ethnic and religious background,
sexual orientation, income status, and political orientations due to the presence
of one of the most prestigious universities in the world, namely the University of
Michigan. You can sense this diversity everywhere around the town, in restaurants,
cafes, and classrooms. One great way to get a feeling of this beautiful feature of Ann
Arbor is during the 4th of July parades. Since I subleased apartments in downtown, I
had a lot of opportunities to watch them. After the politicians, the Jaycees, twirlers,
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preschools, jugglers, clowns, antique cars, and public safety officials, it is always time
for local business people and non-profit organizations. There are African American
groups, Asian American local business people and student groups, an LGBT society,
Latino Student Association, and Arab Americans. They all celebrate America’s
Independence while waving American flags, and Ann Arbor is welcoming them as
warmly as they do the previous parade groups. It is this moment that triggered me
to think that Americans’ attitudes toward minorities may be shaped by the level of
their warmness toward all minorities, regardless of the name of the minority group.
It is a question of welcoming outsiders or strangers. The order of the Ann Arbor
parade groups, even, reflects this. All of these non-mainstream groups or minorities
were clustered together for their turn. They were organized as if they were a big
band in this parade, a “band of others”.
I argue that Muslim Americans are also member of this band of others, and
this membership determines mainstream Americans’ attitudes toward them, rather
than the September 11 terrorist attacks or political orientations. The idea of “band
of others” is an extension of the theory of ethnocentrism, the details of which I
discussed in the previous chapter. Its effect on shaping people’s minority attitudes
is much deeper and persistent than a one-time instance, like terrorist attacks, or
relatively fluid political orientations. People tend to form their affect toward non-
mainstream groups early in their socializations, and it stands relatively independent
of political orientations and unique events.
This, of course, does not mean that the September 11 terrorist attacks did
not have any influence on American public opinion. In several polls conducted
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after the attacks, a large minority of Americans expressed that they were prejudiced
toward Muslims (to exemplify a few of them, please see USA Today/Gallup Poll
2006, Newsweek 2007 Poll). A similar amount of respondents also mentioned that
Muslims in the United States should be required to carry special identification cards
or undergo extra screening at the airports (Theiss-Morse 2009, 2). Even though
President George W. Bush and a fair number of political elites of the time tried
to convince the American public that Islam is a religion of peace, and Muslims are
another component of the richness of American diversity, people formed or reinforced
negative attitudes toward Muslims.
There are two important issues concerning the impact of the September 11
terrorist attacks on Americans’ attitudes toward Muslims. First, if theory of “band
of others” holds, then we may expect to find similar prejudiced attitudes toward
other minorities as well. Those who think that FBI should wiretap mosques would
also think that illegal immigrants should be deported, gays and lesbians should not
be allowed in the military, African Americans are all lazy, and more. The reasons
behind these attitudes may be different. People may be prejudiced against gays and
lesbians because they may find them behaviorally unacceptable. Attitudes toward
African Americans may be an outcome of racial stereotypes. And, people may
dislike Muslims because they are all Arabs (which is empirically not true, please see
the first chapter) and they are not in cultural conformity with the Judeo-Christian
tradition of America.1 The general tendency to welcome or dislike minorities will
1I will elaborate on the multi-dimensional feature of “band of others” later in this chapter.
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hold. This is why, I argue, public opinion surveys which report prejudice toward
one minority do not show us the big picture. It is obviously an empirical question
but if the USA Today/Gallup and Newsweek polls had asked about people’s opinion
of other minorities, I predict we would have found very similar levels of dislike and
prejudice toward those minorities as well.
Second, these post-September 11 surveys may deceive us into thinking that
Americans became prejudiced toward Muslims after the terrorist attacks: They used
to hold positive attitudes but this traumatic event caused them to dislike Muslims.
I argue that this view may not be true due to several reasons. Muslims have seldom
been a focus of actual political or social debates in American memories. Except
several suicide bombings against the U.S. Navy and embassies in the Middle East,
Islam has been mostly unknown, and Muslims have been mostly invisible to the
American public (Jamal and Naber 2008). Unlike the case of Muslims, African
Americans have been the most important element of progressive American political
and social history, Asian Americans were subject to detentions and relocations after
the Pearl Harbor attacks, attitudes toward gays and lesbians have always been a
central part of heated debates especially since the beginning of the early 1990s,
and Latinos are probably the most salient minority group of the most recent times.
Muslims, on the other hand, had become salient only after the terrorist attacks. So,
the American public had not held well-defined attitudes toward Muslims before the
planes hit the towers and the Pentagon. We can see this by looking at the levels of
item non-responses to the questions about minorities in the polls conducted before
September 11, 2001. Unfortunately, for that period, the availability of data that
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include several minorities along with Muslims is severely limited. I was able to
find two Pew datasets that asked questions about the favorability ratings of only
religious minorities like, Jews, atheists, Buddhists, and Muslims. In the 2000 Pew
Campaign Typology survey among mainstream Americans, only 8 and 12 percent
of the respondents mentioned that they “haven’t heard of” or “can’t rate” Jews and
atheists, respectively. In the same survey, however, almost one quarter (23 percent)
of the respondents could not map their opinions about Muslims. A similar picture
also appears in the 2001 Pew Religion in American Public Life Survey (that was
conducted prior to the September 11 attack). Almost 30 percent of mainstream
Americans could not rate Muslims whereas it was 14 and 11 percent for Jews and
atheists.2 We see how Muslims become salient by comparing these percentages to
the ones from the polls conducted after the attacks. While the rates for Jews and
atheists remain at 10 percent levels, the number of people who haven’t heard of or
can’t rate Muslims dropped almost in half (15 percent).
Another argument for why the September 11 terrorist attacks may not be the
reason for Americans’ prejudice toward Muslims is that those who have enough level
of knowledge about Muslims may already have had negative attitudes even before the
attacks. Or, in line with the theory of “Band of Others”, the ethnocentric structure
that explains Americans’ attitudes toward Muslims has always been prevalent, and
independent of this one time shock. I will elaborate on the details of this argument
toward the end of this chapter.
2The only religious minority that has more item non-responses is Buddhists who have never
been salient to the American public, at least until the times of these surveys.
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This chapter represents the core of my dissertation, and will be organized as
follows. First, I provide a theoretical frame, which outlines the view of “Band of
Others” as an extension of the theory of ethnocentrism. The main argument will
concern definitions and measurement of the concepts so even though it is a theo-
retical introduction, it will include some preliminary empirical evidence from factor
analytic techniques. Then, I will examine the impact of this theory of generalized
attitude toward minorities on Muslim evaluations in series of multivariate analyses.
The next empirical part of the chapter will test whether the September 11 terrorist
attacks changed the structure of attitudes toward Muslims. In the conclusion of the
chapter, I will focus on the implications of the theory of “band of others” for future
intergroup relations in the US, with a particular focus on the relationship between
familiarity and affect toward Muslim Americans.
3.2 Structure of Minority Attitudes and Ethno-
centrism
The history of the United States is relatively short when compared to other
countries, especially those in Western Europe. Its people come from many different
territories, cultures, religions, and ethnicities. America is a nation of immigrants.
All of these features of this country make it really difficult to study intergroup
attitudes because boundaries across groups are not very well defined. As I discussed
in the previous chapter, there were immigrants, like Irish and Italian Americans, who
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were not considered as Americans but they are, now, an integral part of this nation.
Jews, who were not initially welcomed either, are, now, one of the most successful
groups. Blacks, arguably the most important minority group in the United States,
used to be slaves but they have been moving up in the ladder, rated pretty high
by whites on favorability scales, and the country has recently elected her first black
President in 2008. We can find other success stories for other minorities as well, like
immigrants from India.
It is especially difficult to determine who is considered to be mainstream or
ingroup, and who minorities are. In the past, it was relatively easier to examine
intergroup attitudes because the most visible minority group was blacks. A race
and ethnicity literature that studied attitudes toward blacks specifically and their
implications flourished in political science. Some people argued that recent racism
is no longer explicit, and it is more symbolic or aversive now (Sears, Hensler and
Speer 1979, Sears et al. 1980, Kinder and Sears 1981). Others oppose this idea on
the grounds that people are still explicit in their expression of negative stereotypes
about blacks and all other minorities (Sniderman and Piazza 1993, Sniderman and
Carmines 1997, Sniderman and Piazza 2002). There has been a huge debate between
these two camps, mostly, based on the measurement of racial attitudes.
The limitation of this literature is that the American minority panorama has
become so complex that studying only anti-black prejudice and focusing on its im-
pact on certain policy attitudes may not capture the complex intergroup dynamics
of this country. For example, the symbolic racism and principled conservatism liter-
atures may not be helpful in studying attitudes toward Latinos, who are, nowadays,
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one of the most salient minorities, and Muslims, who have been at center of polit-
ical debates since the terrorist attacks in 2001. The same argument can, also, be
extended for homosexual attitudes.
We need a more comprehensive understanding of intergroup attitudes. The
theory of ethnocentrism can, as I argued in the previous chapter, provide a much
more thorough framework studies of attitudes toward minorities. Ethnocentrism,
or “prejudice broadly defined”, is a useful and flexible theory. It is useful because
it goes beyond time and place limitations. Unlike group-specific evaluations, ethno-
centrism will be prevalent regardless of time and space. Ethnocentric attachments
can determine prejudice toward one outgroup at one time in one place but it can also
influence dislike of another group at another time in another place. The ethnocentric
structure that impacts prejudice stays the same.
The flexibility of ethnocentrism refers to its definition. Each individual can
define herself with a lot of group attachments, like nationality, race, religion, eth-
nicity, gender, even from time to time football teams, or a combination of these.
By doing this, she also defines who are not like her. If she is ethnocentric, then
she will dislike all who are not like her. If not, then she will be at least neutral, if
not welcoming, them. Ethnocentrism can let us go beyond the boundaries of the
existing study of race and ethnicity literature. In fact, as we saw earlier, Kinder and
Kam (2009) showed that ethnocentric evaluations are one of the most important,
but long-forgotten, aspects of American public opinion.
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3.2.1 Measurement of Ethnocentrism
Kinder and Kam (2009) addressed this important measurement problem by
limiting their ethnocentrism measure to negative stereotype questions in the Ameri-
can National Election Studies. The questions ask respondents to put whites, blacks,
Asian Americans, and Latinos on a scale that ranges from lazy to hard-working,
from untrustworthy to trustworthy, and from unintelligent to intelligent. Kinder
and Kam (2009) measure ethnocentrism as the summation of differences between
ingroup score on one trait and average outgroup trait score on the same trait. For
example, whites rate themselves and three other minorities on laziness, trustwor-
thiness, and intelligence scores. For each trait, the average scores for blacks, Asian
Americans, and Latinos, are subtracted from their ingroup trait score, and these
distance measures are added up, and divided into three (Kinder and Kam 2009, 55).
They also replicate the same method with feeling thermometers, and both yield very
similar conclusions throughout their study.
With this brilliant approach, the flexibility of ethnocentrism is maximized.
Each ethnic and racial minority has its own ethnocentrism score. Whites will have
one, so will blacks, Asians, and Latinos. With this approach, each individual be-
longing to these ethnic and racial groups will have an ethnocentrism score so that
a model can be estimated with only dichotomous control variables for these groups.
For example, then Kinder and Kam (2009) study ethnocentrism and support for the
war on terrorism, they estimated a model with an ethnocentrism score with controls
for black, Asian American, and Latino respondents. They do this for all of their
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models throughout the book. This is a very flexible and innovative approach to
measure ethnocentrism.
Even though this approach is flexible, meaning that everyone can be ethno-
centric –not just the mainstream–it may not be an inclusive way to measure eth-
nocentrism. Remember that ethnocentrism is briefly defined as “prejudice broadly
defined”. Kinder and Kam’s (2009) method estimates an ethnocentrism score out of
negative stereotypes (or feeling thermometers) toward whites, blacks, Asian Ameri-
cans, and Latinos. As I discussed earlier, these are not the only outgroups Americans
formerly sterotyped or are still stereotyping. Catholics, Jews, gays and lesbians, il-
legal immigrants, feminists, and, of course, Muslims among all other minorities, do
not have a well-defined ethnic or racial definitions.
To acknowledge, Kinder and Kam’s measure strongly predicts prejudice to-
ward these minorities, as shown in the book. But, we need a broader ethnocentrism
measure, which can capture prejudice not only toward blacks, Asian Americans, and
Latinos, but also other minorities. I argue that a factor analytic technique may be a
better approach to measure ethnocentrism. Factor analysis was initially developed
in psychology, and has recently been very influential and common in political sci-
ence research as well. The idea is straightforward. We try to measure an unobserved
variable through observed variables. It may not be a good strategy to ask people
whether they are ethnocentric or not. There may be a lot of people who do not know
what the term means because it is too jargon-loaded. Instead, we can ask people
about their evaluations of minorities either through feeling thermometers, negative
stereotypes, or other related questions. We theorize that these evaluations are result
50
of ethnocentrism, which is not directly observed. Factor analysis enables us to get
at this theoretically underlying phenomenon behind these minority evaluations. It
is also a data reduction technique so we can observe a lot of variation among these
variables with a minimum number of dimensions. In other words, factor analysis
minimizes, given all assumptions are satisfied, the curse of dimensionality. “Band
of Others” uses factor analysis to measure ethnocentrism, and to study the dimen-
sional structure of minority attitudes, which will predict attitudes toward Muslim
Americans. It is a broader conceptualization of already existing measures of ethno-
centrism. I use the 2004 and 2008 American National Election Studies (ANES) to
conduct the factor analysis for all available marginalized or minority groups. The
available groups do not change that much from one year to another. In both years,
the analysis will include blacks, Latinos, Asian Americans, Catholics, Jews, welfare
recipients, gays and lesbians, illegal immigrants, feminists, Christian fundamental-
ists, and Muslims. The 2008 ANES also asked about Hindus and atheists.
The choice of these groups is not arbitrary. I included blacks because they have
a unique history by being the most important minority in the United States. Starting
from the era of slavery to the Civil Rights Movement, and recently, to the election
of President Obama, blacks have been at the heart of the American experience.
Explicitly (Sniderman and Piazza 1993) or symbolicly (Sears et al. 1980), anti-black
racism is still prevalent, and has a powerful impact on social welfare attitudes.
They, as Theiss-Morse (2009, 61) finds, “have been frequently been reminded of
their marginal status as Americans across U.S. history” so that they “put some
distance between themselves and this national group to which they belong.” A
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study on minorities in the United States cannot be complete, if not wrong, without
incorporating prejudice toward blacks.
Although blacks have been the most populous minority in the United States,
there are several studies done by the Census Bureau, showing that by 2050, one
in four of the American population will be from Hispanic origin, and they already
outnumbered blacks. People’s attitudes toward Latinos and illegal immigration are
very much related. According to the 2008 ANES, more than nine out of ten people
think that controlling illegal immigration is very or somewhat important with a
weighted sample. This ratio increases to almost 95 percent among the mainstream
population. Studies on attitudes toward immigration is becoming very common in
both political science and sociology (Hood and Morris 1997, Welch and Sigelman
2000).
Scholars have also been studying anti-Asian attitudes. The most recent re-
search on Asian Americans concluded that they are envied and highly stereotyped
people (Lin et al. 2005). In a seminal study, Gilens (2000) empirically showed the
importance of whites’ racial attitudes in shaping opposition to welfare policies. Peo-
ple on welfare are among one of the least liked groups in both the 2004 and 2008
ANES data.
Even though several studies show that Americans are more comfortable with
homosexuality that they used to be (Wilcox and Norrander 2002, Brewer 2003),
Overby and Barth (2002), in a recent study, find that anti-homosexual attitudes are
highly dependent on contact and familiarity with gays and lesbians. The size of the
local gay population is one of the most important predictors of anti-gay attitudes.
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Anti-Christian Fundamentalists was a major focus of two studies by Bolce
and De Maio (1999a,b). They find that anti-fundamentalist attitudes have become
increasingly a strong predictor of partisanship and vote choice. Its impact on elec-
toral outcome is stronger than that of ideology. Since, in the previous chapter, we
establish the fact that mainstream Americans are mostly non-Latino, non-Asian,
and non-Jewish whites who do not belong to any minority religion, whether anti-
fundamentalism is part of band of others is an empirical question. And, I’ll try to
address that in the next part.
Several scholars acknowledge the fact that anti-Catholic attitudes used to be
very negative but, now, they are part of American society as a non-marginalized
group of people. Perceptually, at least, there is no statistically significant difference
between Protestants and Catholics concerning feeling like prototypical Americans
(Theiss-Morse 2009). Even though they may be counted as Americans, stereotypes
and prejudice about them may not change as quickly over time. Therefore, I decided
to include them as part of this initial factor analysis.
The story of Jews in America is very similar to Irish and Italian Catholics, too.
As we see in the previous chapter, they used to be subject to harsh stereotyping and
discrimination but they are very well integrated into American society. However,
anti-semitism has been, unfortunately, one of the most important, and partly still
existing, form of prejudice. Since the seminal study of Adorno et al. (1950) on anti-
semitism, recent studies have documented that prejudice and stereotypes about Jews
are still an important part of American public opinion (Selznick and Steinberg 1979,
Sniderman and Piazza 1993).
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Finally, Muslims are part of this factor analysis because they are one of the
least liked groups in the United States (Gibson 2008, Kalkan, Layman and Us-
laner 2009). Edgell, Gerteis and Hartmann (2006) showed, for example, that many
Americans are not sure whether Muslims agree with their vision of American society.
Similarly, Sides and Gross (2007) display that Muslims are rated very negatively on
some stereotype questions whereas other minority groups have slightly better rat-
ings. If the theory of “band of others” holds in terms of its impact on Muslim
attitudes, then Muslims have to be in this analysis to see where they belong in
relation to other minority groups in America.
3.2.2 Dimensional Analysis of Minority Attitudes
The factor analysis will be conducted among mainstream Americans (non-
Latino, non-Asian, and non-Jewish whites who do not belong to any minority re-
ligion). Since Catholics and Muslims are part of this analysis, I also excluded all
Catholic and non-Judeo Christian respondents from the sample. This way the re-
maining respondents will look approximately the way Theiss-Morse (2009) defines
the mainstream American. All of the minority attitudes are measured by feeling
thermometers, which are positivity biased-corrected.3 Again, the analyses will be
computed for both the 2004 and 2008 ANES.
3Following Wilcox, Sigelman and Cook (1989), I computed a mean rating out of responses
given to all feeling thermometer questions. Then, I subtracted this mean feeling thermometer
rating from the minority feeling thermometers for each respondent. I applied this to all of the
feeling thermometers I used in this and the following chapters using the ANES datasets.
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I used the method of principal components factor analysis to estimate the load-
ings and scores. Since I expect a correlation among the factor dimensions, I prefer
oblique rotation to get a simpler structure. The initial results suggest a three-factor
solution with three eigenvalues greater than 1, following Kaiser’s rule. However,
even though retaining factors using this rule makes technical sense, it is somewhat
arbitrary. The most important drawback is the potential to retain a smaller number
of factors than theoretically necessary. Recent developments in the field of measure-
ment show preference for Horn’s parallel analysis, which runs factor analysis in a
randomly generated dataset with similar distributional properties. Then, we com-
pare the eigenvalues of the factor analysis out of this randomly generated dataset
with our dataset. We retain the number of factors, which have higher eigenvalues
than the ones in the simulated case. It is similar to the bootstrapping procedure.
Horn’s parallel analysis suggests that we can express our data in a two-dimensional
plot, or with two factors.
Rather than presenting the factor loadings in a table, I will display attitudes
toward groups in a two-dimensional plot. The loadings from the first factor will be
depicted on the x-axis, and the second one will be on y-axis. Figures 3.1 and 3.2
show the structures of minority attitudes in 2004 and 2008, respectively.4 In 2004,
there are three clear clusters of minorities. Asian Americans, Latinos, and blacks
are one cluster, and it is highly correlated with the second dimension. Muslims, gays
and lesbians, illegal immigrants, and feminists (although feminists are a little bit
4Even though I use oblique rotation, I presented them in an orthogonal display for visual
reasons. The substantive story does not change in the non-orthogonal display.
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farther from the visible cluster) are another cluster but these are highly correlated
with the first dimension. The final group of minorities is clustered in between these
two groups. It includes Jews, Catholics, and welfare recipients, and this cluster
correlates with both dimensions. The only group that does not cluster with any
group is Christian Fundamentalists. It shows that mainstream Americans’ attitudes
toward this group are fairly independent of their attitudes toward other minorities.
This does not mean that people’s prejudice toward these minority groups do not
have a significant impact on attitudes toward Christian Fundamentalist. It is an
empirical question that goes beyond the scope of my dissertation.
Figure 3.1: Structure of Minority Attitudes in 2004
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Substantively speaking, it seems that American attitudes toward minorities
are multi-dimensional, meaning that there are “bands of others”, rather than a
single monolithic cluster that explains everything. The correlation between these
two factors are above .38 which suggests a relatively strong correlation between
two dimensions. On the one hand, we see ethnic and racial minorities who have
been in the United States for a long time (like blacks and Asian Americans), or
highly salient (like Latinos). These minorities can be considered as the ones that
are benefiting from the long history of familiarity with mainstream Americans. On
the other hand, we observe that feelings toward behaviorally or culturally strange
outgroups are together. Muslims, gays and lesbians, and illegal immigrants are still
highly stereotyped and disliked minorities. Muslims (by belonging to a non-Judeo
Christian tradition), gays and lesbians (by challenging the “traditional” definitions
of marriage), and illegal immigrants (by not respecting the immigration laws) are
behaviorally or culturally strangers.
The cluster between these two clearly structured minority clusters can be
named as the ones who are relatively more mainstream groups when compared to
other two structures. Jews and Catholics, as I discussed in an earlier chapter, used
to be stereotyped in the past but have been becoming more and more mainstream
over time. We can see this theoretical claim by looking at the figure. Attitudes
toward them are equally distant from attitudes toward both the racial and ethnic,
and cultural and behavioral, minorities. The only anomaly in this picture may
be prejudice toward welfare recipients but, given the not uncommon perception
concerning close association of them with being blacks, I think it may be considered
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Figure 3.2: Structure of Minority Attitudes in 2008
as a proxy for black attitudes.
We see a very similar picture in the 2008 analysis in figure 3.2 as well. This
analysis includes attitudes toward Hindus and atheists in addition. Again, we ob-
serve three main clusters, with Christian Fundamentalists being clearly distinctive
like we see in 2004. The racial and ethnic minority attitudes are very closely related
to each other. People tend to form their evaluations of Asian Americans, Latinos,
and Blacks within a single band. This time, unlike 2004, this cluster includes eval-
uations of Jews as well. I do not think that this is a drastic change from what we
saw in 2004. Previously, they were closer to Catholics, who have been a familiar
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minority for a long time, now, they are closer to other familiar minorities.
More consistently than these two structures, band of culturally or behaviorally
“strange” minorities include the same groups in 2008, too. It is clearly seen in the
figure that prejudice toward Muslims, illegal immigrants, gays and lesbians, and
feminists tend to go together, along with dislike of Hindus and atheists. Mainstream
Americans hardly distinguishes these minorities from each other when they express
their feelings toward them. The structure persists from 2004 to 2008 without almost
any change with this band of minorities.
The bigger picture these figures show us is that ethnocentric evaluations of
Americans are multi-dimensional. There is clearly a band of racial and ethnic mi-
norities, a band of culturally and behaviorally marginalized groups, and a band of
more mainstream groups, like Catholics. Based on this empirical fact and substan-
tive expectations, the theory of band of others refers to this multi-dimensional picture
we see in figure 3.1 and 3.2.
I argue that the most important factor behind dislike of Muslims is this multi-
dimensional nature of band of others. People who welcome Hindus, illegal im-
migrants, gays and lesbians, atheists, feminists, Jews, blacks, Latinos, and Asian
Americans tend to welcome Muslims as well. And, this structure, as the theory of
ethnocentrism suggests, will be independent of short-term political predispositions
and some minority related issue attitudes. It is deeper than these, and it is more
of a psychological attachment to bigotry or not. Even though it is only a four-year
period, we see almost no dramatic change in the structure of band of others. So,
this attachment persists.
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In the next part of the chapter, I will examine Muslim attitudes in a multi-
variate analysis, and compare the persistence of band of others in the pre and post
September 11 attacks eras. Then, I will talk about the importance of contact and
familiarity for minority attitudes, with specific attention on Muslim attitudes, in
the United States.
3.3 Band of Others and Muslim Attitudes
What is the most important factor that makes people dislike Muslims? If it
is this ethnocentric attachment, or “band of others”, then is the effect independent
of other competing explanations, like political orientations, religious traditionalism,
or perceived threat from terrorism after the September 11 terrorist attacks? These
are the essential research questions of this multivariate analysis, which will use the
same datasets, the 2004 and 2008 ANES.
A factor analysis, presented in table 3.1, among only minority groups in both
datasets for comparable analysis, suggests a two-factor solution where feeling ther-
mometers for blacks, Jews, Asian Americans, and Latinos load on one, and those
for illegal immigrants, gays and lesbians, welfare recipients, and feminists load on
another factor.5 The second factor also includes atheists and Hindus in the 2008
5Given the factor analyses in the previous section and the theoretical framework about who
the mainstream American is, I decided to exclude Christian fundamentalists and Catholics from
the factor analysis. If whites are perceived as the core mainstream group of American society,
and if Catholics have been known to be an integral part of this mainstream, then my decision to
omit those groups from the rest of the analysis is not arbitrary, but theoretically and empirically
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dataset. By looking at the composition of these factors, we can name the first one
as ”ethnic/racial minority affect” because it includes mostly positively rated and
familiar minorities, like blacks, Asian Americans, and Jews. The second one, on the
other hand, is composed of groups that do not fit into the Judeo-Christian nature of
American society, like atheists, and Hindus, or do not fit into mainstream behavioral
patterns like gays and lesbians. This is why I call this second part of band of others
as ”cultural/behavioral outgroup affect.” 6
As I expressed in the previous chapter, I expect to find that these two mea-
sures of band of others will be the most important determinant of attitudes toward
Muslims both in 2004 and 2008. Those who have positive attitudes toward blacks,
Jews, Asian Americans, and Latinos will also have positive feelings toward Muslims.
Similarly, if a person is not prejudiced toward cultural/behavioral outgroups, she
will welcome Muslims as well. People’s attitudes toward Muslims will follow this
ethnocentric pattern.
Even though I anticipate this social psychological aspect of minority attitudes
to be a major factor, there may be some other alternative explanations either from
the same literature or other theoretical frames. Authoritarian personality can be
supported. Also, since the dependent variable is Muslim feeling thermometer, it is not included in
this factor analysis
6Instead of estimating a factor score for each respondent, I take the average of these feeling
thermometers so that we can keep as many cases as possible. The scale reliability coefficients are
.65 and .55 in 2004, and .67 and .58 in 2008, for ethnic/racial minority and cultural/behavioral
minority affect indices, respectively.
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Table 3.1: Multi-Dimensional Structure of Band of Others in 2004 and 2008
2004 2008
Ethnic/Racial Cultural/Behavioral Ethnic/Racial Cultural/Behavioral
Feeling Thermometers Minority Factor Outgroup Factor Minority Factor Outgroup Factor
Latinos .74 .05 .71 .15
Jews .62 -.15 .67 -.14
Asian Americans .78 .02 .75 .04
Blacks .64 .05 .65 -.03
Feminists -.31 .65 -.36 .38
Welfare Recipients -.01 .47 -.21 .19
Gays and Lesbians .19 .68 -.06 .70
Illegal Immigrants -.01 .69 -.03 .58
Hindus – – .28 .64
Atheists – – -.16 .71
Muslims .28 .54 .11 .73
eigenvalues 2.18 1.95 2.53 2.26
N 677 892
Source: 2004 and 2008 ANES (among mainstream Americans).
Notes: Factors are retained using principal component factor method with oblique rotation.
an essential component of prejudice toward minorities. The theory of authoritar-
ian personality suggests that people may have strong attachments to conformity,
conventional life styles, and sameness, and this attachment translates into intoler-
ance of marginalized groups like Muslims (Adorno et al. 1950, Altemeyer 1996). It
is recently shown that the gap between authoritarian and democratic personalities
has significant impact on American public opinion, and party polarization in the
United States (Hetherington and Weiler 2009). Our model measures the tendency
to have authoritarian personality through questions about desirable child qualities.
The respondents pick one of the two, or voluntarily express “both”, options: inde-
pendence or respect for elders; obedience or self-reliance; curiosity or good manners;
being considerate or well-behaved. In both the 2004 and 2008 datasets, I coded the
authoritarian responses as 1, the democratic choices as 0, and voluntarily expressed
responses of ”both” as 0.5. For each respondent, I take the average of her responses
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to these questions. The higher the rating, the more authoritarian a person is, and,
in turn, the more prejudiced toward Muslims she should be.
Another way of measuring dislike of minorities is through negative stereotypes
about certain minorities (Sniderman and Piazza 1993, Kuklinski et al. N.d.). As I
showed earlier, a recent study by Kinder and Kam (2009) also uses these negative
stereotype questions to construct an ethnocentrism scale for all respondents. It
may seem problematic to have both feeling thermometers and negative stereotypes
in the same model. However, several researchers documented that prejudice and
stereotypes are two different processes. The former refers to more affect or emotional
based evaluations of minorities whereas the latter is more of cognitive attribution
of certain features- like laziness, violent, disgusting etc. - to minorities (Stangor
2004, Cuddy, Fiske and Glick 2007). Also, Gilens (2000) shows that stereotypes
about blacks have much stronger effect on welfare attitudes than affective feeling
thermometers.
Negative stereotype questions are asked about three minority groups, namely
blacks, Asian Americans, and Latinos. In both datasets, respondents are asked
to rate each of these groups on three scales, ranging from lazy to hardworking,
from unintelligent to intelligent, and from untrustworthy to trustworthy. I created
an index of negative stereotypes by taking the average of these variables for each
respondent. The scale reliability coefficient is .86. The higher the ratings, the more
stereotyped a person is, and the more prejudiced toward Muslims.
The September 11 terrorist attacks by radical Muslims heightened the sense of
threat from terrorism in American public opinion. People became willing to restrict
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the civil liberties of Muslims after the attacks (Davis 2007), and their ethnocentric
evaluations determined the level of support for anti-terrorism policies (Kam and
Kinder 2007). Since perceived threat from terrorism has a theoretically expected
influence on Muslim attitudes, I constructed an index score out of two variables in
the 2004 and 2008 ANES datasets. The first one is a question about the level of fed-
eral spending on fighting terrorism, and the second one concerns the importance of
combating international terrorism as a U.S. foreign policy goal. The higher the aver-
age scores on these variables, the higher the level of perceived threat from terrorism,
which, in turn may influence Muslim attitudes. However, as (Davis 2007, 207) finds,
“whites were fairly uniform in their negative feelings toward Islamic fundamentalists
and Arabs, regardless of threat”. Therefore, I do not expect a statistically signif-
icant effect of perceived threat on Muslim attitudes. People’s opinion of bands of
others will be the key determinant.
Since it may be related to the level of perceived threat, I also take the level
of patriotism into account. The September 11 terrorist attacks created a patriotic
atmosphere that almost all Americans were willing to express how much they like
the flag, the country, and freedom. This is why it is necessary to consider patriotic
values when studying attitudes toward Muslims. Unfortunately, the 2008 ANES
did not ask questions about patriotism so this variable is included in only the 2004
analysis. It is a composite score of five variables: how much the U.S. flag makes the
respondent feel good, how much she loves her country, how important it is to be an
American, whether American makes her ashamed or angry. The index score is the
average ratings of responses to these questions, and the scale reliability coefficient is
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.67. Similarly, given the strength of ethnocentric evaluations, I do not expect that
patriotism will have statistically significant effect on Muslim evaluations.
In addition to these alternative explanations, people who are more religious or
traditionalist may hold negative attitudes toward Muslims. For example, Altemeyer
(2003) finds that religious traditionalists hold aversive negative attitudes toward
groups with unfamiliar characteristics, behaviors, or cultural practices. Similarly,
white Evangelical Protestants, who are among one of the most religiously tradition-
alist groups in the United States, may not view Muslims positively. Their strong
support for Israel may translate into dislike against Muslims. To measure religious
traditionalism, I used four variables, namely the frequency of church attendance and
prayer, the view of the Bible and the level of guidance from religion in general. An
average score is computed for each respondent, and the scale’s reliability coefficient
is around .84 in both datasets. I also included a dummy for Evangelical Christians,
and the coding scheme for this variable comes from Layman and Green (2006).
Probably the most important alternative explanation of Americans’ attitudes
toward Muslims focuses on the political orientations of individuals. The common
perception is that conservatives or Republicans will be more likely than liberals or
Democrats to hold prejudiced views of Muslims. In the literature, several scholars
showed a significant relationship between ideology and affect toward minority groups
(Huddy et al. 2005, McClosky and Zaller 1984, Sidanius, Pratto and Bobo 1996).
As opposed to this finding, Edgell, Gerteis and Hartmann (2006), Sniderman et al.
(1989) found that ideology has little or no impact on minority attitudes. In terms
of the political debates after the September 11 terrorist attacks, neither Democratic
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nor Republican elites put blame on Muslims or Islam. For example, President Bush
made efforts to distinguish radical terrorists from ordinary Muslim citizens who have
been living in this country peacefully. There were, on the other hand, Republican
foreign policies, which targeted Islamic nations, like Afghanistan and Iraq. Demo-
cratic elites mostly supported the war on terrorism, and initially approved the war
in Iraq. So, there was not a clear demarcation between Democratic and Republican
elites in terms of their foreign policy preferences at that time. People were exposed
to mixed cues from elites, and as Zaller (1992) would suggest, they may not be
able to sort out their political predispositions with their attitudes toward Muslims.
I measured political orientations by combining the seven point party identification
and ideological placement variables. It ranges from strong Democrat/extremely lib-
eral to strong Republican/extremely conservative.7 Finally, the models will include
several socio-demographic controls such as age, education, region of residence, and
personal income.
Since the dependent variable (positivity bias corrected Muslim feeling ther-
mometer) is a continuous measure, I estimate an Ordinary Least Squares regression
among mainstream Americans (non-Latino, non-Asian, and non-Jewish whites who
do not belong to any minority religion) in both the 2004 and 2008 ANES. All of
the independent variables are coded to range from 0 to 1 so that I can compare the
relative effect of each variable on Muslim attitudes. The results for the 2004 and
7Item non responses (“don’t know” or “haven’t thought much about it”) are coded to “the
middle of the road” category in the ideological orientation variable before creating the composite
score.
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2008 models are depicted in figures 3.3 and 3.4, respectively.
Figure 3.3: Band of Others and Muslim Attitudes in 2004
Both models suggest that Muslims are perceived as members of two bands of
others. Individuals form their attitudes toward Muslims based on their already ex-
isting attitudes toward blacks, Asian Americans, Jews, Latinos, welfare recipients,
feminists, illegal immigrants, gays and lesbians, Hindus, and atheists. The impact
of both ethnic/racial minority affect and cultural/behavioral outgroup attitudes are
both statistically and substantively significant. Among all other theoretically com-
peting variables, ethnocentric evaluations of Americans toward minorities determine
the nature of Muslim evaluations. If a person welcomes these minorities, then she
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will welcome Muslims as well. In a more substantive way, other things being equal,
if we just increase these band of others variables from their minimum to maximum
levels, the increase in Muslim feeling thermometer will be around .2 or .3 units in
2004, and .2 and .6 units in 2008. Under both scenarios, the increase in warmer
feelings is convincingly large on a 0 to 1 scale variable.
Figure 3.4: Band of Others and Muslim Attitudes in 2008
Among other variables, negative stereotypes about blacks, Asian Americans,
and Latinos had some influence on Muslim attitudes in 2004, but not in 2008. Au-
thoritarian values also have some effect but it is not easily distinguishable from
zero. Interestingly enough religious traditionalism has a sign flip but given its coef-
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ficient estimate is really close to zero, this change does not have a significant impact.
We see that there was a significant, although substantively very small, association
between perceived threat from terrorism and Muslim attitudes in 2004. The link
disappears in 2008. People’s attitudes toward Muslims are no longer a function of
their sense of threat seven years after the terrorist attacks.
Political orientations, as expected, do not have statistically significant effect on
prejudice toward Muslims. Conservatives or Republicans are no more or less likely
than liberals or Democrats to hold prejudice toward Muslims, on average. Dislike of
minorities is more of a psychological, as I discussed earlier, than a political process.
Among socio-demographic variables, only the age of respondents have some effect
on Muslim evaluations in both years. The older the person, the more likely she is to
be prejudiced. Southern residents are barely more negative than non-Southerners
toward Muslims in 2008 but not in 2004. Evangelicals’ attitudes are also very similar
to those of Southerners, slightly negative but not very distinguishable from zero.
There are two important implications of these multivariate models. First,
Americans perceive minorities as members of band of others, in a multi-dimensional
way. Outgroups that are more familiar to mainstream society are in one dimension,
and minorities that are less familiar and behaviorally more different from proto-
typical Americans are in another dimension. No matter how these bands are con-
structed, people’s level of prejudice toward them is the major determinant of Muslim
attitudes.
Second, the obvious explanations, such as political orientations or level of
threat, have either very small or no effect on attitudes toward Muslims. Individuals’
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attachments to ethnocentric evaluations are relatively independent of political events
or predispositions. The level of perceived threat in the post September 11 era does
not play that important a role in terms of Muslim attitudes. Nevertheless, my
analysis, so far, has not answered an important question concerning whether the
terrorist attacks changed this ethnocentric structure of Muslim attitudes. Is band
of others persistent over time? Does its structure change after an important even
that is closely related to a minority? In the next section of this chapter, I will try
to answer these questions by comparing the pre and post September 11 models.
3.3.1 Persistence of the Band of Others
Prejudice toward the band of others is a psychological outcome, which is un-
likely to change quickly. There may be ups and downs for some minorities at certain
times but the general pattern, ethnocentric structure, should stay the same. People
may have held much more negative attitudes toward Muslims right after the terror-
ist attacks. However, the most crucial determinant of this dislike may still be dislike
of blacks, Asians, Latinos, Jews, feminists, gays and lesbians, atheists, and illegal
immigrants. One way to test this claim is through comparing similar models in the
pre and post September 11 datasets. I expect to find that the influence of gener-
alized outgroup affect has always been the strongest predictor of Muslim attitudes.
In other words, even before the attacks, Muslims were perceived as members of this
persistent ethnocentric structure.
I use four datasets, two of which were conducted before September 11, 20001.
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They come from the 2000 Pew Campaign Typology and the 2001, 2002, and 2007
Pew Religion in American Public Life Surveys. The dependent variable for all of
these models is a four-category Muslim favorability rating that ranges from “very
unfavorable” to “very favorable”. There are four main independent variables. The
first one is the religious outgroup affect, which is similar to the band of others
variables in the ANES models. For each year, I tried to construct a variable which
can tap into the minority attitudes. It is an average rating of all of the non-Muslim
religious minority groups that the respondent evaluated. All of these groups include
favorability of Jews and atheists8 in all years, with Buddhists added in 2001 and
Mormons added in 2007. I expect these variables to have the strongest positive
relationship with attitudes toward Muslims. Those who rate Jews and atheists high
on these scales will rate Muslims high as well.
In line with my argument about the competing explanations in the previous
section, I control the model for political orientations (mean rating of party iden-
tification and ideology), a dichotomous variable for born-again Evangelicals, and
church attendance; along with socio-demographic controls such as age, education,
and region of residence. All of these variables follow the same coding scheme I used
in the ANES models, and the model variables are coded to range from 0 to 1.
Since the dependent variable is categorical, I use ordered logit to estimate the
coefficients. The estimation sample includes only mainstream Americans. The re-
sults of the models are presented in table 3.2. Since it is a non-linear model, there
8The wording is “non-religious people” in 2001
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is no straightforward substantive interpretation of the raw coefficients. However, we
can still interpret the direction and statistical significance. The positive and statis-
tically significant coefficient estimates on religious outgroup affect clearly support
my expectations. Both pre and post September 11, the most important mechanism
that explains Muslim attitudes is people’s dislike of other religious minorities. If
they welcome Jews, atheists, Buddhists, and Mormons, then they have no problems
with Muslims either. Prejudice toward these religious minorities goes hand in hand
with dislike of Muslims regardless of the time frame we use, before or after the
attacks. Political predispositions may pick up their effects. Born-again Christians
are less likely than those who are not to evaluate Muslims positively. The level of
church attendance, on the other hand, has no statistically significant relationship
with Muslim prejudice.
A more substantive interpretation of these non-linear model coefficients is pos-
sible through predicted probabilities. I computed the change in predicted probabili-
ties of having “very favorable” ratings of Muslims when we move from the minimum
to maximum value on the independent variables. There are other ways to compute
these changes, such as assigning one standard deviation below and above the mean,
but I choose the minimum to maximum approach to be able to compare relative
impact of the independent variables. Equally important, I assigned the observed
sample values to all variables other than the variable of interest. For example, while
calculating the influence of religious outgroup affect, I assigned observed values to
political orientations, born again Evangelicals, church attendance, age, education,
and region of residence variables. Therefore, the predicted probabilities reflect the
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Table 3.2: Structure of Muslim Attitudes Before and After September 11, 2001
Pre 9/11 Post 9/11
2000 2001 2002 2007
Religious Outgroup Affect 5.75 8.21 4.80 5.86
(.51) (.50) (.54) (.48)
Political Orientations -.31 -.70 -.89 -1.61
(.37) (.28) (.34) (.30)
Born Again Christians -.10 -.50 -.45 -.51
(.21) (.18) (.20) (.17)
Worship Attendance .46 .29 -.05 -.32
(.36) (.31) (.36) (.30)
South -.28 -.03 -.46 -.11
(.20) (.16) (.19) (.16)
Age -1.40 -1.47 -.61 -1.48
(.46) (.35) (.41) (.36)
Education .23 -.49 1.17 .44
(.37) (.32) (.38) (.29)
τ1 -.09 -.11 .01 -.72
(.49) (.38) (.49) (.41)
τ2 1.74 2.07 1.60 1.45
(.48) (.38) (.48) (.41)
τ3 5.26 6.49 5.51 5.06
(.54) (.45) (.55) (.45)
N 472 782 529 743
pseudo R2 .16 .26 .11 .18
EPCP .13 .14 .10 .18
Source: 2000 Pew Campaign Typology; 2001, 2002, and 2007
Pew Religion in American Public Life Surveys.
Notes: The cell entries are ordered logit coefficients
with standard errors in parentheses. The entries in italics reflect
the change in predicted probability of having “very favorable ratings
of Muslims as you move from the minimum to maximum value of
the independent variable, while holding all other independent
variables at their observed sample values.
The models are estimated among non-Latino whites who are
Christians. The dependent variable is a four-category favorability
rating of Muslims, ranging from very unfavorable
to very favorable. All independent variables are coded to range
from 0 to 1.
average effect of a change in one independent variable across the whole sample. This
is both theoretically and empirically better than setting the variables to their sample
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means or modes.
The biggest substantive change in the predicted probabilities of having a “very
favorable” rating of Muslims comes from, as expected, people’s favorability of reli-
gious minorities. A move from true dislike of Jews, atheists, Buddhists, and Mor-
mons to the warmest evaluations of them, increased the predicted probability of
having very favorable opinions about Muslims by 52, 61, 25, and 29 percentage
points in 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2007, respectively. The magnitudes of the other
independent variables are nowhere close to these numbers. The association between
band of others and Muslim attitudes is both statistically and substantively strong.
And, this effect is relatively immune to dramatic events like terrorist attacks. We
see a powerful influence of ethnocentric evaluations on Muslim attitudes both be-
fore and after the terrorist attacks. The strength of band of others structure in
explaining Muslim attitudes in contemporary America has been persistent. Hence,
based on the empirical evidence from this over time analysis, it may not be wrong
to conclude that the September 11 terrorist attacks made very small or no change
to how Americans perceive Muslims.
3.4 Muslims, Familiarity, and Band of Others
As I expressed earlier, theory of “band of others” refers to a multi-dimensional
structure of minority attitudes in the United States. It consists of two major clus-
ters, namely ethnic/racial and cultural/behavioral outgroups. The former includes
blacks, Asian Americans, Jews, and Latinos, and the latter has Muslims, illegal
74
immigrants, gays and lesbians, feminists, welfare recipients, Hindus, and atheists.
One of the most important features of this two-dimensional minority attitudes is,
as can be seen in figures 3.5 and 3.6, that the racial/ethnic minorities have clearly
higher favorability ratings than the cultural/behavioral outgroups in 2004 and 2008.
Blacks, Asian Americans, Jews, and Latinos are relatively liked minorities because
they are rated above the average feeling thermometer. In contrast, other minorities
such as Muslims, are consistently rated below the average.
Figure 3.5: Feeling Thermometer Ratings of Minorities in 2004
One distinct thing about Muslims, among others, concerns that prejudice to-
ward them can be explained by both dimensions of band of others. In 2004, Muslim
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attitudes load both on the racial/ethnic minority and cultural/behavioral minority
factors (please see table 3.1). The reason for why Muslim attitudes load highly on
both factors may be due to the ethnic composition of Muslim Americans. They are
mostly foreign born, and American public associates Muslims with Arab Americans
perceptually (please see the first chapter). In addition to a behaviorally “strange”
religion, Muslim Americans have also this ethnic minority feature.
Figure 3.6: Feeling Thermometer Ratings of Minorities in 2008
Given the relatively more positive ratings of ethnic/racial minorities and the
multi-dimensional nature of Muslim attitudes, can we say that people’s attitudes
toward Muslims might grow more favorable as mainstream Americans’ familiarity
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with them increases? In other words, can we observe Muslim attitudes becoming
more and more aligned with attitudes toward blacks, Asian Americans, Latinos, and
Jews after 2004?
A way of looking at whether Muslim attitudes can change in the future is
through incorporating the contact hypothesis. According to Adorno et al. (1950,
149), an ethnocentric person “is prepared to reject groups with which he has never
had contact” so that a “new group can easily become an outgroup”. The contact
hypothesis suggests increased contact among social groups may lead to a decline in
the level of prejudice against outgroups. Contact among different social categories
will eventually reduce negative attitudes and stereotypes about the groups that are
contacted (Stangor 2004). It is a peaceful progression model (Allport 1954, 261).
This is not an unconditional expectation, though. The contacting groups must
hold equal status, the prejudiced outgroup must show signs of acceptable behavior
to the ingroup, both parties must be in an interdependent environment, broader
culture must promote norms concerning tolerance, and finally, “it is important that
enough time be allowed for the changes to take effect” (Stangor 2004, 324). Learning
about others can combat stereotypes of outgroups (Kawakami et al. 2000), eliminate
uncertainty about outgroups (Crosby, Bromley and Saxe 1980), and increase cultural
sensitivity (Dovidio et al. 2002).
Empirical support for the contact hypothesis presents mixed findings. Studies
using the meta-analysis method to survey the existing literature, (Pettigrew and
Topp 2000), however, find that contact per se works for reducing the prejudice and
improving outgroup attitudes. Since, Muslims introduce a “strange,” or at least
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not-widely known, religious preferences and teachings into mainstream American
culture (Jamal and Naber 2008, 120–121), attitudes toward Muslims can arise from
a lack of familiarity or contact. If people get to know Muslims, this behavioral or
cultural “strangeness” may fade away.
I use the 2007 Pew Religion and Public Life dataset, which has a question
about whether the respondents had contact with Muslims. 41 percent of mainstream
Americans know someone who is Muslim. They tend to be male, young, more
affluent, and highly educated. The findings are presented in tables 3.3 and 3.4,
for Muslims and Mormons, respectively. Those who do not know any Muslim tend
to hold very or mostly unfavorable ratings of Muslims. More than 60 percent of
them are in either one of these categories. In contrast, we see the same number
of people who hold mostly or very favorable ratings of Muslims, among those who
know someone who is Muslim. There is a clear pattern between familiarity, or lack
thereof, and dislike of Muslims. As you become more familiar with Muslims, there
is a potential to become less prejudiced toward them. The strong chi-squared test
statistics (37.06, df = 3) also verifies this association.
Table 3.3: The Impact of Familiarity on Muslim Favorability
Know Anyone Who is Muslim?
Muslim Favorability No Yes
Very Unfavorable 22% 13%
Somewhat Unfavorable 39 26
Somewhat Favorable 34 54
Very Favorable 5 7
Total 100% (N=413) 100% (N=370)
χ2, df = 37.06, 3
Source: 2007 Pew Religion in American Public Life Survey
Among mainstream Americans.
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The visibility and salience of Muslims, on the other hand, is very recent (please
see Jamal and Naber (2008)). This is why knowing someone Muslim may still work
to reduce prejudice toward them. The perceived differences between the mainstream
American culture and Islamic practices may erode over time, and Muslims may be-
come one of mostly-liked minorities like blacks, Jews, Asian Americans, and Latinos.
The 2008 ANES data do not suggest a very promising story in terms of Muslims’
place in the multi-dimensional picture of band of others. They are aligned more
with the mostly-disliked cultural/behavioral outgroups like feminists, illegal immi-
grants, gays and lesbians, welfare recipients, Hindus, and atheists. On the other
hand, the 2007 Pew data are telling us a more positive story. As the familiarity be-
tween mainstream Americans and Muslims increases, the likelihood of having more
favorable ratings of Muslims may increase. Muslims may experience what Jews,
Irish and Italian Americans experienced in the past. Initially disliked, they became
an integral part of mainstream society. However, as the 2008 data show, it is not
going to be easy for Muslims, or happen in the near future.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I elaborated on the theory of the band of others. It expands
the scope of ethnocentrism by incorporating prejudice toward all possible minorities.
An empirical look at the minority attitudes revealed that Americans evaluate mi-
norities on two major dimensions, an ethnic/racial and cultural/behavioral outgroup
affect. The former includes mostly-liked groups such as blacks, Asian Americans,
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Jews, and Latinos. The latter is composed of mostly-disliked minorities like fem-
inists, welfare recipients, illegal immigrants, gays and lesbians, atheists, Hindus,
and Muslims. I argue that this multi-dimensional structure of minority attitudes
is the most important predictor of prejudice toward Muslims. They are perceived
as another member of this band of others so mainstream Americans will evaluate
them with respect to their feelings toward other minorities. In other words, if an
individual welcomes these minorities, she will welcome Muslims as well. Since this is
mostly a psychological orientation, the structure that explains Muslim feelings will
not change due to political orientations or traumatic events like terrorist attacks.
By using the 2004 and 2008 ANES data, I find support for my expectation
that attitudes toward Muslims are mostly determined by attitudes towards the band
of others. And, a longitudinal analysis by using the pre and post September 11 data
(Pew Data), I show that the structure that explains Muslim feelings is persistent.
It is not affected by the terrorist attacks.
In the final part of the chapter, I tried to answer whether prejudice toward
Muslims have some distinct features. Particularly, in 2004, we observe that Mus-
lims are perceived as both ethnic/racial and cultural/behavioral minorities. The
former is due to a common perception about Muslims being Arabs, and the latter
is due to their non-Judeo Christian practices. The 2008 data show that Muslims
become increasingly perceived as part of the latter, rather than the former. Posi-
tively rated minority groups are in the ethnic/racial minority dimension, not in the
cultural/behavioral one. The 2007 Pew data showed that mainstream Americans
who know someone who is Muslim are more likely than others who do not know
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a Muslim to hold more positive attitudes toward Muslims. It looks like familiarity
will be the key factor in determining their long term place in American society.
They may climb up in the societal ladder and become a part of the “melting pot”
of the United States as they interact with mainstream Americans more. It will take
some time but the higher socio-economic status of Muslims and their willingness to




Voting for a Hypothetical Muslim
Candidate
4.1 Muslims in Politics
Keith Maurice Ellison became the first Muslim to be elected to the United
States Congress from Minnesota in 2006. He was also the first African American
elected to the House of Representatives from Minnesota but debates around his can-
didacy and campaign were predominantly about him being a Muslim. He converted
to Islam from Catholicism during his college years at Wayne State University. Af-
ter graduating from the University of Minnesota Law school, he became an active
political figure in Minnesota politics. When Rep. Martin Sabo (D-MN) decided to
retire in 2006, Ellison appeared as his successor in the primaries, and won 56 percent
of the votes in the general election. After his election, there was a big controversy
around his decision to be sworn in using a Quran, rather than the Bible. For ex-
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ample, Rep. Virgin Goode (R-Va) just before the ceremony mentioned that “I fear
that in the next century we will have many more Muslims in the United States if
we do not adopt the strict immigration policies that I believe are necessary” (Shear
and Craig 2006). This fear also showed itself in the November 14, 2006 edition of
CNN Headline News. Keith Ellison was Glenn Beck’s guest after his first election
to the House. Here is a brief transcript of their dialogue at the very beginning of
the program:
BECK: OK. No offense, and I know Muslims. I like Muslims. I’ve been to mosques.
I really don’t believe that Islam is a religion of evil. I – you know, I think it’s
being hijacked, quite frankly. With that being said, you are a Democrat. You
are saying, “Let’s cut and run.” And I have to tell you, I have been nervous
about this interview with you, because what I feel like saying is, “Sir, prove
to me that you are not working with our enemies.”
And I know you’re not. I’m not accusing you of being an enemy, but that’s
the way I feel, and I think a lot of Americans will feel that way.
ELLISON: Well, let me tell you, the people of the Fifth Congressional District
know that I have a deep love and affection for my country. There’s no one
who is more patriotic than I am. And so, you know, I don’t need to – need to
prove my patriotic stripes.
What we see both in Beck’s and Rep. Goode’s reaction toward Rep. Ellison
is fear or at least suspicion against those who are not like them. Rep. Goode
emphasizes the importance of immigration laws to halt Muslim presence in the
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United States, and Beck generalizes his suspicion about Rep. Ellison’s religious
background to a lot of Americans. The common denominator in both cases is a
dislike of a minority group, which follows an ethnocentric path, a generalized dislike
or fear of outgroups that are not like “us.” It is quick and readily available. No
evidence is needed to be able to ask a Muslim Congressman whether he is working
with enemies. Ethnocentric evaluations are easily triggered by someone’s minority
status, like race, religion, ethnicity or even a “strange” sounding name.
In this chapter, I will examine the influence of ethnocentric evaluations and its
the electoral importance in linking candidates’ socio-demographic backgrounds to
vote choice by analyzing experimental data on the impact of cues about the ethnic,
religious, and cultural background of a hypothetical Muslim and Arab-American
candidate. Does a Middle Eastern sounding name have any effect on this candi-
date’s electoral chance? What if he is a Muslim or an Arab? What conditions
people’s vote choice when they hear about candidate’s minority status? Is it mostly
ethnocentrism? Or, do political predispositions, religious traditionalism, or authori-
tarianism play any role in this electoral decision making? I seek to expand the scope
of research on the political consequences of candidates’ socio-demographic character-
istics to include candidates with Muslim and Arab religious and ethnic backgrounds.
I find that the nature of the candidate’s name is inconsequential for his appeal to
voters, while information about the candidate’s Muslim religious affiliation and cues
about his Arab ethnic background have very similar effects on his electoral strength.
There are virtually no differences in support between respondents who know that
the candidate is Muslim, those who know that he was born in an Arab country,
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and those who know both things. As expected, I also find strong support for the
fact that people’s attitudes toward the band of others, or their ethnocentric eval-
uations, are the major conditioning effect on the likelihood of voting for a Muslim
or an Arab candidate. As they grow warmer toward cultural/behavioral outgroups,
their tendency to vote for a minority candidate increases as well. Even though
voting is mainly a political process, in the case of minorities, political predisposi-
tions, religious traditionalism, or authoritarianism do not play as important a role
as ethnocentrism plays.
4.2 Stereotypes as Shortcuts and Voting
Classical democratic theory defines voting as a complex cognitive process that
requires citizens’ deep involvement in political debates and deliberations. How-
ever, as Schattschneider (1960) aptly argues, this is not a realistic expectation.
Widespread political ignorance found among individuals is not necessarily a bad
thing. It is democratic theory that fails to foresee politically unsophisticated peo-
ple, not the practice (Schattschneider 1960). Even though people might only know a
little bit about the political environment, they are still able to make sense of politics,
and cast their vote accordingly. Lack of political knowledge does not prevent them
from aligning their positions with their electoral preferences. In this process, rather
than engaging in detailed analyses of elections or candidates, most citizens make
political decisions on the basis of information heuristics such as party identification
(generally the most readily accessible shortcut) (Campbell et al. 1960, Downs 1957,
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Conover and Feldman 1982, 1989, McDermott 2009), incumbent/challenger status
in congressional elections (Jacobson 1992, Herrnson 1995), and stereotypes about
social groups (Brady and Sniderman 1985, Lau 1986, Fiske and Taylor 1991, Miller,
Wlezien and Hildreth 1991). Voters use these cognitive heuristics as a way to act
“rationally” under a low information environment, and one such shortcut is the de-
mographic profile of the candidates in an election (Stokes and Miller 1962, Popkin
1994). Candidate characteristics provide low-cost information based on commonly-
accepted social group stereotypes. Through early socialization in family and at
school, past experiences, and stored knowledge, “voters can make reasonable as-
sumptions about the ideology of a candidate based on associations with salient
political or social groups” (McDermott 1997, 271).
Most of the research on the impact of candidates’ socio-demographic features
has focused on the cases of female or African-American candidates, perhaps because
of the history of gender and anti-black discrimination in American life and because
gender and race may be the most salient stereotypes for low-information voters. As
Lippmann (1922) argues, stereotypes are “pictures in our heads”, and these pic-
tures enable citizens to simplify the complex political processes, like voting or issue
formation. Stereotypes about groups act as cost-reducing tools by relying on pic-
tures and generalizations about a particular group. For example, large numbers
of voters use gender-based stereotypes to make inferences about candidates’ policy
positions, issue attitudes, and personal traits (Sapiro 1983, Huddy and Terkildsen
1993, Koch 2000, Matland and King 2002). Stereotypes about women being more
liberal, nurturing, and less hawkish stimulate these automatic generalizations about
86
a woman candidate. A woman candidate may be stereotyped to support social wel-
fare policies, more money for schools, and less interventionist foreign policy. As
Sanbonmatsu (2002, 20) finds, people tend to see male candidates as better at han-
dling crime and foreign affairs, and female candidates as better at helping the poor
and protecting women’s rights’, and these gender-based attributions affect voting
behavior. Similarly, McDermott (1997) finds that, particularly in down-ticket races,
voters stereotype women candidates as more liberal than men of the same party.
Liberal voters are more likely to vote for a female Democrat than for a male Demo-
cratic candidate, and quite in the opposite direction among conservative candidates.
Dolan (1998) reinforces these findings by showing that women, via gender-oriented
issue attributions, are more likely to vote for a woman House candidate than are
men.
Meanwhile, research on the impact of candidate race on voting behavior find
a more varied impact than that of gender. In a seminal study, Sigelman et al.
(1995) conclude that voters are no more or less likely to vote for black or Latino
candidates than for Anglo (white) candidates. The race or ethnicity of candidates
neither fosters nor dampens the likelihood of being elected. Moreover, there is
no difference between white liberals, who are stereotypically in favor of ethnic or
racial minorities, and white conservatives, who are stereotypically racist, in their
attitudes toward black candidates (Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991). Some
scholars, on the other hand, find that the impact of candidates’ race depends on
contextual factors like candidate’s personal traits, prior record, and campaign style
(Citrin, Green and Sears 1990), or the level of black voter density at the local level
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(Carsey 1995). Unlike these studies, Terkildsen (1993) finds that black candidates
are penalized by white voters as a result of racial attitudes. Those with darker
black skin are “evaluated much more harshly than [their] lighter skinned peer[s]”
(Terkildsen 1993, 1048).
Despite the close and growing ties between religion and political behavior in
the United States (Layman 2001, Green 2007, Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2006), few
studies examine the influence of candidate’s religion on voting decisions, and those
that do focus almost exclusively on Catholic (Converse et al. 1961, McDermott 2007)
or Evangelical candidates (McDermott 2009). Like gender and race, candidate re-
ligious affiliation is another readily accessible information heuristic for politically
unsophisticated voters (Bolce and De Maio 1999a,b, Campbell, Green and Layman
2007). Because certain religious groups are closely associated either with a particular
party or with particular policy stands, candidate religion provides “voters with in-
ferential information about candidates’ political positions” (McDermott 2007, 955),
and a handful of studies have found candidate religion to be consequential for vote
choice and for the impact of other orientations on the vote (Converse et al. 1961,
McDermott 2007, Wilson 2007, Campbell, Green and Layman 2007). Most recent
studies focus on evangelical candidates. For example, McDermott (2009, 352) con-
cludes that voters perceive Evangelical candidates as being more conservative than
other candidates but more trustworthy and competent at the same time, so being
an Evangelical can be both an advantage or a disadvantage to the candidate.
Reliance on socio-demographic heuristics is especially likely when candidates
are from highly stereotyped minority or politically underrepresented groups (Hamil-
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ton 1981). If Muslim Americans have been one of the most highly stereotyped mi-
nority groups in the United States, as I showed in the previous chapter, we should
anticipate that stereotypes or ethnocentric evaluations will play a great role in deter-
mining voting for a hypothetical Muslim candidate. In fact, the 2003 Pew Religion
and Public Life Survey asks respondents whether they would vote for a Muslim who
is nominated by their own party as a generally well-qualified person for president.
While 60 percent said they would vote for a Muslim candidate, it was 92, 91, and
81 percent, respectively, said they would vote for a Catholic, Jewish, and Evangeli-
cal candidate. 1 Clearly, American public opinion is not very enthusiastic about a
Muslim candidate, even though he is a well-qualified person who is nominated by
one of the two major political parties.
There is also an important ethnic dimension to being Muslim in America. Ac-
cording to the 2007 Pew Muslim American survey 65 percent of Muslim Americans
are foreign born, and 32 percent are from the Middle East (Arab region and Iran).
Although 62 percent of Arab Americans are Christians (the 2003 Detroit Arab Amer-
ican Study), there is likely to be a very close association between Muslim religion
and Arab ethnicity in the minds of most Americans.2 Therefore, in addition to the
impact of cues about a candidate’s Muslim faith, I also need to assess the impact of
1These percentages are computed among mainstream Americans. To be fair, I excluded Catholic
and Evangelical respondents from the sample when I report the likelihood of voting for Catholic
and Evangelical candidates.
2Not surprisingly, the correlation between Arab and Muslim feeling thermometer ratings, in our
dataset, is .8 (by far the highest correlation between all pairs of minority group thermometers).
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Arab and Middle Eastern ethnic identifiers, like Middle Eastern oriented name and
origin, on the likelihood of supporting him.
4.3 Band of Others and Voting
In the previous chapter, I showed that mainstream Americans’ attitudes to-
ward Muslims follow an ethnocentric pattern. Those who do not dislike other mi-
nority groups also feel warmer toward Muslims, and this was true both before and
after the terrorist attacks in 2001. Political orientations, religious traditionalism,
or authoritarianism have some or no influence on prejudice toward Muslims. Prej-
udice is a social psychological process rather than a political one. Democrats or
liberals are no more or less likely than Republicans or conservatives to hold nega-
tive attitudes toward Muslims in contemporary American society. I argue that this
non-political nature of Muslim attitudes will also be prevalent in terms of voting for
a Muslim candidate. Party identification, ideology, authoritarianism, or religious
traditionalism may still play a role, but not as strong as the role ethnocentric eval-
uations play in voting for a Muslim or Arab American candidate. People’s feelings
about cultural/behavioral outgroups, more so than their political preferences, will
determine the likelihood of voting for this candidate.
There are two important reasons why political predispositions will play a lesser
role in conditioning the likelihood of voting for a Muslim or Arab American can-
didate. First, Muslim Americans’ salience in American public opinion is due to
non-partisan reasons, like terrorist attacks, different lifestyles, the war on terrorism
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and the Middle East. Their rising visibility in the United States mostly concerns
stereotypes or prejudice against them. Social psychological dynamics play a much
bigger role in debates around Muslim Americans and their place in American so-
ciety. This is why I found that it is attitudes toward band of others that shapes
Muslim attitudes in the previous chapter, and I expect to find a similar pattern
when it comes to voting for a Muslim or an Arab American cadidate. Second,
mainstream Americans may not have a clear idea concerning Muslim Americans’
party identification or ideology. They may think that Muslims are predominantly
Democratic or liberal because of attitudes coming from Republican or conservative
pundits after the post September 11 terrorist attacks. But, they may also think that
Muslims are socially and morally conservative so they may be conservative. There
are both liberal and conservative tendencies that may shape Muslim Americans’
political preferences. This potential confusion about Muslim Americans’ political
predispositions is visible in our dataset (2007 CCES) where we asked about several
groups’ party identification, namely Evangelicals, gays and lesbians, and Muslims.
More than 75 percent of the respondents thought that Evangelicals were mainly Re-
publicans, which is also empirically documented by several scholars (Layman 2001).
20 percent thought they they are divided evenly between the Democratic and Re-
publican Parties. We see a similar pattern for party identification of gays and
lesbians as well. Almost 74 percent of Americans think that they are predominantly
Democrats, and the rest think that they are divided evenly between the two parties.
People have solid ideas about which party Evangelicals and gays and lesbians belong
to. The story changes a little bit when it comes to Muslims’ party identification. 60
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percent of Americans think that Muslims are evenly divided between Democratic
and Republican Parties, and 35 percent think that they are mostly Democrats. Ac-
tually, the huge cluster around the “evenly divided” category partly indicates the
empirical reality about Muslims’ party identification. They used to be predomi-
nantly Republicans or at least not Democrats before the 2004 presidential election,
and since then, they have been dealigning from the Republican Party, and slowly
realigning themselves with the Democratic Party. For example, a recent empirical
study by Barreto and Bozonelos (2009) shows that high levels of religiosity coupled
with perceptions of discrimination against Muslims leads them to be independents
with Democratic leanings rather than strong partisans. Muslim Americans, unlike
Evangelicals (especially see Campbell, Green and Layman (2007) for the importance
of party identification concerning Evangelical candidates) and gays and lesbians, do
not belong to one of the parties in huge numbers, and this is mostly reflected in
Americans’ perceptions about their partisan ties. Lack of loyal political ties to any
major political party by Muslim Americans may decrease the influence of political
predispositions on voting for a Muslim candidate.
Religious traditionalism may also be another rival explanation for a lack of
willingness to vote for a Muslim candidate. Those people who think that the Bible
is the word of God, are frequent church attenders, consider religion as an important
part of their lives, and pray frequently may not want to vote for a Muslim candidate.
As their adherence to the basic tenets of Christianity increases, they may not want
to cast their ballot for a person with a Middle Eastern sounding name, or non-Judeo
Christian faith. The previous chapter showed that religious traditionalism did not
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play a big role in determining the structure of Muslim attitudes. Those who are on
the conservative side of this spectrum are no more or less likely than the ones on
the liberal side to dislike Muslims. I expect to find the same thing with the voting
analysis as well. Ethnocentric evaluations toward cultural/behavioral outgroups will
trump all rival explanations like religious traditionalism.
One last important factor that may shape voting for a minority candidate is
authoritarianism. Like ethnocentrism, it refers to a deep, social psychological pro-
cess that develops at the early stages of socialization. Preferences for stability and
conventional lifestyles over change may show itself in lack of willingness to vote for
a Muslim or Arab American candidate. So, when people hear a candidate’s Middle
Eastern name, Arabic ethnicity or faith (Islam), their authoritarian tendencies may
be triggered, which may in turn condition the likelihood of voting for her/him. Like
in the previous chapter, I do not expect authoritarianism to appear as a strong
predictor as affect toward cultural/behavioral outgroups.
4.4 Survey Experiment and Measurement
A Muslim candidate may have the potential to exhibit several minority fea-
tures to the electorate in addition to religious background. For example, a Muslim
candidate may also be an Arab American who came to this country as an immigrant
a long time ago. As I noted earlier, the belief that all Arab Americans are Muslims
or vice versa is not an uncommon belief among mainstream Americans. Similarly,
this candidate may have a non-Anglo or Middle Eastern sounding name. Ameri-
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cans are exposed to these types of names especially after the September 11 terrorist
attacks so they may lead to negative evaluations of a Muslim candidate as well.
In order to assess the separate effects of these three different but closely re-
lated (at least at the perceptual level) components of a potential Muslim candidate,
I employ a 2X2X2 experimental design, where I manipulate the name, religious,
and ethnicity backgrounds of the candidate. The analysis is based on a unique
experiment, included in modules of CCES surveys constructed by several political
scientists at the University of Maryland and the University of Akron and adminis-
tered online to national samples of 1,000 respondents (each-the combined sample size
of the Maryland and Akron surveys is 2,000) by Polimetrix in the fall of 2007. The
experimental questions gauge respondents’ levels of support for a hypothetical state
legislative candidate and assess the impact of information about the candidate’s
religious background (whether or not he is identified as a Muslim), his ethnicity
(whether or not he is identified as having emigrated from an Arab/Middle Eastern
country), and his name (whether or not it is Middle Eastern). We randomly place
respondents into eight experimental groups, with each group receiving a different
combination of the two values of each of these three variables. This allows us to
isolate the specific effects of the candidate’s Muslim faith, his Middle Eastern eth-
nicity, and his name—in addition to the various combinations of those factors—on
levels of support for him. The candidates’ policy positions are designed to be neutral
with regard to partisanship and ideology so that those factors should not influence
the likelihood of supporting him. The baseline question which did not identify the
candidate as Muslim, as having a Middle Eastern background, or as having a Middle
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Eastern name, was worded as follows:
We would like to get your opinion about a candidate running for the
state legislature in another state. Please read his description, and then
tell us what you think about him.
“Michael Choudhary is a successful local businessman. He is forty-one
years old, married, and has three children. He has long been active in
his community and local politics. In a recent newspaper article, this is
what he said when he was asked why he has entered the state legislative
race 3:”
“I am running for the state legislature because I want to see good wages,
a strong economy, quality schools, and honest government.”
If you lived in this candidate’s district, how likely would you be to vote
for him?
3The name “Michael Choudhary” was chosen for the baseline (or Anglo) name condition because
“Choudhary” is a relatively common last name among Arab-Americans. This fact is easily seen
in Facebook profiles. Thus, the name may plausibly combine being Muslim and having a Middle
Eastern background (in order to isolate the impact of these attributes from the impact of the
degree to which the candidate’s name is Middle Eastern). In other words, being Muslim and
having emigrated from the United Arab Emirates should seem less far-fetched to respondents for
“Michael Choudhary” than it should for a more-typically-Anglo name such as “Bob Smith.”
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Four response options are given to the respondent ranging from “not at all
likely” to “very likely”. Keeping the candidate’s policy priorities and other bi-
ographical information intact, his biography is manipulated for seven treatment
groups. In the first treatment group, his biography includes his Islamic background:
“Michael Choudhary is a successful local businessman and a Muslim. He is
forty-one years old...”
The impact of Middle Eastern ethnicity is measured by the nationality of the
candidate:
“Michael Choudhary is a successful local businessman. He immigrated to the
United States from the United Arab Emirates and is a naturalized American citizen.
He is forty-one years old...”
In order to see whether having both religion and ethnicity has a more negative
effect on the likelihood of voting, the fourth treatment group is asked about the
candidate who is a Muslim, and a Middle Eastern immigrant:
“Michael Choudhary is a successful local businessman and a Muslim. He
immigrated to the United States from the United Arab Emirates and is a naturalized
American citizen. He is forty-one years old...”
These questions are asked with the same set of manipulations (baseline, only
Muslim, only UAE, or both) for a candidate with a Middle Eastern-sounding name,
“Yousef Abdollah”. The respondents were randomly assigned to the control and
treatment groups so that we do not need to control the model for confounding
demographic variables such as education, gender, income, and education.4
4I compared the eight experimental groups using Tukey’s Honestly Significant Difference test
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The main independent variable concerns people’s attitudes toward cultural/behavioral
outgroups. A factor analysis of minority group feeling thermometers in the dataset
reveals a two-dimensional structure, as I found in the previous chapter. The findings
of the factor analysis are presented in table 4.1. 5 The multi-dimensional structure
of band of others is prevalent in this dataset as well. Ethnocentrism among main-
stream Americans has two dimensions, one for cultural/behavioral outgroups, and
one for racial/ethnic minorities. The former band includes attitudes toward Mus-
lims, Arabs, illegal immigrants, gays and lesbians, and welfare recipients whereas
the latter band includes feelings about Jews and blacks. The cultural/behavioral di-
mension (1st factor) has a stronger eigenvalue than the ethnic/racial dimension (2nd
factor). One reason for this may be the fact that I do not have other racial/ethnic
minorities in this dataset, like Asian Americans and Latinos. This is why we may
expect to find the prejudice toward cultural/behavioral minorities will have more
power in conditioning the treatments’ effect on voting for the hypothetical candidate.
Another reason may also be the fact that attitudes toward Muslims and Arabs are
closely related to cultural/behavioral outgroup affect, rather than the ethnic/racial
minority attitudes. In order to keep as many cases as possible in the estimation
sample, I computed mean of non-missing ratings of feeling thermometers in each
on the basis of education, gender, income, and age found no statistically significant differences
between them on these factors. Therefore, random assignment of respondents to control and
treatment groups worked as expected.
5Since the University of Akron module did not include some of the minority feeling thermome-
ters, the sample size decreases both in the factor analysis and the interactive model.
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factor. So, respondents average ratings for illegal immigrants, gays and lesbians,
and welfare recipients constitute the cultural/behavioral outgroup affect.6 I repli-
cated the same thing for feelings toward ethnic/racial minorities as well (average
feeling thermometer for blacks and Jews). Both variables are coded to range from
0 to 1.
Table 4.1: Factor Analysis of Minority Attitudes in 2007




Illegal Immigrants .83 -.12
Gays and Lesbians .72 -.04






Notes: Minority attitudes are measured on feeling thermometer that ranges from 0 to 100.
The factor analysis is conducted among mainstream Americans using principal component
factor method with oblique rotation.
I measure political orientations as a composite score of party identification and
ideological orientations, as in the previous chapter. Party identification is measured
as a 7 category variable, ranging from “Strong Democrat” to “Strong Republican”,
and ideological self placement is a 5 category variable ranging from “Extremely
Liberal” to “Extremely Conservative.” After recoding both variables to range from 0
6Since the hypothetical candidate is a Muslim, an Arab, or both, I did not include Muslim and
Arab feeling thermometers in this index variable.
98
to 1, I computed an average score out of these two variables (the bivariate correlation
between them is .70 among mainstream Americans) for each respondent so that the
minimum value represents those who are strong Democrat and extremely liberal, and
the maximum value represents strong Republicans who are extremely conservative.
The other important variable concerns authoritarianism which may also con-
dition the treatments’ impact on voting likelihood for the hypothetical candidate.
Following the same scheme from the previous chapter, I measured authoritarianism
out of preference between pairs of child qualities, namely independent vs. respect-
ful, curious vs. good manners, considerate vs. well-behaved, and self-reliant vs.
obedient. Unlike the NES 2004 and 2008 data, respondents were not given the
volunteered option of “both.” After coding authoritarian responses to 1, and the
others to 0, I took the average score of these four variables for each respondent. The
higher values on this variable, the more authoritarian a person is.
The last important independent variable is religious traditionalism, which may
pose an alternative rival explanation for our main hypothesis. I measured religious
traditionalism the same way I did in the previous chapter. It is a composite av-
erage score on four variables, namely view of Bible, importance of religion, church
attendance, and frequency of prayer. After coding all of these variables from 0 to 1,
where higher scores refer to more traditionalist responses, I took the average score
on them for each respondent (α = .84 among mainstream Americans).
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4.5 Findings
The first set of findings concerns whether our treatments lead to lower likeli-
hood of voting for our hypothetical candidate. Do people become less likely to vote
for him when his name is Yousef Abdollah, rather than Michael Choudhary; he is a
Muslim or an Arab American, or both? If ethnocentric evaluations play role in vot-
ing for a minority candidate, then any cue that refers to a minority status—name,
religion, or ethnicity—should yield a lower probability of voting. That is, highly
stereotyped religious and ethnic affiliations, like being Muslim or Arab, may make
people not vote for such a candidate in an election. In order to test this claim, I
estimated an ordered logit model among mainstream Americans with 7 treatment
conditions as dichotomous variables.7 The excluded category is the control group,
namely Anglo name with no cues.
The ordered logit coefficient estimates are presented in table 4.2. All treat-
ment conditions, regardless of the nature of the cue, generated lower likelihood of
voting. A Muslim or Arab American candidate with an Anglo or Middle Eastern
oriented name will be less likely than the candidate with no cue to win support
among the mainstream electorate. That is, the candidate’s minority status acted as
an informational shortcut and triggered already existing stereotypes about Muslims,
Arabs, or both, and this, in turn, leads to lower level of support when compared to
the candidate with no minority status. By looking at the size of the standard errors,
7The ordered logit models estimated throughout this chapter do not violate the assumption of
parallel regression.
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it is seen that the ethnicity cue does not influence the vote choice as strong as the
religious cue. Mainstream Americans do not differentiate the candidate who immi-
grated from the United Arab Emirates from the candidate with no minority status
at statistically significant levels. This is true for the candidate with both Anglo and
Middle Eastern oriented names. Another treatment that does not seem to generate
statistically significant effects concerns the change in name only. Yousef Abdollah
(with no other minority cues) is no more or less likely than Michael Choudhary
(with no other minority cues) to gain votes from the mainstream Americans. This
may be a surprising finding given the frequency of similar Middle Eastern oriented
names on media sources, especially after the terrorist attacks. On the other hand,
maybe Michael Choudhary is not an Anglo enough name to generate a good com-
parison category. Or, mainstream Americans may not be knowledgeable enough to
associate Yousef Abdollah with Islamic or Arabic origins.
Of course, the better way to compare the effect of these seven treatments is
through comparing predicted probabilities. I computed the predicted probability
of “very likely” voting for the candidate in each experimental condition. These
probabilities also have 95% confidence intervals which are generated through simu-
lations. They are depicted in figure 4.1. The dotted line refers to the lower end of
the confidence interval for the predicted probability of voting for the control group
candidate. There are several important things to report about this figure. First,
all treatment conditions generated lower levels of predicted probabilities; they are
all to the left of the control group candidate’s level. So, regardless of the nature
of the cue, the support is dampened. This is a verification of my band of others
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Table 4.2: All Treatments and Likelihood of Voting for Hypothetical Candidate
Independent Variables Coefficient Estimates
Anglo Name and Muslim -.67
(.22)
Anglo Name and Ethnicity -.36
(.19)
Anglo Name, Muslim, and Ethnicity -.55
(.21)
Middle Eastern Name -.27
(.18)
Middle Eastern Name and Muslim -.65
(.20)
Middle Eastern Name and Ethnicity -.43
(.22)











Notes: The model is estimated among mainstream Americans.
The excluded category is the control group, Anglo name with no cues.
The cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
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theory. Minority status is understood as a negative aspect in an ethnocentric way.
Second, the biggest drop in predicted probability of ‘very likely’ occurs when the
candidate is Muslim. The ethnicity cue alone decreases support but its influence
is weaker when compared to the effect of the religious cue. Last, when compared
to the predicted probability of ‘very likely’ voting for the control group candidate,
mainstream Americans are less likely to vote for a Muslim candidate (with Anglo
or Middle Eastern oriented name, Arab, or not) at statistically significant levels, as
the non-overlapping confidence intervals suggest.
Figure 4.1: Predicted Probability of Candidate Support Across Seven Treatment
Groups
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Both the coefficient estimates and predicted probabilities show that main-
stream Americans do not or cannot distinguish between Anglo and Middle Eastern
oriented names. They are no more or less likely to vote for Michael Choudhary than
Yousef Abdollah. In order to see whether the name treatment mattered for vote
choice, I conducted a likelihood ratio test of equality in coefficients for treatment
pairs. The findings of the test are presented in table 4.3. As the test of significance
suggests, the name manipulation did not matter for any comparison pair. Since
having an Anglo or Middle Eastern oriented name did not matter, I collapsed the
seven treatments into three. The first category includes the treatment on religion,
the second on ethnicity, and the third on both. That is, the first one refers to
a Muslim candidate, the second to an Arab candidate, and the the last one to a
Muslim and Arab candidate. These collapsed treatments cover both the Anglo and
Middle Eastern oriented names. The control group stays the same, namely Anglo
name with no religious or ethnic cues.8
In table 4.4, I presented the ordered logit model with these three combined
treatments. Mainstream Americans are less supportive of a Muslim or an Arab
American candidate. As the signs of the coefficients suggest, the likelihood of vot-
ing for these minority candidates is less than the control group candidate who does
not have any minority status. In order to best assess the relative impact of these
treatments, I computed predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for
‘very likely’ voting. The findings are presented in figure 4.2. Following an ethnocen-







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































tric pattern, all of these minority candidates find less support than the control group
candidate among mainstream Americans. The predicted probability of ‘very likely’
voting for the Muslim or Arab candidate is less than that for the control group can-
didate. Similar to the previous case, it looks like religious affiliation mattered most
and significantly when compared to the ethnicity cue. The difference in support for
the Muslim candidate and for the baseline candidate is statistically significant. We
observe the same effect for the candidate who is both Muslim and Arab American.
The importance of religion appears once again in this combined treatment analysis.
Nevertheless, the picture is very clear that regardless of the nature of the cue, the
predicted probability of voting for minority candidates is less than that of voting for
a baseline candidate. What we observe as a general tendency reflects mainstream
ethnocentrism.
Table 4.4: Combined Treatments and Likelihood of Voting for Hypothetical Candi-
date
Independent Variables Coefficient Estimates
Muslim Cue -.52
(.15)
Ethnicity Cue (U.A.E) -.25
(.15)











Notes: The model is estimated among mainstream Americans.
The excluded category is the control group, Anglo name with no cues.
The cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 4.2: Predicted Probability of Voting Across Combined Three Treatment
Groups
So far, the findings suggest that the experimental treatments make mainstream
Americans less willing to support a Muslim or an Arab American candidate at sta-
tistically significant levels. A hypothetical Muslim or Arab American candidate will
have a lower probability of getting elected when compared to a mainstream can-
didate without any minority features. I argue that the main reason for this lower
level of support is primarily due to people’s attachment to ethnocentrism. The
more ethnocentric a person gets, the less likely she will vote for a Muslim or an
Arab American candidate. In other words, our candidate’s socio-demographic char-
107
acteristics will trigger individuals’ attitudes toward band of others. Affect toward
illegal immigrants, gays and lesbians, and welfare recipients, for example, will be
the main conditioning effect on the probability of voting for a Muslim or an Arab
American candidate. To test this hypothesis, I estimated a fully interactive ordered
logit model where the treatments are interacted with cultural/behavioral outgroup
affect. The coefficient estimates are presented in table 4.5.
Ordered logit is a nonlinear model so t-statistics will not be helpful to examine
whether the interaction term is statistically significant or not (Ai and Norton 2003).
But, we can still interpret the directions for both the constitutive and interactive
terms. For example, those who really dislike cultural/behavioral outgroups are less
likely to vote for a Muslim or an Arab American (or both Muslim and Arab Ameri-
can) candidate when compared to the mainstream candidate without any minority
features. So, the treatment group candidates have lower levels of intercepts than
the control group candidate. the sign on the cultural/behavioral outgroup affect
term is negative but the sampling variability around it is so big. Based on that we
would expect almost a flat predicted probability curve indicating no conditioning
effect of cultural/behavioral affect on voting for the control group. All of the in-
teractive terms have positive signs so that as attitudes toward cultural/behavioral
outgroups become warmer, the likelihood of voting for a Muslim or an Arab Amer-
ican candidate increases as well. That is, when mainstream Americans hear about
a candidate’s minority background, their ethnocentric evaluations kick in, and con-
dition their voting decisions.
The coefficient estimates are not very helpful in determining the relative impor-
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Table 4.5: Cultural/Behavioral Outgroup Affect and Voting for Hypothetical Can-
didate
Independent Variables Coefficient Estimates
Muslim Cue -2.65
(.68)
Ethnicity Cue (U.A.E) -2.14
(.69)
Both Muslim and Ethnicity Cue -2.64
(.66)
Cultural/Behavioral Outgroup Affect -.48
(.87)
Muslim Cue X Cultural/Behavioral Outgroup Affect 4.93
(1.27)
Ethnicity Cue X Cultural/Behavioral Outgroup Affect 3.97
(1.23)











Notes: Muslim cue refers to hypothetical candidate who is Muslim; ethnicity cue indicates
candidate from the United Arab Emirates; both cues refer to candidate who is Muslim
and from the United Arab Emirates.
Cultural/Behavioral outgroup affect ranges from 0 to 1, higher values being warmer.
The model is estimated among mainstream Americans.
The cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
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tance of ethnocentrism across treatment groups. Do we see a differentiation across
treatments in terms of ethnocentrism’s conditioning influence on vote choice? The
best way to compare the relative effects in non-linear interactive models is through
computing predicted probabilities for each scenario. I calculated the predicted prob-
ability of ‘very likely’ voting for the candidate, and depicted them in figure 4.3.
There are a couple of important points about the figure. First, as expected, the
curve for the control group candidate is almost flat. Ethnocentric evaluations have
no conditioning effect on the likelihood of very likely voting for a mainstream can-
didate. Second, all other curves, regardless of the minority status, follow a similar
pattern. That is, when mainstream Americans hear about a Muslim or an Arab
candidate, they do not distinguish between them. They are members of the same
band, band of others. Last, there is a clear conditioning effect of cultural/behavioral
outgroup affect on voting likelihood across the treatment groups. As mainstream
Americans’ attitudes toward these minority groups grow warmer, they become more
supportive of a Muslim or an Arab candidate. The predicted probability curves for
the treatment groups start at lower levels than the control group curve, and end
at much higher levels as attitudes toward cultural/behavioral outgroups grow more
positive. To sum up, it may not be wrong to conclude that mainstream Amer-
icans’ willingness to support a Muslim or an Arab American candidate is highly
conditioned by their generalized attitudes toward cultural/behavioral outgroups.
Even though ethnocentric evaluations play a huge role in voting for a Muslim
or an Arab American candidate, we need to test whether there may be other al-
ternative explanations such as political orientations, authoritarianism, and religious
110
Figure 4.3: Cultural/Behavioral Outgroup Affect and Voting for a Hypothetical
Candidate
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traditionalism. Since voting is a political process, individuals’ political preferences,
such as party identification or ideology or both, may be triggered when it comes to
voting for a minority candidate. For example, we would expect that Democrats and
liberals are more likely than Republicans and conservatives to vote for a Muslim or
an Arab American candidate. Even though political choices do not play a major role
in predicting prejudice toward Muslim Americans (please see the previous chapter),
they may kick in during voting. I estimated a fully interactive ordered logit model
with the same set of treatments interacted with political orientations (average score
on party identification and ideology) which range from Strong Democrat/extremely
liberal to Strong Republican/extremely conservative. The coefficient estimates are
in table 4.6. They suggest that mainstream strong Democrats/extremely liberals
are more likely to vote for a Muslim and a Muslim/Arab American candidate when
compared to a mainstream candidate. The negative coefficient on ethnicity cue may
indicate less willing to vote for Arab American candidate among the same group
of people but the standard error around it is quite large. As people get more Re-
publican and conservative, their likelihood of voting for the mainstream candidate
decreases. This is a surprising coefficient because the control group candidate is sup-
posed to have neutral policy positions. All of the interactive terms suggest that as
mainstream Americans become more Republican and conservative their likelihood
of voting for a Muslim or an Arab American candidate decreases.
Since this is a nonlinear model, the relative impact of political orientation
across treatment groups cannot be gathered by looking at the raw coefficients and
their standard errors. This is why I computed predicted probability of ‘very likely’
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Table 4.6: Political Orientations and Voting for Hypothetical Candidate
Independent Variables Coefficient Estimates
Muslim Cue .92
(.37)
Ethnicity Cue (U.A.E) -.03
(.36)
Both Muslim and Ethnicity Cue .55
(.38)
Party Identification and Ideology -1.13
(.48)
Muslim Cue X Party Identification and Ideology -2.69
(.63)
Ethnicity Cue X Party Identification and Ideology -.74
(.66)











Notes: Muslim cue refers to hypothetical candidate who is Muslim; ethnicity cue indicates
candidate from the United Arab Emirates; both cues refer to candidate who is Muslim
and from the United Arab Emirates.
Political orientation refer to individuals’ mean ratings on party identification and ideology.
It ranges from 0 to 1, strong Democrat/very liberal to strong Republican/very conservative.
The model is estimated among mainstream Americans.
The cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
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voting for the hypothetical candidates for each treatment across the value of po-
litical orientations. They are in figure 4.4. The figure suggests that there is some
conditioning effect of political orientations among mainstream strong Democrats
and extremely liberals. They are willing to support a Muslim and an Arab/Muslim
candidate more than they support a mainline candidate. But, the difference in pre-
dicted probability is around 20 and 15 percentage points, so the change is not as
dramatic as we observe in the case of cultural/behavioral outgroup affect. There is
some conditioning effect of political orientations but it is minimal.
Figure 4.4: Political Orientations and Voting for a Hypothetical Candidate
One of the most important social psychological processes that may influence
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people’s willingness to vote for a minority candidate concerns authoritarian person-
alities. When mainstream Americans hear about a Muslim or an Arab American
candidate, their authoritarian tendencies may be triggered, and as a result, they
may become less supportive of such a candidate. In table 4.7, I present a fully inter-
active ordered logit model where I test the conditioning effect of authoritarianism
on voting likelihood for a Muslim or an Arab American candidate. The least au-
thoritarian mainstream Americans seem to be more supportive of such a candidate
but the variability around the coefficients is a lot higher than the estimates. So,
the effect is not statistically significant. As authoritarian tendencies increases, the
likelihood of voting decreases for the control group candidate but this is also not a
significant effect. In terms of interactive terms, the signs suggest that as mainstream
Americans become more authoritarian, they become less likely to vote for a Muslim
or an Arab American candidate.
In order to assess the conditioning effect of authoritarianism, I computed the
predicted probability of ‘very likely’ voting across the treatment groups. They are
presented in figure 4.5. We see some conditioning effect at the higher end of the
authoritarianism scale. As mainstream Americans become more authoritarian, their
probability of ‘very likely’ voting for a Muslim or an Arab American candidate
decreases when compared to that for the control group candidate. The difference in
predicted probability is less than 20 percentage points across all treatment groups.
Like political orientations, the conditioning effect of authoritarianism is far weaker
than that of attitudes toward cultural/behavioral outgroups.
One last important effect may be mainstream Americans’ religious tradition-
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Table 4.7: Authoritarianism and Voting for Hypothetical Candidate
Independent Variables Coefficient Estimates
Muslim Cue .16
(.47)
Ethnicity Cue (U.A.E) .38
(.46)




Muslim Cue X Authoritarianism -1.27
(.78)
Ethnicity Cue X Authoritarianism -1.47
(.80)











Notes: Muslim cue refers to hypothetical candidate who is Muslim; ethnicity cue indicates
candidate from the United Arab Emirates; both cues refer to candidate who is Muslim
and from the United Arab Emirates.
Authoritarianism ranges from 0 to 1, higher values being more authoritarian.
The model is estimated among mainstream Americans.
The cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 4.5: Authoritarianism and Voting for a Hypothetical Candidate
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alism. As their level of traditionalism increases, they may be less likely to vote for a
Muslim or Arab American candidate. Their view of Bible, importance of religion in
their life, level of church attendance, and frequency of prayer may kick in when they
hear about a candidate who is a Muslim. To test this hypothesis, I ran a fully inter-
active ordered logit model, and the coefficient estimates are presented in table 4.8.
The constitutive terms indicate that those who are not religiously traditionalist are
more likely to vote for a minority candidate. However, the standard errors around
these estimates are quite large. The interactive terms indicate that as mainstream
Americans grow more traditionalist, they become less likely to vote for a Muslim or
an Arab American candidate. The best way to see the conditioning effect, as in the
previous cases, is through a figure of predicted probability of ‘very likely’ voting,
which is shown figure 4.6. As the figure suggests, there is some sort of conditioning
effect among traditionalist people. They are less likely to vote for a candidate who
is Muslim or an Arab or both. The difference in predicted probability of voting is
around 10 percentage points. Like in the case of political orientations and author-
itarianism, the conditioning effect of religious traditionalism is less stronger when
compared to that of attitudes toward band of others.
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Table 4.8: Religious Traditionalism and Voting for Hypothetical Candidate
Independent Variables Coefficient Estimates
Muslim Cue .02
(.25)
Ethnicity Cue (U.A.E) .04
(.24)




Muslim Cue X Religious Traditionalism -1.55
(.45)
Ethnicity Cue X Religious Traditionalism -1.06
(.48)











Notes: Muslim cue refers to hypothetical candidate who is Muslim; ethnicity cue indicates
candidate from the United Arab Emirates; both cues refer to candidate who is Muslim
and from the United Arab Emirates.
Religious Traditionalism ranges from 0 to 1, higher values being more traditionalist.
The model is estimated among mainstream Americans (non-Latino and non-Jewish whites).
The cell entries are ordered logit coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Figure 4.6: Religious Traditionalism and Voting for a Hypothetical Candidate
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4.6 Conclusion
Politically unsophisticated voters use many shortcuts to make sense of poli-
tics and vote accordingly. One of those shortcuts is a political candidate’s socio-
demographic characteristics, such as gender, race, and religion. Particularly, if a
candidate belongs to a highly stereotyped minority group, then socio-demographic
characteristics may play a bigger role. As I showed in the previous chapter, Muslims
and Arabs are among one of the most disliked minorities in the United States. So,
we would expect that a Muslim or an Arab American candidate may find it difficult
to find support among mainstream Americans.
In this chapter, I showed that a Muslim or Arab American candidate will be
less likely to be elected when compared to a candidate with no minority features.
Mainstream Americans’ attitudes toward the band of others have significant impacts
on the likelihood of voting for a Muslim or an Arab American candidate. Belong-
ing to a highly prejudiced religion or ethnicity, Islam and Arab, triggers mainstream
Americans’ ethnocentric evaluations which provide easily accessible heuristics in vot-
ing decisions. Those who feel warmer toward gays and lesbians, welfare recipients,
and illegal immigrants are more likely to vote for a Muslim or an Arab Ameri-
can candidate when compared to a mainstream candidate. It is also possible that
political orientations, authoritarianism, and religious traditionalism may play a sig-
nificant role in voting for a Muslim or an Arab American candidate. My findings
suggest that they have minimal or no conditioning effect on the likelihood of voting
for a minority candidate. The major influence on voting decision for a Muslim or
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5.1 Rumor in Action
Sixty-seven year old Kathy Mayhugh who is a retired medical transcriber in
Jacksonville, Florida said during a Tea Party protest that “I just feel he [Obama]
is getting away from what America is. He’s a socialist. And to tell you the truth, I
think he’s a Muslim and trying to head us in that direction, I don’t care what he
says. He’s been in office over a year and can’t find a church to go to. That doesn’t
say much for him” (Zernike and Thee-Brenan April 14, 2010, emphasis added).
Even though the Tea Party demonstration in Florida was to protest taxation policy
just before national tax day, Ms. Mayhugh chose to mention her anger toward Pres-
ident Obama rather than criticizing the out-of-control public spending and budget
deficits in the U.S. For her, Obama is not only an anti-American socialist, but also
a Muslim. Several polls also find that around 10 percent of Americans think he was
not born in America, and another 12 percent are not sure (Research 2000, July 27).
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So, almost one in four Americans do not think that he was born in America. It may
not be wrong to say that Ms. Mayhugh’s anger and the saliency of birthers are con-
crete examples of prevailing ethnocentric attitudes among mainstream Americans:
Obama is an outsider; he is not American enough; he was not even born in America;
he is a socialist; and, he is a Muslim. He plays many instruments in the “band of
others”.
Among all the negative evaluations of Obama, arguably the most persistent
one concerns him being a Muslim. This misperception about his faith has always
been salient. Polls conducted during and after the 2008 campaign show that a
non-negligible portion of the American population think Obama is a Muslim. For
example, the Pew pre- and post-election surveys show that between 10 and 15
percent of Americans believe this rumor. As figure 5.1 shows, belief in this rumor
has been highly persistent as well. The most recent poll by Harris Interactive in
April 2010 showed that the number of people believing this rumor has more than
doubled. There may be several reasons for this huge jump. First, the rumor may
have become highly salient since the end of the election. In fact, this pattern is very
visible in the Pew data, too. Over time, Democrats are less likely while Republicans
are more likely to say Obama is a Muslim. Second, the Harris Interactive and
Pew polls use two radically different sampling techniques. Pew surveys use random
digit dialing telephone surveys whereas Harris Interactive employs a voluntary opt-
in method for online surveys. Even though the numbers do not agree across these
two types of surveys, it is obvious that the saliency of this misperception is real and
highly durable.
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Figure 5.1: Misperception Over Time
This chapter attempts to answer two questions: first, investigating what fac-
tors determine who holds this misperception; second, whether this misperception
had any electoral impact on the 2008 presidential election. The empirical analyses
show that white Americans’ attitudes about religious minorities shape the likelihood
of associating Obama with Islam. Surprisingly, racial or ethnic minority attitudes
play a minimal role in predicting individuals’ tendency to believe that he is a Mus-
lim. Electorally speaking, it would be logical to find that those who think Obama
is a Muslim are less likely to vote for him due to the low favorability of Muslims
in American public opinion, as the previous chapters show. In this chapter, by
using the 2008-2009 American National Election Studies Panel Data, I show that
the influence of this misperception is independent of many potential confounding
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factors such as party identification, emotional reactions against Obama, black fa-
vorability, economic evaluations, foreign policy attitudes, thoughts on affirmative
action, and the socio-demographic characteristics of non-Latino white Americans.
In accordance with the broader claim of the chapter, I also examine the influence
of attitudes toward the band of others on vote choice. The rumor is electorally
consequential under any model specification. It also shapes the level of political
participation among the same group of people. Those who thought Obama was a
Muslim felt less enthusiastic about taking part in politics.
5.2 Racial Attitudes and the 2008 Elections
The 2008 Elections witnessed a hopeful and successful African American leader
running for the highest political office in the United States. After a remarkable cam-
paign, Barack Obama became the first African American president of the country.
In a nation long divided by its struggle with race, his campaign rarely talked about
race and race related topics. Obviously, the low level of attention to race did not
mean that racial politics did not play a role in this election. In fact, racial prejudice
may have been at the heart of the campaign. But, there was something more than
race per se during Obama’s campaign. He had to directly address rumors about
being of Islamic faith. Kristof (March 9, 2008, 13) of the New York Times argued
that “the most monstrous bigotry in this election isn’t about... race... It’s about
religion”, or, more specifically, the belief by a considerable number of Americans
that Obama is, either secretly or openly, a Muslim. And, this misperception is, as
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figure 5.1 suggests, quite enduring and not just a one-time rumor.
I argue that there has been an active campaign designed to continue this
misperception and portray Obama as not being American enough. He has a middle
name, Hussein, that is very common among Middle Eastern people. Both of his
fathers, biological and legal, have close ties with Islam. He attended a school in
Indonesia where most, if not all, of his friends were Muslims. Although the school he
attended followed a secular curriculum, it was called a “madrasah” which triggered
extremely negative reactions in American public opinion after programs, exclusively
aired on Fox News, focused on this word.1 Also, the belief that he was not even
born in America was another mechanism used to reinforce this misperception after
the election was over. In the end, many conservative elites attempted to show the
non-American roots of Barack Obama rather than attacking him on racial grounds,
which were observed, for example, during the Reagan campaign. It was more than
him being black. Most of the minority related debates concerning Barack Obama
referred to his “foreignness” or outsider features.
Given that Muslims are one of the most negatively evaluated minority groups
in American (please see previous chapters, and Kalkan, Layman and Uslaner (2009)),
there may not be a better way to de-Americanize a candidate than by associating
him/her with Islam. By being a “closet Muslim,” Obama became a foreigner. Mus-
lims are part of an unpopular band of others (please chapter 3) so labeling him
as Muslim associates him with some real “others in American society. By calling
1The word madrasah, in Arabic, means nothing but a place where learning and studying are
done.
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him a Muslim, he is implicitly associated him illegal immigrants, welfare recipients,
atheists, homosexuals, and Latinos. So, this misperception was a clear implication
of band of others.
Even though the most salient and visible socio-demographic feature of him
was his racial identity, conservative elites preferred to show his lack of American
roots rather than stereotype his racial background through spreading this misper-
ception about his faith. Undeniably, race-specific attitudes played a huge, if not
the biggest, role in terms of minority attitudes in this election—but it was not just
about being black. This is why I also argue that this misperception, its non-trivial
visibility among the American public and stability over time, is another form of
mainstream Americans’ ethnocentric attitudes. Or, as I try to develop through-
out my dissertation, it is mostly about the band of others rather than one specific
group.2
5.2.1 Prejudice and Political Behavior
Prejudice among white voters has been shown to be electorally consequential
in terms of voting for a minority candidate. For example, Terkildsen (1993) and
Moskowitz and Stroh (1994) find that white voters are less likely to vote for a hy-
2It may also be argued that labeling him as a Muslim was an effort to talk about race without
talking about race. Since talking about race is no longer acceptable in American politics, the
Muslim charge may be used as a way to point out his “otherness without mentioning that he is
black.
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pothetical African American candidate as opposed to a white challenger.3 A recent
study by Piston (2010) concerning white voters’ behavior in the 2008 presidential
election finds that explicit racial stereotypes (particularly among Democratic white
voters) conditioned the likelihood of voting for Obama. In other words, racial prej-
udice was a major determinant in this election. To illustrate this effect in a simpler
way, a pie chart depicting the two-party presidential vote in the 2008-2009 ANES
Panel Data clearly shows that John McCain would have been the winner of the
election if the American public had been an all-white nation and the election was
decided on popular vote rather than by the Electoral College.4
However, I argue this election was not just about the role of prejudice in terms
of race—it was also about religion. In the previous chapter regarding voting for a
hypothetical Muslim/Arab candidate, I showed the strong effect of generalized cul-
tural/behavioral affect on voting decisions, along with other studies that measure
the role of religious prejudice in public opinion (Converse et al. 1961, McDermott
2007, Wilson 2007, McDermott 2009). The highly durable and salient mispercep-
tion about Obama’s faith being Islam, then, is expected to have an impact on white
Americans’ electoral choices in addition to racial prejudice. Attitudes toward Is-
lam may be considered another expression of attitudes toward the band of others
3In contrast, there are other studies that show almost no or minimal effect of prejudice on
voting for African American candidates (Sigelman et al. 1995, Highton 2004, Citrin, Green and
Sears 1990).
4This finding is also confirmed by many other public opinion surveys such as the 2008 ANES




2008 Presidential Vote Choice
In both waves (pre and post) among white respondents
55%
45%
Figure 5.2: Two Party Presidential Vote Choice among White Voters (Source: 2008-
2009 ANES Panel Data)
in addition to just anti-black prejudice. Therefore, it is closely associated with
the ethnocentric predispositions of American public opinion, and this, like in the
hypothetical candidate example, will shape electoral decisions.
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5.2.2 Misperception and Political Implications
To examine the relationship between the misperception about Barack Obama’s
faith, the band of others, and the political behavior of white5 voters, I use the 2008
and 2009 ANES Panel Data. It is a telephone-recruited Internet panel with two
cohorts. The cohorts were recruited in late 2007 and the summer of 2008 using
random-digit-dialing (RDD). Knowledge Networks called each number to recruit
for the panel through an extensive interview. Prospective respondents completed
surveys on the Internet for 30 minutes each month for 21 months, from January 2008
through September 2009. To minimize panel attrition and conditioning effects, only
8 of the 21 monthly surveys were entirely about politics. Other surveys were about
a variety of non-political topics, using questions not written by the ANES. The
panelists answered political questions prepared by the ANES in January, February,
June, September, October, and November 2008, and in May and July 2009.6
I chose this dataset because it includes close-ended questions about Obama’s
and McCain’s religious affiliations. They appeared only on two waves—in September
(pre-election) and November (post-election) 2008. The questions read as “What is
Barack Obama’s (John McCain’s) religion?”, and the respondents are given five
response options, namely Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, and not religious,
5Throughout this chapter, the term “white” refers to non-Latino white respondents.
6So far, only the 2008 data have been released by the ANES. For a more detailed explanation
of the sampling method and other details regarding the dataset, please see study page of the
2008-2009 ANES at www.electionstudies.org
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along with a “don’t know” option.7 Among everyone 23 (pre-election) and 22 percent
(post-election) think that Obama is a Muslim. The proportions jump a little bit
among white voters: one in four thinks that he is a Muslim.8 Across the two waves,
66 percent of the white respondents hold the same belief that Obama is a Muslim.
The pairwise correlation and tetrachoric rho (ρ) between the two waves are .56 and
.80, respectively.
The socio-demographic and political profile of whites who believe this rumor
reveal some initial ideas about their potential voting behavior. For example, ac-
cording to the pre-election survey, they are mostly middle aged (the median age is
48) high school graduates who make less than $50,000 annually and are less likely
to be from the West Coast as opposed to other regions. The misperception hits
both genders equally, females being slightly more likely to think Obama is a Mus-
lim. They identify themselves as independent leaning toward the Republican Party
and slightly conservative, on average. This profile looks almost identical in the
post-election survey as well.
We would expect individuals with these socio-demographic characteristics to
vote for McCain as opposed to Obama even without knowing their idea on Obama’s
7Well below 1 percent say Obama is Jewish or Buddhist, so they are excluded from the analysis.
Respondent who think Obama is a Muslim are coded to 1, and those who think he is either Christian
or atheist are to 0.
8There is clearly a racial component to this misperception because the percentages drop below
10 (and sometimes 5) percent among African American and Latino respondents. All percentages
are weighted.
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religion. The panel data asked vote choice in all panels. I use the one just before
the election in October so the responses are not contaminated by the candidates’
religious affiliation questions which were asked in September and November. By
using the misperception question from an earlier panel and the vote choice question
from a later panel, we can also assume that this misperception question may have
acted as a treatment on vote choice. A mosaic plot between the misperception
question from September and vote choice from October, in figure 5.3, confirms my
expectation very clearly. Those who believe that Obama is a Muslim are more
likely to vote for McCain. A test of association (χ2 = 60.61, df = 1, p < .0001) and
difference in proportion (p < .0001) indicate that this relationship is statistically
significant.
Even though the bivariate relationship is substantively strong, we cannot be
sure whether the misperception picks up other potentially confounding dynamics
like party identification, social welfare policy attitudes, emotional antipathy toward
Obama, and more importantly, anti-black prejudice. Unfortunately, the ANES
Panel Data did not ask the classical symbolic racism/racial resentment measures
(Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979, Kinder and Sears 1981, Kinder and Sanders 1996)
or explicit racial prejudice questions which are usually gauged through stereotype
questions (Sniderman and Carmines 1997, Feldman and Huddy 2005). Instead, they
asked three specific questions about prejudice toward blacks in the September wave
in which they also asked about the misperception for the first time. The first two
concern how often people have felt admiration and sympathy for blacks. The vari-
ables are 5-category ranging from “never” to “always.” The third question is about
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Figure 5.3: Misperception and Vote Choice (Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Data)
the idea of having a black president, and how much the respondents are pleased
with this. It is also a 5-category variable that ranges from “not pleased at all” to
“extremely pleased.” I conducted a factor analysis out of these three variables, and
both the eigenvalue (2.09) and high factor loadings on all three indicators (.77 or
higher) suggest a one factor solution. I estimated a factor score to measure black
favorability that ranges from 0 to 1—higher scores referring to warmer feelings.
I also expect Muslim prejudice to shape voting behavior in the 2008 presiden-
tial election. If white Americans perceive minorities as multidimensional clusters
rather than absolutely distinct entities, then ethnocentric evaluations about Mus-
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lims may decrease the likelihood of voting for Obama. Also, the misperception
about him being a Muslim may simply reflect anti-Muslim attitudes so in order to
show an independent effect of this rumor, I also control the model for Muslim affect.
It is, unlike the black prejudice factor score, a single variable that asks about the
favorability of Muslims, and it is a 7-category variable ranging from extremely cold
to extremely warm. In order to measure attitudes toward the band of others, I con-
ducted factor analysis among attitudes toward Hindus, atheists, blacks, and Latinos
which are measured with 7-category favorability scales.9 The factor analysis with
oblique rotation showed that, like in the third chapter, there are two dimensions
in attitudes toward minorities. While affect toward Hindus and atheists load (.81
and .85, respectively) on one dimension (eigenvalue = 1.45), attitudes toward Lati-
nos and blacks (.90 and .88, respectively) load on a second dimension (eigenvalue
= 1.66) among white Americans. I called the first dimension as religious minority
affect, and the second one as racial/ethnic minority affect. The structure is a very
similar replication of the structure I found in the third chapter. Opinions about
band of others are persistent and multidimensional.
It can also be argued that the misperception is a covert expression of emotional
reactions against Obama. Emotions, according to many scholars, play a substantial
9I did not include attitudes toward Muslims into this factor analysis due to high collinearity with
the misperception. Inclusion of this variable into the specification creates highly inflated standard
errors. Also, theoretically speaking, people who dislike Muslim may be more likely than others
to think that Obama is a Muslim. This potential confounding relationship will pose endogeneity
problems.
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role in political evaluations because they may act as informational shortcuts for
many people (please see Marcus (2000) for an extended review). For example, Mar-
cus and MacKuen (1993) find that emotions provide efficient tools for uninformed
people to engage in meaningful deliberations. Conover and Feldman (1986) find
that emotional reactions hold a significant place in political evaluations, like atti-
tudes toward the economy. Stangor, Sullivan and Ford (1991) find that emotional
evaluations outperform cognitive measures, like stereotype questions, in predicting
prejudice. Likewise, Jackson and Sullivan (1989) find that negative affect plays
a crucial role in determining prejudice toward homosexuals. So, emotional reac-
tions against a black presidential candidate may be expected to be a significant
determinant of electoral decisions. The 2008-2009 ANES Panel Data asked four
questions about how Obama elicits emotional reactions: “When you think about
Barack Obama, how angry/afraid/hopeful/proud does he make you feel?” They
are five-category variables ranging from positive to negative evaluations depending
upon the question. A factor analysis out of these four measures yields an eigenvalue
of 2.77 on the first factor which explains more than 77 percent of the variance among
all of these variables. Thus, I created a factor score which ranges from 0 to 1, with
higher values indicating more antipathy toward Obama.10
10Factor scores measuring black prejudice and Obama unfavorability are highly correlated with
each other (.38). A model that includes both of these variables will have artificially inflated
standard errors due to multicollinearity, and, even, theoretically meaningless signs. In fact, when
I run such a model with these two variables, I get high sampling variances and theoretically wrong
signs. Therefore, there will be two separate models: one with black prejudice, and one with Obama
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Since the dependent variable is vote choice, a model that tries to prove an in-
dependent effect of the rumor on the vote should take several theoretically necessary
factors into account. Party identification is arguably the most crucial determinant
of electoral decisions (Campbell et al. 1960, Bartels 2000), and it is measured as
a 7-point scale ranging from strong Democrats to strong Republicans. I used the
first wave party identification question to isolate any campaign effect over time.
The model findings do not change with respect to the timing of party identifica-
tion because the inter-wave correlation for party identification is above .88 among
white respondents. I also included a measure of ideological self-identification (7-
point scale raging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative) into the model
that explains the likelihood of believing Obama is a Muslim.
Among all other theoretically relevant variables for vote choice, economic eval-
uations may play an unquestionably important role, given the dramatic financial
meltdown and concomitant fiscal crises starting in the summer of 2008 onwards.
Either retrospectively (Fiorina 1978, 1981) or prospectively (MacKuen, Erikson and
Stimson 1992, Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson 2002), the public may decide on a
candidate based on the national (Kinder and Kiewiet 1981) (or personal (Downs
1957)) economic circumstances. This is why the vote models will include both
retrospective and prospective national economic evaluations. Both are from the
June panel so that they reflect evaluations at the time when the financial downturn
started to be highly salient. Both range from 1 to 5, and higher scores denote higher
unfavorability. Affect toward Muslims is included in the model with black favorability to have a
fair comparison.
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pessimism about the economy.
There are two important issue attitudes that the vote model predicting Obama
support should have: opinions on affirmative action and the Iraq War. There is a
common, but empirically wrong, belief that most of the people receiving welfare
are African Americans. Therefore, opinions on affirmative action may shape the
likelihood of voting for an African American leader. The 2008-2009 ANES panel
asked a more specific question about affirmative action in university admissions: “Do
you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose allowing universities to increase the
number of black students studying at their schools by considering race along with
other factors when choosing students?” It is a 7-category variable ranging from
strongly oppose to strongly favor, and it is recoded to range from 0 to 1. The Iraq
war was another important campaign topic in the 2008 presidential election, and
the candidates (Obama and McCain) differed radically on a schedule for withdrawal
from Iraq. The ANES asked a specific question about this timeline for Iraq: “Do
you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose setting a deadline for withdrawing
all U.S. troops from Iraq?” It is also a 7-category variable, ranging from strongly
oppose to strongly favor, and it is recoded to range from 0 to 1.
Exit polls showed that Obama increased the Democratic vote margins when
compared to the 2004 percentages everywhere except among Southern whites. There-
fore, the vote model will also control for the regional effects through a binary variable
for Southern residence. Among other socio-economic indicators gender and age of
the respondent may also affect voting decisions. A majority of white females, ac-
cording to the 2008-2009 ANES panel data, voted for McCain, and this relationship
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is statistically significant (χ2 = 5.42, df = 1, p < .02). Income and education levels
of the respondents are also included in the model.
5.3 Who Believes This Misperception?
Before getting into the electoral consequences of the misperception, an impor-
tant question should be addressed comprehensively. What made white Americans
believe this rumor that Obama was a Muslim? Was it purely partisan? Did racial
attitudes play a role? Or, was it mostly due to religious minority affect? I argue that
one dimension of the band of others, namely religious minority affect (a dimension
that explains attitudes toward atheists and Hindus), played a substantial role in
shaping white Americans’ belief about Obama’s religion. Since the misperception is
itself about associating a prominent political figure with a highly stereotyped reli-
gion, this expectation should not be surprising. Racial and ethnic minority attitudes
may find their impact in emotional reactions against Obama, which can be a strong
control in a model that attempts to measure the impact of religious minority affect
on the probability of believing Obama is a Muslim.
I estimated a probit model with the misperception as the dependent variable,
and the findings are depicted in figure 5.4. Affect toward the band of others is
measured with two dimensions estimated from factor analysis. Obama unfavorabil-
ity indicates emotional evaluations of him. Since sophistication may play a crucial
role in believing this rumor, I also included education as a control variable.11 Re-
11Unfortunately, the dataset does not include factual knowledge questions.
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publicans and conservatives may be more likely that Democrats and liberals to
associate Obama with Islam so the model has controls for political orientations as
well. Regional effect is measured with a dichotomous variable in which Southern
white Americans are coded to 1, and all else to 0. All variables in this model are
coded from 0 to 1.
Figure 5.4: Explaining the Misperception and Band of Others
The model findings empirically support my expectations about the impact of
the band of others on the likelihood of calling Obama a Muslim. Both dimensions of
the band of others show that as the level of prejudice toward minorities, as a whole,
increases, the probability of associating him with Islam increases after controlling
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for emotional unfavorability against him, sophistication, political orientations, and
region of residence among white Americans. In other words, the generalized nature
of outgroup attitudes played a substantial role in determining who is more likely
to believe this rumor. Ethnocentric bigotry was a major actor. Particularly, the
religious minority dimension of the band of others played a considerable role when
compared to the ethnic/racial dimension. That is, people’s opinions about atheists
and Hindus play a statistically significant role. However, a relatively wider sampling
variance around racial/ethnic minority affect prevents it from exerting a statistically
significant influence on the likelihood of calling Obama a Muslim. A thorough exam-
ination of the substantive impact of these variables on the rumor also confirms this
picture. The change in the predicted probability of calling Obama a Muslim as you
move from the most prejudiced to least prejudiced attitudes toward racial/ethnic
minorities is 2 percentage points, holding all other variables at their observed values.
The same move in religious minority affect, on the other hand, leads to a change of
10 percentage points in the likelihood of calling Obama a Muslim. The highest sub-
stantive effect comes from emotional reactions against Obama, and white Americans
with the most unfavorable evaluations against him are 15 percentage points more
likely than the ones with the least unfavorable reactions to call Obama a Muslim,
when all other variables are held at their actual values. Interestingly, neither party
identification nor ideological orientation of white Americans play a significant role
when compared to the statistical and substantive significance of the opinions about
the band of others.
These findings support the hypothesis that racial politics played a much bigger
141
role in the 2008 presidential election than most people thought. However, the nature
of the prejudice was not just about historically important anti-black attitudes. It
was mostly about religious and other behavioral minorities, and the Muslim misper-
ception about Obama was largely shaped by this generalized attitude toward the
band of others. The effect is robust even when strict controls, including candidate
evaluations, political orientations, and sophistication, are taken into account. Peo-
ple who are prejudiced toward religious minorities, more so than toward ethnic and
racial minorities, are the ones who are more likely to associate Obama with Islam.
5.4 Misperception and Obama Vote
The next test will examine the electoral consequences of this misperception
under several specifications. The first test will examine the rumor’s influence after
controlling for emotional reactions against Obama. The following test will examine
the effect of the misperception along with anti-black and anti-Muslim prejudice to
compare the relative effects. The final specification will reveal a broader expectation
regarding the relationship between the band of others, religious minority affect, and
the vote choice in the 2008 presidential election.
The dependent variable is two party presidential vote choice in which Obama
voters are coded to 1, and McCain voters to 0. As I mentioned, this is a vote
intent question which was asked in October just after the wave when respondents
were asked about the candidates’ religious affiliations. Due to the binary nature
of the vote choice variable, I estimate probit models with emotional evaluations of
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Obama and prejudice items–blacks and Muslims–separately. The probit coefficient
estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for the two models are depicted in
figure 5.5. The solid circles refer to the model with emotional evaluations of Obama















Misperception and Vote Choice in 2008
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● Black and Muslim Favorability (N = 801, Pseudo R2 = .54)
Figure 5.5: Vote Choice Model (Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Data)
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After controlling for all theoretically relevant variables, like black prejudice,
Obama unfavorability, party identification, and policy evaluations, the mispercep-
tion about Obama being a Muslim has a statistically significant effect on vote choice
in the 2008 presidential election. White Americans who believe the rumor that
Obama is a Muslim are less likely to vote for Obama as opposed to McCain in both
models. The confidence interval around the point estimate does not overlap zero so
the effect in the two models is statistically significant at the .05 level or less. In the
model with the Obama unfavorability measure, whites who believe this mispercep-
tion are 7 percentage points less likely to vote for Obama as opposed to McCain,
when we set all other variables in the model to their observed values. Similarly,
the change in predicted probability is more than 10 percentage points in the model
with black and Muslim prejudice. These movements in predicted probability are
also statistically significant at the .10 level based on the confidence intervals gener-
ated by simulations. So, my major hypothesis about the electorally consequential
nature of this misperception is verified by the model. It diminished the probability
of voting for Obama among white Americans both statistically and substantively.
Additionally, the misperception of Obama’s faith may be considered to exert an
independent effect because the model is very well specified in accordance with pre-
vious scholarship in American public opinion. The model shows that the rumor’s
potential impact may not be just a re-expression of emotional anger toward Obama,
prejudice toward blacks or Muslims, and partisanship. There was much more to it,
and it was electorally consequential.
Another substantively interesting finding concerns the nature of the linkage
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between prejudice and vote choice in the 2008 presidential election. Black and
Muslim prejudice decreased the probability of voting for Obama, on average. It is
interesting, though, to see that a single variable measuring Muslim affect is as strong
as a factor score measuring black prejudice in terms of influencing vote choice. That
is, we would expect much more measurement error in a single indicator variable as
opposed to a multiple indicator measure, and the higher the measurement error, the
higher the sampling variability. However, the standard error around Muslim affect
is much tighter than the standard error around black prejudice which is supposed to
have lower measurement error. In terms of substantive effects, as you move from the
lowest to the highest favorability in black and Muslim affect, whites become 11 and
22 percentage points more likely to vote for Obama, after setting all other variables
to their observed values. A similar story regarding the sampling variability is also
seen in the standard errors around these changes in predicted probabilities. While
the change we observe resulting from Muslim affect has a p-value of .10, the change
as a result of a move in black prejudice has much higher sampling variability.12
All other variables are in the theoretically expected direction. For example, as
whites get more Republican, pessimistic about the past and future situation of the
economy, opposed to affirmative action and a deadline for troop withdrawal from
12While the statistical significance of a change in predicted probability always means significant
change, statistically insignificant change does not necessarily indicate a statistically insignificant
change. The point I want to make here is that we would expect weaker inferential power from a
single indicator variable as opposed to a multiple indicator variable, but that is not the finding in
this case.
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Iraq, they become less likely to vote for Obama controlling for socio-demographic
variables. Among these, economic evaluations and attitudes on the Iraq War reach
conventional levels of statistical significance. And, Southern whites are more likely
than non-Southern whites to vote for McCain in the 2008 presidential election.
Figure 5.6: Band of Others and Vote Choice (Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel Data)
The final probit model, shown in figure 5.6, tests how the misperception shaped
vote choice, along with attitudes toward the band of others through its two di-
mensions (racial/ethnic minority affect and religious minority affect). The findings
strongly support earlier findings. The belief that Obama is a Muslim dampens the
likelihood of voting for Obama controlling for attitudes toward the band of others,
146
political orientations, and other theoretically important variables. In this fully-
specified model, those who believe in the rumor are 15 percentage points less likely
to vote for Obama while holding all other variables at their sample values. Simu-
lations show that the change in predicted probability is statistically significant at
the .10 level. The other expectation regarding the relative importance of religious
minority affect over racial/ethnic minority affect in voting behavior is also both
statistically and substantively supported. The effect of the band of others mostly
works through affect toward atheists and Hindus, rather than blacks and Latinos.
The effect of the former is significantly different from 0. A comparison of substantive
effects also shows a similar story. White Americans who feel the least prejudiced
toward religious minorities are 14 percentage points more likely to vote for Obama
as compared to the ones who are extremely prejudiced toward atheists and Hindus,
when we hold all other model variables at their observed values. The magnitude
of change resulting from racial/ethnic minority affect is 3 percentage points. The
former effect is statistically significant at .10 whereas the latter is not.
5.5 “Obama is a Muslim”: A Negative Ad?
If the rumors about Obama’s faith were electorally consequential, then it may
have also influenced voter turnout and political participation in the 2008 presiden-
tial election.13 Since the 2000 presidential elections, the United States has been
experiencing a continuous increase in voter turnout. It was, for example, around 49
13I want to thank David Leege of the University of Notre Dame for this idea.
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percent in 1996 but hit almost 57 percent (both among the voting age population) in
2008, thereby setting a new record since 1968 (McDonald 2008). The turnout jump
among the young, African Americans, and Latinos was remarkable (Philpot, Shaw
and McGowen 2009, Pettigrew 2009), and the shift was predominantly in favor of
the Democratic Party (Weisberg and Devine 2010). Despite all of these favorable
circumstances in the U.S. electoral base, the promising Democratic candidate was
an African American, and prejudice toward blacks would make some voters not show
up to cast a ballot on Election Day. In fact, Pasek et al. (2009) find, using measures
of both implicit and explicit racism, that racial prejudice was costly for Obama in
terms of both voting behavior and turnout. As a direct effect of anti-black preju-
dice, many Americans “who were otherwise strongly inclined to vote for Obama but
not necessarily strongly inclined to turn out might have chosen to not vote, because
voting for McCain would have been distasteful” (Pasek et al. 2009, 949).14
The rumor about Obama being a Muslim is somewhat related to anti-black
prejudice but it also has an independent electoral effect as I showed in the vote
choice model. It is an expression of a more generalized de-Americanizing campaign
that features ethnocentric attitudes toward outsiders, not just African Americans.
So, we may expect to find that, like anti-black prejudice, white Americans who
14They also looked at the impact of the misperception about Obama’s faith on turnout and vote
choice but they did not find a statistically significant effect. The reason for insufficient evidence,
as Pasek et al. (2009) also acknowledge at the end of the article, may be due to the over controlled
or exploratory nature of the multinomial logit model which has more than eighty variables ranging
from sociodemographic variables to candidate personalities.
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believe that Obama is a Muslim would choose to abstain rather than turnout to
vote. Their negative evaluations toward African Americans and Obama along with
associating him with Islam may decrease the likelihood of voting among many white
voters. Unlike the former two prejudiced attitudes, though, the misperception was
an active and stable component of the presidential campaign. Except a very few
instances like the Rev. Jeremiah Wright incident, the Obama campaign did not
address race-related issues directly. In contrast, they had to issue several campaign
statements, and Obama himself felt it necessary to talk about his Christian faith
to dismiss allegations regarding his faith being Islam. So, the rumor, unlike other
forms of prejudice, may be considered as a negative campaign by conservative elites.
Even though John McCain always talked against the rumor, it became a widespread
campaign tool among conservative radio/TV shows and email chains. “Obama is a
Muslim” was like a negative campaign ad not being aired on TV by the Republican
challenger but everywhere else in the media.
The empirical findings of the effect of negative ads on turnout are mixed.
For example, Ansolabehere et al. (1994), Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995), An-
solabehere, Iyengar and Simon (1999) find that negative advertising demobilizes
electorates by weakening the sense of efficacy or the belief in the responsiveness
of public officials and the electoral system. In contrast, a recent study by Geer
(2006) showed that negative ads boost turnout and political participation. Since
the negative ads are likely to include more substantive and easy information than
positive ads which are usually policy-driven and technical, Geer (2006) argues for
easy knowledge generated by these ads translating into greater political partici-
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pation. A meta analysis of negative political campaign research shows that even
though it stimulates campaign knowledge, its effects are mostly negative in terms of
declining political efficacy, satisfaction, and trust; but not in terms of turnout (Lau,
Sigelman and Rovner 2007). If misperception about Obama can be considered a
negative campaign advertisement, then we would expect a negative impact on both
turnout and political participation among white voters. A hot button rumor like a
presidential candidate being a Muslim is easy information, and it may raise doubts
about his suitability for office because of the Judeo-Christian tendencies in the po-
litical system. That is, voters may feel disappointed as a result of such a rumor
that they would prefer to stay home on Election Day, and refrain from being an
active part of the political system. Initial evidence from the 2008-2009 ANES Panel
Data supports this expectation. The mosaic plot in figure 5.7 depicts the bivariate
relationship between turnout and the misperception among white voters. Those
who associate Obama with Islam are more likely than the others to abstain from
casting a ballot. Almost 15 percent of those who believe in this rumor did not vote
as compared to 8 percent among non-believers. A test of association shows that this
relationship is statistically significant (χ2 = 15.04, p < .0001).
I constructed a political participation index score out of nine items that are
not directly related to voter turnout. They include whether the respondent joined
a march/rally/demonstration, attended a meeting of a town or city government or
school board, signed a petition on the Internet about a political or social issue,
signed a petition on paper about a political or social issue, gave money to a reli-
gious organization, gave money to any other organization concerned with a political
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Figure 5.7: Voting Turnout and Misperception (Source: 2008-2009 ANES Panel
Data)
or social issue, attended a meeting to talk about political or social concerns, invited
someone to attend a meeting to talk about political or social concerns, or distributed
information or advertisements supporting a political or social interest group. They
are all binary choice variables transformed into a single additive index with a re-
liability (Cronbach’s α) of .77. Figure 5.8 shows the distribution of this variable
among the white population as a whole, those who believe Obama is a Muslim,
and those who do not. Those who believe the rumor are less likely to participate
politically when compared to those who think Obama is not a Muslim. Both the bar
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charts and the Gaussian kernel density, which is a non-parametric way of showing
skewness, support the idea that the rumor depressed the level of political activity
among white Americans.
Figure 5.8: Political Participation and Misperception
Obviously, negative campaigns or prejudice are not the only determinants
of turnout and political participation (please see Harder and Krosnick (2008) for
an extensive review of turnout and participation determinants). For example, the
higher someone’s political efficacy, the higher the likelihood of political participation
(Acock, Clarke and Stewart 1985). It can be either internal (the belief in one’s
capability to understand and participate in politics) or external (the belief in the
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responsiveness of political institutions to citizen involvement) efficacy (Rosenstone
and Hansen 2003). Both of them are 5-category variables, ranging from “not at all”
to “a great deal.” They are coded to range from 0 to 1. The higher the value, the
more efficacious the person is so the more likely she will participate. Strength of
partisanship can be another potential determinant of political participation as the
stronger the identification, the more likely the person is to participate (Rosenstone
and Hansen 2003). Across the two parties I coded strong, weak, independent leaners,
and pure independent respondents together. It ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values
indicating stronger partisanship.
Socio-economic status is believed to be crucial in determining political par-
ticipation as well. It is believed that wealthier people may expect more rewards
from voting and participating. They have more to lose depending on the electoral
outcome so they are more likely to vote and participate (Frey 1971, Rosenstone and
Hansen 2003). I measure wealth through personal income which ranges from 0 to 1.
Since formal education strengthens civic skills regarding the ability to understand
how the political processes operate and how to navigate the requirements of regis-
tration, each additional year of education is associated with higher levels of political
participation (Teixeira 1992, Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, Harder and Kros-
nick 2008). It is a 12-category variable in the 2008-2009 ANES Panel Data where
each category refers to years of schooling, 0 being the least and 1 being the highest
number of years. Until the mid-1980s women were less likely than men to vote and
politically participate due to low levels of political efficacy (Arneson and Eells 1950).
They become much more interested in politics and efficacious since the 1990s that
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they now turn out to vote at the same or higher rates as men (Schlozman et al.
1995). The relationship between age and political participation is non-linear. That
is, people become increasingly interested in politics, participate, and vote more be-
tween early adulthood and late adulthood. After about 75, they become less likely
to be involved in politics and participation (Strate et al. 1989, Turner, Shields and
Sharp 2001, Rosenstone and Hansen 2003). I include both age (ranging from 0 to
1) and age-squared terms into the same model to account for this non-linearity.
Unfortunately, since more than 90 percent of the white voters in the 2008-2009
ANES Panel Data reported turnout, it is impossible to fit a non-linear functional
form (probit or logit) with these independent variables. Some of the coefficient
estimates were too big indicating identification problems. This is why I was able
to examine only the political participation index in a multivariate setting. The
dependent variable, as I mentioned earlier, is an additive index score of nine political
participation items. The count nature of it necessitates fitting either a poisson or
a negative binomial model. But, as can be seen from figure 5.8, the distribution is
fairly normal. Hence, I run an ordinary least squares regression which makes the
substantive interpretation a lot easier.15 This is especially true in linear models when
all independent variables have similar ranges. All of the independent variables in the
political participation model range from 0 to 1. The model findings are presented
15Poisson model parameter estimates and standard errors suggest the same level of statistical
and substantive significance as the ones from OLS. I did not fit negative binomial regression




Figure 5.9: Multivariate Analysis of Political Participation and Misperception
As the coefficient estimate on misperception suggests, white Americans who
think that Obama is a Muslim are less likely than the rest to politically participate,
controlling for anti-black prejudice, emotional reactions against Obama, political
efficacy, and all other theoretically relevant variables as discussed. Like the vote
choice example, the impact of this rumor can be considered as independent of all
other prejudice-related dynamics. The negative advertisement nature of the rumor
depressed the willingness to participate in 2008. Similarly, racial prejudice toward
African Americans plays a crucial role as well. As whites get less prejudiced to-
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ward blacks, they become more likely to participate. Since all variables are on the
same scale, we can also say that the effect coming from black favorability has a
substantively large impact on the political participation index score. The influence
of emotional evaluations of Obama is significantly different from 0 but substantively,
when compared to the other measures’ coefficient sizes, the effect is minimal.
Internally and externally efficacious people, as theoretically expected, are more
likely to be active in political and social life. Strong partisans are more likely than
pure independents to participate, on average, under controlled conditions. Females
are no more or less likely than males to have higher scores on the political participa-
tion index. The non-linear nature of the relationship between age and participation
is clearly seen in the figure, too. While the constitutive age term is positive, the
squared term is negative suggesting a concave link. Substantively speaking, age
has the largest impact on participation, indicating the habitual nature of participa-
tion. As people get older, participation may become a regular activity in daily life.
Wealthier and more highly educated people also participate more, on average.
Obviously, there may be many other individual and aggregate level variables
such as voter registration laws (Hanmer 2007, 2009), the quality of candidates and
open seat status (Jacobson 2004), and party contact and canvassing (Gerber and
Green 2000), that could be added to this participation model. However, this par-
simonious model, along with the straightforward bivariate relationships, support
the idea that this misperception was not only electorally consequential but also a
non-trivial factor in shaping turnout and political participation in 2008.
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Conclusion
The 2008 presidential election was an exceptional election. It resulted in the
election of the first African American person to the highest political office in the
United States. His success was remarkable, especially among new voters such as
young people and minorities. Despite all favorable conditions for a Democratic
victory, Barack Obama was denied a landslide vote margin in the election. An
extremely unpopular incumbent president from the Republican Party, an unprece-
dented and devastating financial credit crisis leading to an economic recession, sky-
rocketing unemployment rates, and favorable population shifts toward the Demo-
cratic Party among the youth made many election forecasters expect a wide margin
of victory for Obama (Lockerbie 2008, Lewis-Beck and Tien 2008, Holbrook 2008).
But, he was not able to win a decisive victory, and, actually, he held a minority of
the popular vote among white voters. Lewis-Beck, Tien and Nadeau (2010) later
concluded that the big discrepancy between their forecasted and the realized margin
was due to a lack of racial prejudice measure in their forecasting model. In other
words, according to them, the denial of a landslide for Obama was the result of
anti-black attitudes among whites. Pasek et al. (2009) reach the same conclusion
that racism played a substantial role in the 2008 presidential election.
The models in this chapter simply provide additional evidence for such claims,
and broaden the scope of racial prejudice’s role in the 2008 elections. The impact
of anti-black attitudes on both vote choice and political participation was undeni-
ably strong both statistically and substantively. Whites who hold negative attitudes
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toward blacks were less likely to vote for Obama, turnout to vote, and participate po-
litically. It is terribly unfortunate but not surprising to find such a powerful impact
of racism against blacks in American public opinion due to historical, institutional,
and structural reasons. But, this chapter also shows that anti-black prejudice may
not be the sole factor behind the denial of an overwhelming triumph for Obama.
A misperception about his faith played a key role in that discrepancy as well. A
non-trivial portion of the American population, especially among whites, held the
stable belief that Barack Obama was a Muslim. We also observe this in the statis-
tical and substantive influence of affect toward religious minorities and Muslims on
vote choice. Both the rumor about Obama being a Muslim and prejudice toward
the religious dimension of the band of others diminished electoral support for him
among white voters independent of anti-black prejudice and emotional evaluations
of Obama, and all other theoretically important variables. An examination of this
rumor as a negative campaign advertisement also revealed that it depressed turnout
and the tendency to become involved in political and social life among whites.
Racial attitudes played a crucial role in the 2008 presidential election. Preju-
dice toward African Americans may be the leading force in this dynamic, but not
the only one. It was more than that. A rumor about Obama being a Muslim was
successful in portraying him as an outsider, not American enough, and a member of
many outgroups at the same time. The generalized structure of opinions regarding
religious minorities, or attitudes toward a dimension of the band of others, provides





6.1 Muslims in America and Europe
During my stay at Nuffield College (University of Oxford) as a post-doctoral
fellow, I found many opportunities to compare and contrast Muslim immigrants’
experiences both in the United States and the United Kingdom. Muslim Ameri-
cans, as I showed in the introductory chapter, have mostly middle class experiences
due to their education and income levels. Muslims in Britain, on the other hand,
are overwhelmingly living in lower-class areas, and mostly in their own enclaves.
Muslim Americans are more motivated than their counterparts in Britain to be-
come an integral part of mainstream society. Other than Dearborn, MI, it is hard
to spot a specific location which is densely populated by Muslim immigrants in the
United States. In contrast, everybody knew that the eastern part of Cowley Road
in Oxford was predominantly a Muslim area with lots of halal stores and restaurants
serving Middle Eastern, Pakistani and Afghani food. Through my interactions with
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Muslims in Oxford, I learned that almost all of them sought asylum or refugee sta-
tus, and their case had been waiting at the home Office, the immigration authority
of the United Kingdom. In a colloquial term, they define themselves as “off the
book.” Conversely, the majority of Muslim Americans have legal immigrant status
or citizenship because they came to pursue higher education or operate small busi-
nesses. Another striking difference between the experiences of Muslims in England
and America is the radicalism of the religious leaders. My experiences at mosques
in America have always been peaceful because sermons always condemned violence,
terrorism, and extremism. As a secular person, I felt extremely uncomfortable to
hear many imams’ openly jihadist positions in Britain so I stopped going to mosques
in England.
When compared to Muslim immigrants in England, Muslim Americans are
having a better immigration experience full of education and business opportunities.
It may not be wrong to name them “role models both as Americans and as Muslims”
((Stephens and Reago 2005), emphasis in the original). Unlike British Muslims,
Muslim Americans are willing to become part of mainstream American society (but
see also Peach (1996)). But what makes Muslim Americans want to accept American
ways of life and culture? My experience in England gave me the intuitive answer
to this question. If a Muslim immigrant holds positive attitudes toward out-groups
or out-group related issues, then she or he will not have problems with the idea of
becoming mainstream. In other words, the level of ethnocentrism will be the main
determinant of a minority group’s (like Muslims in Western societies) willingness
to live like mainstream society. Muslim Americans also hold opinions toward the
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band of others, and these attitudes will shape the trajectory of their integration.
As they become more welcoming toward non-Muslims, homosexuals, and increase
the diversity of their friendship network, they will grow positive attitudes toward
becoming mainstream. Level of ethnocentrism will play a central role in Muslims’,
and arguably all other minorities’, assimilation. Income disparities will prevent
most Muslim immigrants from being perceived as mainstream in Europe. However,
the story in America is different and this chapter will show that lower levels of
ethnocentrism among Muslim Americans make them accept mainstream values. By
using the 2007 Pew Muslim American survey, I find that if a Muslim American does
not have any problems with marrying a non-Muslim, accepts homosexuality as a
way of life, and has a diverse friendship network, then she is more willing to think
of herself first as American, accept American ways of life and norms, and speak
English fluently.
6.2 Measuring Assimilation of Muslim Americans
Assimilation is a controversial concept at a theoretical level. There are three
approaches that try to define assimilation at a conceptual level. The classical ar-
gument is the most ethnocentric as compared to the others because it perceives
middle-class Protestant white group as the normative reference category (Alba and
Nee 2005, Jung 2009). Immigrants are measured against whites to determine how
assimilated they are and how “good” they are. As such, the argument is immigrants
should try to “act white”. Assimilation is an inevitable process that follows a non-
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linear process for groups. Some groups may take longer to assimilate, and some may
become assimilated quickly but all assimilate into this dominant category eventu-
ally. Socio-economic mobility or any other ethnicity-specific features of immigrant
groups do not weigh in prominently in this approach to assimilation because it is
an unstoppable process (Alba and Nee 2005).
The neo-classical argument, on the other hand, defines assimilation as a con-
text where ethnic distinctions and cultural differences among all social groups decline
(Alba and Nee 2005). Assimilation is not just for immigrants or minorities but it is a
simultaneous process for all groups, including the mainstream. White Anglo origin
Americans are not considered to be an ideal category for immigrants. Rather, it is
more of a cultural integration that fosters the idea of “living together”. Immigrants
will want to have better jobs, education, houses, and speak English fluently, and
these requests will lead to assimilation without a conscious effort (Alba and Nee
2005).
Finally, the segmented assimilation theory is a counter argument against this
cultural interpretation of assimilation. They argue that simply requesting better
life standards will not be enough. There are contextual factors like recent economic
downturns, rising unemployment, and declining demand for unskilled labor in devel-
oped countries that prevent immigrants from realizing upward mobility (Gans 1992).
This is particularly important in the case of second generation immigrants. Accord-
ing to Portes and Zhou (1993), second generation immigrants have three potential
paths to follow. They may become like the white middle class, decline in socio-
economic status and assimilate into the underclass, or experience rapid economic
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advancement due to tight solidarity among the immigrant community. The vari-
ants that determine which path they will belong to, according to Portes and Zhou
(1993), include financial resources, education, job skills, experience, language pro-
ficiency, government attitude toward immigrant communities, receptiveness of the
“native population”, level of racial prejudice, family structures, and, more impor-
tantly, immigrants’ attitude toward the dominant culture. Unlike the neo-classical
scholars, the segmented assimilation theory does not foresee an automatic and in-
exorable process of integration into the mainstream.
Based on these theoretical approaches, there may be three different ways of
measuring the level of assimilation among immigrant groups. The classical approach
defines assimilation as becoming similar to the dominant category so if an immigrant
calls herself first “American” rather than her racial, ethnic, or religious background,
then she would be considered as “assimilated” by the classical theorists (Huntington
2004). She prioritized being American over her other identifications so she wants
to be a part of the dominant category. The unconscious nature of assimilation,
offered by the neoclassical theorists, can be measured by fluency in English. For
example, if an immigrant answers survey questions in English rather than in her
native language, then the neo-classical theory would consider her as an assimilat-
ing case. Fluency in a nation’s predominant language will facilitate an immigrant’s
cultural assimilation (Staton, Jackson and Canache 2007, De la Garza, Falcon and
Garcia 1996, Rumbaut 1994, Huntington 2004). The third way of observing assim-
ilation would be a perceptual measurement of an immigrant’s willingness to adopt
to the culture and norms of the dominant society. The segmented theory of assimi-
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lation puts a different aspect to assimilation by requesting a positive feeling toward
the mainstream. For example, accepting American values, for them, is a starting
point to experience educational and economic upward mobility, and this may lead to
“complete incorporation into mainstream society within three generations (Gordon
1964).
The 2007 Pew Muslim American Survey has all three different measures of
assimilation. The survey asked the respondents “Do you think of yourself first as
an American or first as a Muslim?”, and almost one in three Muslim Americans
preferred to say “American.” Comparatively, more than three quarters of the main-
stream American population consider themselves first as American as opposed to
“Christian.” The difference in Muslims’ integration into the American and Euro-
pean societies is most visible in this question. Only 7, 13, and 3 percent of British,
German, and Spanish Muslims identify themselves first with the national belonging,
rather than religious tradition, respectively, according to the 2006 Pew Muslims in
Europe survey. Respondents who called themselves first as American are coded to
1, and Muslim to 0.
As a second measure, the interview language is used. 83 percent of Muslim
Americans answered the questions in English. This is a relatively high level of En-
glish proficiency when compared to other immigrant groups like Latinos (71 percent
of Latinos answered questions in English in the 2008 American National Election
Studies, post election survey). If respondents completed the interview in English,
then they coded to 1, and all other languages (like Arabic and Farsi) are coded to
0. As a final way of measuring Muslim Americans’ integration, I will use willingness
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to become American. The survey asked Muslim Americans:
Which comes closer to your view?
1. Muslims coming to the U.S. today should mostly adopt American customs
and ways of life, OR
2. Muslims coming to the U.S. today should mostly try to remain distinct from
the larger American society
Almost half of Muslim Americans thought that they should mostly adopt
American customs and ways of life. One in five Muslim Americans thought that they
should mostly try to remain distinct from the larger American society1. Respondents
in the first category are coded to 1, and the second category to 0.
There will be separate models in which these three different measures of Mus-
lim American assimilation will be the dependent variables. In addition to these
models, I also create a combined variable out of the three variables to get a more
precise estimate of Muslim Americans’ level of assimilation. An exploratory factor
analysis of these variables2 shows that these three variables can be explained by
one factor, with loadings of .72, .68, and .67 for the American identity preference,
1The rest gave voluntary answers of “both” or “neither” but they are excluded from the analysis.
2Exploratory factor analysis of binary variables is not technically correct due to the distribu-
tional assumptions. In the model estimation stage, the dichotomous nature of these variables is
modeled for a more accurate depiction of the underlying dimension. This exploratory analysis is
conducted only to show that these variables are closely related to each other.
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language of interview, and willingness to assimilate variables (eigenvalue = 1.42).
Therefore, I will model this combined score of assimilation among Muslim Americans
as well.
6.3 Assimilation and Ethnocentrism
Immigration to a different country is only the beginning of a long journey
of integrating into mainstream society. It is a long journey because it is mostly a
non-linear process (Chong and Kim 2006). As we see in the experiences of Jews
and Italian Catholics, there are favorable and unfavorable times in this process. It
has many aspects like socio-psychological, cultural, and economic assimilation that
may occur simultaneously or not (Staton, Jackson and Canache 2007). In the end,
assimilated individuals abandon old cultural practices, national attachments, and
other related loyalties to the country of origin (Guarnizo, Portes and Haller 2003).
Earlier generations of European immigrants were role models in leaving most of their
previous attachments and loyalties, and becoming more and more American as time
passed and they become more affluent (Alba and Nee 2005). Recent immigrants, on
the other hand, may not experience the same assimilation story. They may think
that even though they earn economic achievements, there may be some glass ceilings
that limit their willingness to become mainstream (Chong and Kim 2006). Their
attitudes toward mainstream society’s life-styles may be a powerful factor. That
is, prejudice among minority groups toward mainstream people may shape their
willingness to adopt new value systems and behaviors.
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Given that Muslim Americans are mostly middle class, then the socio-economic
obstacles that early immigrants had to cope with may not be a powerful factor in
their willingness to become mainstream American. I argue that the level of eth-
nocentrism or generalized prejudice toward American norms, values, and ways of
life among Muslim Americans will play a crucial role in their journey of integration
into the core American society. Absence of prejudice in both immigrants and main-
stream society is an essential feature of assimilation’s final stages (Rumbaut 1997).
Assimilation requires work from both parties. Even if I elaborate the theory of band
of others around the understanding of mainstream ethnocentrism, ethnocentrism is
not limited to only the major “ingroup”. Kinder and Kam (2009) show that eth-
nocentrism can be found in any individual regardless of race, ethnicity or any other
minority feature. Asian Americans, Latinos, and African Americans can be as eth-
nocentric as white Americans, and ethnocentrism is found in each group in varying
degrees. Thus, ethnocentrism is not a phenomenon that is limited to mainstream
opinion. Muslims are no exception to this rule. Their attitudes toward outgroups
like homosexuals and non-Muslims will make them more or less ethnocentric.
Then, what is the mechanism that explains ethnocentric evaluations and as-
similation? Ethnocentrism, as I defined earlier, refers to a readily available tendency
to see the world in an enemies vs. friends fashion. As ethnocentrism grows stronger,
the distance between the ingroup and outgroup increases. The definition of enemies
and friends becomes more restrictive or exclusive. There are clearly defined enemies
with undesirable qualities, and friends with positive features. If a member of a mi-
nority group holds an ethnocentric worldview, then the most visible outgroup for
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her will be the mainstream society. As this worldview gets more and more ethno-
centric, she will not be willing to become an integral part of this mainstream society.
The mainstream society will be a clear enemy with lots of undesirable norms and
styles. So, the starting point for a successful assimilation should be to minimize
ethnocentrism both in the mainstream society and with the minorities in question.
It is a dual process. I argue that the level of ethnocentrism among minority groups
in general, Muslim Americans in particular, will play a big role in explaining assim-
ilation. My hypothesis is that as Muslim Americans become more positive toward
outgroups in general or less ethnocentric, they will be more willing to assimilate into
mainstream American society.
I will measure outgroup affect (or lack of ethnocentrism) among Muslim Amer-
icans through a combined score of three different variables. The first one concerns
Muslims’ attitudes toward homosexuality. It is shown that homosexuals are one of
the highly stereotyped outgroups almost everywhere, not just in the United States
(Andersen and Fetner 2008). Muslim Americans’ opinions about homosexuals are
no exception to this general tendency. When they were asked in the 2007 Pew Sur-
vey, almost two out of three Muslim Americans thought that homosexuality is a way
of life that should be discouraged by society. Clearly, Muslim Americans evaluate
homosexuality as unacceptable so they draw a clear distinction between themselves
and homosexual people. It is a reliable way of measuring ethnocentrism. I coded
those who think that homosexuality should be accepted by society to 1, and that it
should be discouraged to 0. The second measure for outgroup affect among Muslim
Americans comes from a tendency to accept marrying a non-Muslim. Theologically
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speaking, Islam allows men to marry a non-Muslim women in the expectation of
a conversion but it strictly prohibits intermarriage for women. We observe this
doctrine-based distinction in Muslim Americans’ answers to the question whether
it is okay to marry a non-Muslim. Overall, 62 percent think that intermarriage is
acceptable. While this number reaches 86 percent among immigrant Muslim3 men,
it stays the same among immigrant women. Willingness to accept intermarriage is
considered to be one of the most crucial factors that shape immigrants’ assimilation
process (Gordon 1964, Alba and Nee 2005, Anderson and Saenz 1994, Liang and
Ito 1999, Qian and Lichter 2001). Respondents who are okay with intermarriage
are coded to 1, and those who find it unacceptable to 0. The final measure of out-
group affect is the outgroup composition of friendship network. As the diversity of
close friends increase, the frequency of contact with different groups increase, and
as a result prejudice or stereotype against outgroups may decrease (Allport 1954,
Pettigrew and Tropp 2006). The survey asks Muslim Americans how many of their
close friends are Muslims. Ten percent of immigrant Muslims have only Muslim
close friends, and 8 percent have very few. Forty-five have somewhat diverse friend-
ship networks, and 37 percent have mostly Muslim friends. I coded this 4-category
variable so that the higher the score, the more diverse the friendship network is.
I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to create an underlying outgroup affect
variable out of these three variables. The higher the values on this variable, the less
3By saying immigrant Muslim, I mean those Muslims who are not born in the U.S., or converted
to Islam from other religions such as Christianity.
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ethnocentric Muslim Americans get so that they will be more likely to assimilate4.
6.4 Behavioral Factors of Assimilation
The level of discrimination and other behavioral forms of prejudice among the
dominant society toward minorities can have a significant influence on minorities’
willingness to assimilate and immerse into mainstream society. Worry of being under
constant surveillance by many people or feelings of being subject to prejudice and
discriminated can “reinforce the tendency of minorities to think in group terms”
so they will attribute more importance to race and ethnicity related policies, and
retain their group-specific consciousness (Chong and Kim 2006, 337). In other
words, discriminated minorities will allocate most of their resources in enhancement
of their groups’ status in society by trying to remove inequalities. This will facilitate
a mindset that is configured to think in terms of groups rather than a nation which
will slow down the process of assimilation (Alba and Nee 2005, Chong and Kim
2006) and political integration into the system (Pei-te Lien and Wong 2004).
In the 2007 Pew Muslim American survey, there are three types of discrimi-
4Since the variables are categorical, they are not distributed normally. It would be a violation of
the distributional assumption if the measurement model did not take this feature of these variables
into account. Therefore, I used the Mplus 5.0 program to run both the measurement models and
structural equation models with latent variables because, unlike Stata or any other statistical
packages, Mplus has the ability to model categorical indicators and dependent variables with their
respective distibutions, like Bernoulli, beta, beta-binomial, etc. This is the case for all other latent
variables I used in the final structural model.
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nation questions. The first set concerns worrying about not being hired for a job or
promoted because of being Muslim; being under close surveillance by the govern-
ment in terms of means of communication (like emails and telephone calls) because
of being Muslim; and being treated poorly due to headcover (for men) or headscarf
(for women) because it identifies them as Muslim. They are all 4-category variables
ranging from not at all worried to very worried. I created a latent variable to be
included into the assimilation structural equation models. Higher scores on this
latent variable indicate higher levels of worrying about discrimination.
The second set of questions asks respondents whether they experienced dis-
crimination under several scenarios so it gets at their perceived level of discrimina-
tion. There are four questions in this category asking whether they have experienced
people acting suspicious of them, calling them offensive names, being singled out by
airport security, and being singled out by other law enforcement. They are all binary
response variables, and those who expressed being discriminated against are coded
to 1, and the rest to 0. I created a latent variable out of these 4 binary questions.
Higher scores on this factor means higher level of perceived discrimination.5 The
third variable about discrimination is a more direct question whether respondents
have ever been a victim of discrimination. Those who said yes are coded to 1, and
the rest to 0.
Another set of behavioral factors that may shape Muslim Americans’ assimila-
5Since African Americans suffer “the indignities of racial discrimination to a significantly greater
extent than other minorities” like Latinos and Asian Americans, I included paths coming from being
black Muslim American to these two sets of discrimination in the structural equation models.
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tion journey is the level of religiosity. As religiosity of a minority increases, they may
become more group-oriented which may dampen the speed of integration into main-
stream society. For example, Amyot and Sigelman (1996, 187) find that the most
assimilated Jews are the ones who do not practice Judaism or maintain strong ties
with other Jews in the area. Similar results are also found for religiously committed
Christian Asian Americans and their lack of seeing themselves as an integral part
of larger American society (Pei-te Lien and Wong 2004). In terms of political con-
nectedness to the American political spectrum, Barreto and Bozonelos (2009) show
that high religiosity coupled with discrimination make Muslim Americans dealign
themselves from the two major parties, and identify themselves more and more
as independent. Since neither the Democrats nor Republicans appeal to Islamic
religiosity as much as they “encourage religiosity among Protestants, Jews, and
Catholics,”, religious Muslim Americans cannot find a political home in line with
their belief systems (Barreto and Bozonelos 2009, 4). The structural equation mod-
els in this chapter control for potential impact of religiosity on Muslim Americans’
assimilation as it may play a critical role in assimilation (Foner and Alba 2008). I
measure religious commitment with three observed indicators in line with the work
of Layman and Green (2006). Respondents are asked about how important religion
is for them, how frequently they pray and attend mosques6.
6Unfortunately, I could not include the view of the Koran variable as another indicator because
almost 90 percent of immigrant Muslims think of the Koran as the word of God. There is a
theological emphasis on this aspect of Islam. Anything other than this view would make someone
a non-Muslim theologically so Muslims may feel a moral and religious obligation not to think of the
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6.5 Politics, Demographics and Assimilation of
Muslim Americans
Government policies targeting minorities can play significant roles in the speed
of immigrants’ assimilation into mainstream society (Alba and Nee 2005). Income
inequality, for example, makes it harder for immigrants to move up in the socioeco-
nomic scale (Dye 1969, Hero 1992). Thus, governments that have extensive social
welfare programs promoting egalitarian values help immigrants’ integration. Muslim
Americans are mostly highly educated and middle class so social welfare programs
may not be as important as they are for other minorities in the U.S.
This does not mean that politics has little say in their assimilation. Instead, it
plays a greater role in foreign policy area. After the September 11 terrorist attacks,
the U.S. government launched a war on terrorism which includes pre-emptive policies
such as the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars, and even the PATRIOT Act. Even though
the political architects of these policies try to frame them as against terrorists, not
against Muslims, Muslim Americans have not had very positive attitudes toward
them. According to the 2007 Pew Muslim American survey, more than 85 percent
of immigrant Muslims think that the U.S. government made the wrong decision
about the Iraq War. They are evenly divided regarding the Afghan War. But
overall, when they are asked about whether the U.S. led war on terrorism is a sincere
Koran as written by men. Since age and education may have a significant impact on religiosity,
I included paths from them to this latent variable. Also, African Americans are known to be
religiously more committed so there is also a path from African American Muslims to religiosity.
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effort to reduce terrorism, 60 percent think it is not. So, Muslim Americans may
be resentful about acts and actions of the U.S. government, and this may decrease
their willingness to assimilate into the larger American society. I created a factor
score out of these three binary measures. Higher scores mean being more critical of
U.S. foreign policy7.
There are several socio-economic indicators that are theoretically necessary
in explaining assimilation. The first one concerns the number of years in the U.S.
Among immigrants, research shows that as time passes, assimilation gets easier
because of the increase in familiarity , and frequency of contact with mainstream
society (Gordon 1964, Alba and Nee 2005). Similarly, upward mobility in income
scale and education are believed to hasten assimilation. Importance of generational
differences also makes age of the respondent as a theoretically important variable in
assimilation models (Gans 1992).
6.6 Models and Findings
There are four structural equation models with different dependent variables
measuring the level or willingness of assimilation among Muslim Americans. The
factor loadings of latent variables for each model is presented in table 6.1. For the
7Since all of these policies are predominantly formulated and executed by the Republican ad-
ministration and elites, I included paths from party identification of Muslim Americans to this
latent factor. Party identification is measured by two dichotomous variables, namely Democrats
and Republicans. Independents are the comparison category.
174
fourth combined model, the dependent variable is also a latent variable. Its factor
loadings are presented in table 6.2. One of the loadings for each latent variable in
all models is set to 1 to satisfy the identification condition in structural equation
model.
The first model examines Muslims’ likelihood of calling themselves first Amer-
icans rather than Muslims and their level of outgroup affect. The model and esti-
mates are shown in figure 6.18.
In line with my expectation, those who hold warmer attitudes toward out-
groups and related issues are more likely to call themselves first American rather
than Muslim. If a Muslim American does not hold ethnocentric evaluations about
homosexuals, intermarriage with non-Muslims, and have diverse friendship net-
works, then she sees herself primarily as American as opposed to Muslim. Among
other statistically significant variables, Muslim Americans who were victims of dis-
8The circles refer to latent variables, and rectangles to manifest or observed variables. The
figures do not show measurement indicators which can be found in the previous tables. The loadings
are shown only for the main independent variable, namely outgroup affect. The estimates between
the independent variables and the ultimate dependent variable—assimilation (First American,
English interview, willingness to adopt American customs, and a combined measure of all)—are
logit coefficients. Estimates going toward the latent variables are linear coefficients. Simultaneous
estimation of both the linear and non-linear models are possible within Mplus 5.0. Unfortunately,
the mixed nature of the estimation technique and non-linearity prevent me from computing indirect
and total effects, which are usually reported in linear structural equation models. Therefore, the
only substantive interpretation can be made by referring to the sign and statistical significance of



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6.2: Assimilation Factor Score Measurement Model
Indicators Loadings
Adopt American customs 1.00
Interview in English 2.09
First American 2.05
Source: 2007 Pew Muslim American Survey.
Notes: The models are estimated among immigrant Muslim Americans.
crimination are less likely than other Muslims to call themselves first American.
And, as they become more critical of U.S. foreign policy, they are less likely to iden-
tify themselves as Americans. The model fit of this and other models are presented
in table 6.3. Statistically significant chi-squared values refer to a poor fit but it is ex-
tremely sensitive toward sample size. As the sample size gets larger, like in this case
(N = 525), it becomes impossible to get insignificant p-values. Due to this extreme
sensitivity to sample size, Kline (2005) suggests an alternative way to examine the
chi-squared values: If the quotient after dividing the chi-squared value with degrees
of freedom is less than 3, then the model can be considered to have a good fit. As the
table shows in the second row, the models of the chapter satisfies this threshold so
they can be said to fit the data well. The root-mean-square-approximate (RSMEA)
is a better measure for large samples with non-linear components. The lower the
RMSEA, the better, and the cutoff point is usually .05 or .06. So, both this and all
the other models make the cutoff point in terms of good model fit within structural
equation modeling standards.
As a second way of measuring assimilation, I model the language of the inter-
view being English or not, and the findings are in figure 6.2. This has the best model





























Figure 6.1: Outgroup Affect and American Identification (Pew 2007 Muslim Amer-
ican Survey)
to what we see in the previous model. As Muslim Americans get less ethnocentric
or much warmer toward outgroup related issues, then they are more likely to have a
survey interview in English. Ethnocentrism among Muslim Americans shapes their
proficiency in English. Like the previous case, being critical of U.S. foreign policy
and the victim of discrimination dampen the likelihood of being fluent enough in
English to answer the survey questions. Among the socio-demographic variables,
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Table 6.3: Model Information
Models
Information First American English Interview Adopt Customs Combined
χ2 (df) 153.02* (51) 104.50* (41) 150.87* (51) 133.09* (46))
χ2/(df) 3.00 2.54 2.96 2.89
RMSEA .06 .05 .06 .06
Number of Observations 525
Source: 2007 Pew Muslim American Survey.
Notes: The models are estimated among immigrant Muslim Americans.
* p <.05
unlike the first model, we see that younger and more educated people who have
been living in the U.S. for a long time are more likely to be fluent in English. The
younger generations tend to be more fluent in English due to their socialization
into the American education system earlier than older Muslim Americans. So, this
finding is not surprising.
To measure the cultural aspect of assimilation, I model the willingness to
accept American customs and ways of life as opposed to remain distinct from the
larger American society. Like in the previous models of assimilation, as figure 6.3
shows, lack of ethnocentrism is the driving force behind the Muslim Americans’
attitudes toward mainstream American customs and ways of life. As they get less
and less concerned about homosexuality, intermarriage, and holding a homogenous
friendship network, they become more likely to see the benefits of immersion into
American society. In fact, outgroup affect is the only variable that has a statistically
significant effect on cultural assimilation. Unlike previous models, being a victim
of discrimination or critical of U.S. foreign policy were not playing that much of an



























Figure 6.2: Outgroup Affect and Fluency in English
In the final model depicted in figure 6.4, I try to examine the big picture of
assimilation by combining all of these different but closely interrelated measures of
assimilation into one latent variable. Since the assimilation factor score is an in-
terval level variable, unlike the other models, the paths have ordinary least squares
coefficient estimates not logit estimates. The major finding we observe in the previ-
ous models holds strongly in this case as well. Ethnocentrism, or lack thereof, is a





























Figure 6.3: Outgroup Affect and Willingness to Accept American Customs
drome regarding how they feel about outgroups and related issues determine Muslim
immigrants likelihood of assimilation. In this bigger-picture model, we also see that
being a victim of discrimination has a negative influence on joining the mainstream
society. Likewise, political attitudes about American foreign policy in the Middle
East plays a major role in dampening the likelihood of assimilation. Also, educated
Muslims who live in the U.S. for a longer time have a much easier time becoming
immersed into the larger American society. This model has the best fit to the data
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Figure 6.4: Outgroup Affect and Assimilation Factor Score
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter showed that the theory of Band of Others, or ethnocentrism, is
also a major player in Muslim Americans’ attitudes toward mainstream American
society so it is not just a mindset of the dominant group(s). It can be found every-
where, and it is particularly important for immigrant communities. I showed that
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Muslim Americans are willing to integrate into American society at varying degrees,
and their attitudes toward homosexuals, intermarriage, and the idea of having non-
Muslim friends play a huge role in determining their level of assimilation. What
matters the most for Muslim Americans’ integration is their attitudes toward the
band of others.
It has always been a big question whether Muslim Americans will join other
immigrants, like Jews and Catholics, in terms of being an integral part of the larger
American society. I think this chapter establishes a convincing answer to that ques-
tion. Yes, the attitudes of white Americans toward Muslims is extremely important
but Muslim Americans should work toward this ideal goal as well. As the findings
of this chapter suggest, their evaluations of outgroups will play an essential role in
this. They may become mainstream one day, as long as they leave their exclusionary
view of the world aside, and try to have a more positive attitude toward groups that
are not like them. It is not hard. Jews, for example, are known to be one of the
most tolerant and liberal groups in the U.S., and I am confident that this attitude
helped them become a significant component of American society. Muslims can do
it too. Of course, it will take time to get rid of old-school ethnocentric bigotry, like
it did for other immigrant minorities, but there is a shining hope about a success




7.1 American Democracy and Muslim Americans
Muslims in America have never been this vulnerable before. The September 11
terrorist attacks followed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the most recent
Christmas Day and New York City bombing attempts, reinforced the existing neg-
ative image of Muslims in contemporary American society. The preceding chapters
analyzed the sources and outcomes of this prejudiced image of Muslim Americans
through both an original theoretical framework and a series of empirical tests. This
research shows that many Americans evaluate Muslims primarily through an ethno-
centric lens. I call this mainstream ethnocentrism the Band of Others. It refers to a
multidimensional structure of mainstream ethnocentrism which shapes the presence
or absence of prejudice toward Muslim Americans. Those who welcome blacks, Jews,
Latinos, Asians, homosexuals, illegal immigrants, people on welfare, and feminists
also welcome Muslim Americans. Bigotry does not put clear-cut boundaries among
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minorities. And, dislike of Muslims is no exception to this generalized attitudinal
structure.
The empirical findings also suggest strong influence of the band of others in
American public opinion and political behavior. Ethnocentrism among mainstream
Americans conditions the likelihood of voting for a hypothetical Muslim or Arab
candidate, believing in the rumor that Barack Obama is a Muslim, and voting for
him in the 2008 presidential election. Additionally, this study demonstrates that
ethnocentrism is present among Muslim Americans as well, and it is one of the
strongest factors that shapes willingness to assimilate into mainstream American
society.
The band of others is found to be a powerful dynamic for mainstream society
and Muslim Americans in almost every aspect of American public opinion. V. O.
Key (1961, 535), in Public Opinion and American Democracy, argues that the study
of public opinion is “bootless unless the findings about the preferences, aspirations,
and prejudices of the public can be connected with the workings of the governmental
system.” So, the question is what the theory of the band of others and its empirical
influence on attitudes toward Muslims mean for democratic theory. Normatively,
the welcoming nature of American Democracy for immigrants depends upon how
mainstream society feels about the band of others. Warmer feelings toward the band
will strengthen the dynamic nature of democracy in the United States. Conversely,
as mainstream society gets more racist, xenophobic, homophobic, and anti-Semitic,
the longstanding peaceful nature of American democracy may be harmed. It may be
impossible to completely rid mainstream minds of ethnocentrism, but the govern-
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ment institutions and opinion leaders of society may coordinate to lessen prejudice
toward the band of others.
Muslim Americans’ journey into becoming a part of mainstream society de-
pends largely on the general mood toward this band. Will they move from the rel-
atively disliked band (cultural/behavioral) to the relatively liked one (ethnic/racial
band)? The historical accounts of previous immigrants’ stories show signs of success.
Jews and Catholics suffered from highly prejudiced public opinion but, in the end,
social norms developed much warmer attitudes toward them. Today, they can be
considered as indispensable members of mainstream America. Traumatic terrorist
attacks by radical Islamists made Muslims, unfortunately, one of the most disliked
groups in America. References to the Judeo-Christian foundations of American so-
ciety have been salient during debates about whether Muslims can someday become
part of mainstream American society. It may not be wrong to say that the current
mood among mainstream Americans toward the band of others, not just Muslim
Americans, is not very favorable.
So, I argue that Muslim Americans should take the initiative in terms of
strengthening their willingness to assimilate into American society. Their socio-
demographic features cannot be more favorable for a minority group to show their
good faith in becoming part of the mainstream. Many Muslim Americans, un-
like Muslims in Europe, are highly educated and earn mostly middle class income.
They are self-employed business owners, doctors, lawyers, teachers, and students.
When compared to the first Catholic and Jewish immigrants, these are very favor-
able strengths in terms of integration. These early immigrants had to work a lot
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harder to have better socio-economic status in America. And, this upward-mobility
played, arguably, the most important role in their journey into mainstream soci-
ety. Muslim Americans already mirror middle class America, and this may provide
a positive motive for their story. However, as the final chapter shows, they may
be hit by ethnocentric attitudes, too. The hopes for integration based on their
socio-demographic characteristics may be hindered by the level of prejudice they
hold toward non-Muslims. Negative attitudes toward mainstream society or other
minorities among Muslim Americans may impede the process of integration. There-
fore, Muslims should make their positive socio-economic status salient in the eyes
of mainstream American society, and put their own prejudices aside as much as
possible. Middle class, highly educated, and hard working people have always been
welcomed in the United States, and Muslim Americans should put effort into making
their highly favorable features widely known by everybody in America.
To conclude, the United States has struggled throughout her history with
the saddening history of slavery and dislike toward immigrants from time to time.
But, the people of America have been able to overcome most of these ethnocentric
sentiments. The contemporary United States has been credited for the mutual
understanding of differences among ethnic, racial, and religious groups. Otherwise,
it would be impossible to sustain the longest functioning democracy in the world.
And, as this piece of research shows through multiple empirical tests, the key to this
mutual understanding is attitudes toward the band of others. Positive opinions of
the band of others, coupled with the willingness to blend in by Muslim Americans,
will enhance the strength of the vibrant and affluent democracy in America.
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